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**In the gray zone**



**Copenhagen  
Business School**  
HANDELSHØJSKOLEN

# In the gray zone

With police in making space  
for creativity

**Mia Rosa Koss Hartmann**

PhD Series 39-2014

LIMAC PhD School  
Department of Operations Management

PhD Series 39-2014

# **In the Gray Zone**

**With police in making space for creativity**



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PhD School in Language, Law, Information,  
Operations Management, Accounting and Culture

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*With police in making space for creativity*

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## **Abstract**

What does it mean to be innovative in public organizations? Scholars and policy makers call for public sector organizations to become innovative, whether this is through increasing collaboration, exploring networks or recognizing the innovation that occurs in government. This study contributes to this discussion a critical perspective arguing that much of the innovation that occurs in public organizations may come about in ways that are intentionally silenced by the organization and therefore dependent on the tactical creation of space for everyday creativity. It does so through an 18-month ethnographic study informed by Foucault's concepts of governmentality and discourse, as well as his history of the emergence of police within the state, and by De Certeau's theory of everyday practice and metaphor of the city.

I observe that innovation is understood differently across the hierarchical strata of the organization and that this matters considerably for how creative practices emerge. At the top of the organization, managers relate to innovation as a 'correct' means of improving efficiency and legitimizing police to the surrounding society. Middle managers relate to innovation through their work of translating top-down initiatives and selecting amongst bottom-up solutions, while prioritizing that they themselves remain 'safe'. Rather than relating to innovation as an aim of government, rank and file police officers at the bottom of the hierarchy relate to creativity as inherent in doing 'real' police work. 'Real' creativity is widely perceived as essential to concrete responsiveness to crime and unexpected situations here and now. As such, we observe a tension between an 'inner' office approach to innovation as correct, safe bets and an 'outer' street approach to innovation/creativity as 'real' responses to 'real life' challenges as they play out in this very moment.

As especially rank and file officers experience that what they associate with creativity is not necessarily recognized as desirable or necessary to other domains of the organization, they do not cease being creative. Rather, they exploit what they themselves term 'gray zones'. Gray zones are an integral part of police work, in which laws and rules do not always translate into meaningful practices 'on the street', nor do they provide meaningful guidelines for dealing with novel problems. However, gray zones are also spaces of indistinction and obscurity that police officers actively seek to create and expand in order to develop, use and share novel solutions. While gray zones are mostly informal and discrete (even secretive), some parts of the formal organization seem to institutionalize aspects of them and hereby support similar kinds of spaces for creative development of new practices and solutions.

I discuss these observations relative both to the ethical dilemmas of this type of creative and innovative activity and to the theoretical frameworks that I apply. Of central importance, however, are the implications for innovation research, particularly in the context of public organizations. Paradoxically, the call for more innovation may result in less innovation: Because innovation is understood so differently across hierarchical strata, because 'real' creativity is not recognized as innovation by the 'innovators' themselves and because much 'real' creativity occurs at the edge of accepted rules and procedures, there is little formal support for these kinds of creative, yet highly persistent, practices. This poses critical questions about how to increase managerial attention in respect of transparency, accessibility and qualification of gray zone creativity in the police as an important input to debates about how to balance responsible and responsive government in legal-democratic societies.

## Dansk resumé

Hvad vil det sige, at offentlige organisationer er innovative? Forskere og politiske beslutningstagere kalder på, at offentlige organisationer skal være mere innovative, hvad enten det skal ske gennem øget tværgående samarbejde, udforskning af netværk eller anerkendelse af den innovation som sker i staten. Dette etnografiske studie af innovation i dansk politi bidrager kritisk til denne diskussion. På baggrund af 18 måneders feltarbejde og ca. 60 dybdegående interviews med medarbejdere og ledere på tværs af politiet viser studiet, at en del af den innovation, som udspiller sig i organisationen, opstår på måder, som bringes til tavshed. Det sker på grund af en række kulturelt forankrede dynamikker, som især udspiller sig omkring eksplicite og implicite former for hierarkisk disciplinering af autonomi i politiets hverdag. Derfor afhænger innovation i politiets hverdag af, de ansatte taktisk skaber rum for kreativitet i hverdagen. Analysen er primært informeret af Michel Foucaults begreber om governmentality, magt og diskurs samt Michel de Certeau's praksisteori.

Vi ser, hvordan innovation forstås radikalt forskelligt på tværs af organisationens hierarkiske lag og at det har stor indflydelse på, hvordan kreative politipraksisser opstår. På toplederniveau opererer man med innovation som et 'korrekt' middel til at forbedre effektiviteten og kvaliteten i politiets ydelser med henblik på at sikre politiets legitimitet i samfundet. Mellemledere relaterer primært til innovation som led i deres arbejde med at oversætte top-down initiativer og selektere mellem forslag til nye løsninger nedefra, imens de ofte holder sig på den sikre side af, hvad der måtte ønskes oppefra. På bunden af hierarkiet forholder politifolkene sig sjældent til innovation som et politisk ønske. Derimod forbinder frontlinjemedarbejderne kreativitet med en iboende del af udførelsen af *rigtigt* politiarbejde. *Rigtig* kreativitet opfattes derfor bredt af politifolk som et grundlæggende



fundament for konkret at kunne reagere på kriminalitet og uventede situationer som opstår her og nu i politiets arbejde.

Som resultat af de forskellige syn på innovation ender 'kontorets' tilgang af innovation ofte med at dominere tilgangen til innovationers anvendelighed blandt politifolkene på 'gaden'. Men det betyder ikke at frontlinje kreativiteten ophører. Derimod benytter politifolkene hvad de kalder "*at arbejde i gråzonerne*". Gråzoner er en integreret del af politiarbejdet, når politifolk oplever at love, regler og procedurer ikke altid lader sig oversætte til meningsfulde praksisser 'på gaden' eller angiver passende retningslinjer for at håndtere nye typer af problemer. Det er et særligt uklart rum, som det kræver erfaring at skabe og navigere i for at udvikle, bruge og dele nye løsninger på nogle af de udfordringer politifolkene støder på i deres arbejde. Mens gråzone aktiviteter mest foregår uformelt og med stor diskretion synes dele af den formelle organisation at gøre brug af lignende aspekter i forhold til at skabe alternative rum for kreativ og fokuseret opgaveløsning.

Disse observationer diskuteres op imod både de etiske dilemmaer, som den uundgåelige og uundværlige gråzone kreativitet ansporer, og det teoretiske begrebsapparat der er anvendt i afhandlingen. Studiet har især implikationer for den del af innovationsforskningen, som retter sig mod offentlige organisationer. Et politisk ønske om mere innovation kan paradoksalt nok resultere i et snævert fokus på, hvad man ledelsesmæssigt opfatter som innovation. Dermed risikerer det at begrænse typen af - og forskellige perspektivers adgang til - udvikling i organisationen. Fordi innovation opfattes så forskelligt på tværs af hierarkiet, fordi *rigtig* kreativitet ikke betragtes som innovation af 'innovatørerne selv' og fordi den opstår i lovgivningens og procedurernes grænsfelt, er der begrænset formel støtte til denne slags kreative men særdeles vedholdende praksisser. Det rejser

vigtige spørgsmål omkring hvordan man kan øge en ledelsesmæssig opmærksomhed med hensyn til transparens, adgang og kvalificering af gråzone kreativitet I politiet som del af en vigtig debat om balanceringen af ansvarlig og responsiv styring i rets-demokratiske samfund.



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## PART I: Opening

### Introduction

*“What are you doing here?”*

A patrol officer addresses me skeptically, folding his arms across his chest. He is having lunch in the small lunchroom of a local police station as I enter the room. A group of officers sit around the table and inspect me with obvious reservations.

I politely reply that I am a researcher and that the purpose of my presence is to study innovation, that is, how police officers bring about new solutions in their daily jobs. As I speak, I notice the pitched tone of my own voice, as I sense how I am further alienating myself.

The same police officer slowly leans back in his chair, raising an eyebrow:

*“Innovation, huh... Is that something we can put in our coffee? Or else you can pack it up and shove it!”*

The others laugh.

As this study took off, the idea of *innovation* is enjoying enormous popularity among Western policy-makers as the key to ensure future economies and welfare.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See for example Government of Canada 2002, Liljemark 2004, Obama 2009, European Commission 2009, Danish Government (Regeringen) 2010; 2012



Innovation and innovativeness have also become common parlance in public organizations and not just in the world of business.

Of key importance in bringing this state of affairs about, Osborne & Gaebler (1992) proposed that government must reinvent itself to become *entrepreneurial* and thus do away with its dominantly bureaucratic form. This echoed the doctrine of New Public Management that throughout the 1980s and up to today has called for government to become more efficient *by becoming* more like private companies (Hood, 1991).

Initially, this has meant adopting a range of managerial practices related to monitoring, controlling and improving the relationship between inputs and outcomes. More recently, as innovation has gained attention in private companies together with ideas about the knowledge economy and the creative class, it has also implied that government accepts the idea that innovation is of central importance, possibly even related to organizational survival.

Moreover, advocates of new forms of public sector governance (e.g. Osborne, 2006; Hartley, 2005; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) argue that the future public sector should move beyond New Public Management towards innovation in services and collaboration with external partners. In this way, the concept of innovation seems solidly fixed to the agenda, as governments must *become* innovative.

There are, however, arguments contesting this call and its implied assumptions. While accepting the idea that more innovation is generally better, some (e.g. Borins, 2008) make the argument that government is in fact already quite innovative, but that innovation happens in ad hoc and unsystematic ways. This argument implies that government should seek not to become innovative, but to become *more* innovative by recognizing and valorizing more innovative work.

Taking a more skeptical stance, Perren & Sapsed (2013) argue that innovation, while being used more and more, lacks a consistent meaning in governmental discourse and might even mean less and less. This raises questions to what is actually *meant* by becoming innovative. Even more skeptically, Du gay (2000) has argued that there is good reason to not be too focused on innovativeness, given how innovation might run counter to the *virtues* of public bureaucracies. Du Gay would have us reflect on whether we even want an innovative public sector, because getting that would mean compromising important values.

Without much explicit skepticism, the call for becoming more innovative is reflected in the four-year national strategy published in 2011 by the top management of the police and prosecution in Denmark, which promotes *strategic innovation* as a central means of solving a number of crime- and resource-related future challenges<sup>2</sup>. However, as the vignette that opens this chapter indicates, the term *innovation* was met with some reservations from the police, as it may have done elsewhere. Whether these reservations were as straightforward as the reaction from these patrol officers, the institutional hinterland of the Danish police showed interesting responses to innovation. As an aim of government the call for innovation confronted specific institutional dilemmas and practices associated with creativity. It is to the relation between innovation as an aim of government and the kind of creative/inventive practices already institutionalized in the police that I dedicate this study.

What slowly emerged from 18 months of ethnographic field work and nearly 60 in-depth interviews with members of the rank and file, managers, and civilians were accounts and demonstrations of what police officials refer to as '*working in*

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<sup>2</sup> Politiets og Anklagemyndighedens strategi 2011-15. <http://www.politi.dk/NR/rdonlyres/6257EAD5-9AF3-42C6-ACFE-E97658AA47DF/0/Politietoganklagemyndighedensstrategi201115.pdf>

*the gray zones*’ (at arbejde i gråzonerne). ‘Working in the gray zones’ describes creative and novel solutions taking the form of informal practices invented by the police in their daily jobs to circumvent formal, disciplinary means and restrictions to their work. Through ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 2001) I will show how ‘gray zone’ practices are not necessarily intelligible as ‘innovation’ to police officials and how they differ from formalized organization, procedures and solutions, yet still manage to live on in the organization in the most creatively evasive ways.

What the study shows is that police are *already* skilled in organizing their own spaces for creativity across ranks, irrespective of the creativity planned for in strategic agendas.

What this study offers is a close-range exploration of organizational creativity that moves beyond the discursive colonization of the term *innovation*. In other words, creativity does not seem to happen *because* of discursive alignment of organizational identities and practices. Rather, the strategic attempt to formalize creative autonomy evokes forces trying to silence its call, namely the cultural embeddedness of disciplinary government from which the modern institution of police is born.

Thus, the aim of this ethnographic study is threefold.

**First**, it aims to explore innovation as a *discursive technique* of government; that is, innovation is understood here as a politically loaded term as it enters the specific setting of the police while mirroring a discourse of liberal enterprise management. The process of subjecting the members of the police to this discourse models a mobilization of individual responsibility and engagement to increase performance. In other words, when governments and public agencies place *innovation* at the center of their strategies, a normative ideal of the enterprise

is communicated through official statements that spur autonomous creativity by urging individual members of organizations to be innovative.

With the conceptualization of *governmentality*, Foucault (1978a) provides a helpful theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics that give rise to government innovation. Over time, tensions between differing governmentalities generate new governing principles or specific *techniques* of governing – including *police* as both governmentality and a manifest State authority and the role of *innovation* in government strategies.

This thesis empirically questions the assumption that the innovation discourse *per se* works as a macro-determinant or common denominator of organizational identities and practices. In fact, this is far from the full story playing out in the police.

By drawing on Foucault's genealogy of modern police - building on government rationality prescribing that society<sup>3</sup> is arranged from a body of disciplinary arrangements - it is possible to highlight how the police organization itself is densely furnished with disciplinary techniques.

This leads us to the **second** focus of this study, namely how certain disciplinary arrangements within the police often articulated by police officers as '*our culture*', primarily related to the hierarchy, are highly effective in dominating the innovation discourse.

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<sup>3</sup> Foucault opposed the notion of 'society' as merely reflecting the setup of sovereign power exercise, i.e. 'a solution to the introduction of the economic actor into the legal and political order of states from the late-eighteenth century' (Dean 2010b, p.684). But Dean argues convincingly that when we attend to problems that arise from within the construction of society, we merely 'contribute again to the formation and reformation of the social' (Ibid., p. 693). Therefore it does not necessarily make sense to abandon terms of 'society' and 'the social' if one aims to address precisely the kinds of issues as in the case of this study.

**Third**, police officials demonstrated how creative gray zone practices ‘underskirt’ innovation as a discursive strategy and in ways that work around disciplinary arrangements and invert power relations within the police to create space for frontline improvisation, experimentation and invention.

This form of exploration draws on Michel de Certeau’s *theory of everyday practice* (1984) and his call for ethnographic detail for studying the variety of creative and silent endeavors of everyday life.

The study suggests that when reformers urge governmental agencies, such as the police, to modernize and innovate from within while top-down governance and control (at least in the police) seem inescapable, they end up leaving little space for formal creativity and innovation because of the narrow discursive frame from which they operate. Instead, we end up with frustrated formalized attempts while exiling creative everyday practices to the informal gray zones from where they seem to emerge.

## **Research questions**

Police constitute an authority through which government projects its power. Acting on behalf of the State, the police has a State monopoly on violence and the license to detain, physically incapacitate, and ultimately kill human beings who are perceived as a threat to the State and its citizens (Hunt 1985). As such, the modern police is self-regulated through a continuously growing body of laws, standardized procedures, norms and forms of education to ensure that they do not abuse their mandate.

However, in relation to innovation this creates a striking paradox: How can police perform both as a regulative State organ ensuring legal conformity and order *and* as an autonomously creative and innovative organization?

This study is dedicated to examining this tension, while addressing the following questions:

How does innovation, as an aim of government and managerial discourse, play out in the everyday life of the police?

How does innovation measure up against the sorts of practices already being carried out by police officers that they associate with creativity?

And, as I zoom in on *gray zone* creativity, a term provided by police and interpreted through their stories, what can we learn about how the tension between strategic discourse and everyday practices creates precedents for some kinds of innovation while silencing others?

These dynamics are also relevant for better understanding why innovation strategies - rather than strategically aligning or balancing organizational behavior - may fail to translate into formal practices supporting a call for employee creativity, a subject that most likely applies beyond the case of the police.

Before providing an overview of chapters, I will briefly introduce how this study came about.

## **Events framing the study**

Unknowingly echoing the interest on the part of scholars engaged with studying innovation in the public sector, I wrote a proposal to the police in Denmark

suggesting a three-year PhD study to identify ‘social dynamics of what induces and inhibits innovation’ in the police.

Not knowing the proper place to address such a proposal, I posted it to a friend of a friend who worked in a department of the national police. My proposal wound its way along channels within the organization, and a few months later, I got a request for a series of meetings with representatives of the National police. Eventually the proposal was accepted and fully sponsored by the National Police.

That is the somewhat condensed story of how this study came about.

My initial plan to collect empirical material through six months of observations and interviews, guided by a priori assumptions about innovation and how to ‘identify’ them, collapsed as I set foot on police territory. Also, the field work took place at many different sites in the police as a result of the premises that I had to accept in negotiating my way into the field as described in chapter 2, something which provided me with a unique insight in very different units and spheres of policing but which also was very time-consuming.

Except for a few initiatives previously publicized in the public media, there really weren’t many ‘innovations’ out there among police officers, ready to be ‘discovered’ by a young researcher.

Instead, what soon became apparent was that the term *innovation* was used by some people within the organization with largesse to legitimize and embellish initiatives or political demands while others simply rejected the term and regarded it as a mere ‘*hurrah-word of management*’ (ledelsens hurra-ord). This was clearly the case in the introductory conversation with the patrol officers, meaning that they later expressed their frustrations with managers distancing themselves from

the sphere of ‘*real police work*’ (rigtigt politiarbejde) through managerial systems of control and abstract means of communication.

Innovation thus has many ‘faces’ in the police, depending on your rank, function, interest, etc.

One aim in writing this thesis is to deliberately ‘sing out of tune’ with the choir of innovation enthusiasts who celebrate the idea that managerial calls for innovation are the salvation for the hardships of our time. Innovation, at least as it is understood differently across the police, is already happening, sheltered from the tangle of formalizing disciplinary arrangements that are produced in the name of innovation itself.

## **Disposition**

The thesis is organized in four parts, each part contributing to the story of innovation in the police with a different focus.

***Part I: Opening***, introduces the study in terms of its general focus as well as the circumstances, continuous learning, the analytical and methodological framework that shaped it. *Chapter 1. Understanding government innovation* offers a review of the literature on innovation in the public sector, and in the police in specific. This outline indicates that innovation in government is generally surrounded by a discourse constructing innovation as a means for managing public organizations more like private businesses; i.e. effective, efficient and with a reduction in bureaucratic ‘obstacles’. Innovation tends to be considered as large scale improvements, typically in the form of new programs and conceptual ‘best practices’ of government that apply broadly and strategically. The theoretical threat that informs the study runs from a) Foucault’s genealogy of police first as



governmentality - an aspiration of government as a disciplinary body in society, and the emergence of the modern institution of police we know today in Denmark to b) How innovation can be understood as a political *discourse* that acts on the social by creating precedence for a particular knowledge about what innovation 'is', hereby subjecting individuals its prophecy, to c) the argument that in order to understand innovation as it plays out in the everyday life of the police, we need not only to focus on innovation as a particular discursive power. De Certeau encourages us to explore the everyday practices in the police following the premise that creativity constantly emerges in our daily *tactics* as we expand the *strategic grid* (or *place*) of existing order. This invites openness to innovation as everyday creativity/invention in the form of more small-scale creative variations of practices that people invent in the margins of discourse and the system they are part of. *Chapter 2. Methods* introduces how the methodological approach is partly a (tactical!) continuation of the theoretical framework and partly an expansion of as it also draws on contemporary symbolic-interpretive ethnography as it is represented in the work of primarily Geertz (2001). This takes off from de Certeau's intentional reluctance to prescribe more concrete methodological guidance and paves the way to an even closer engagement with a variation of social discourse. That is, how different cultural settings shape different interpretations of innovation/creativity as it unfolds in everyday police work and how to describe, or '*inscribe*' (Ibid.) the field's perspective in text. Chapter 2 also provides an introduction to the terms and conditions of the study that led to an ethnographic inquiry as well as a clarification of how access was negotiated through the building of rapport (trust). The chapter is rounded by research ethical steps and precautions implied with the study.

***Part II: Three worlds of policing: How hierarchy disciplines innovation***, is the first of two empirical parts. It is primarily a Foucauldian analysis of how the police hierarchy works as a disciplinary mechanism to regulate police autonomy, sustain formal power relation and lines of communication and ensure that police is aligned with political demands and expectations. Part II serves both as a contextualization of police as a self-disciplinary institution which is crucial to recognize in order to better understand how innovation as a managerial discourse becomes segmented or disciplined according to the hierarchical division of top, middle and bottom. *Chapter 3. A few words on hierarchy*, is a brief introduction to the hierarchical-bureaucratic ‘protected place of disciplinary monotony’ (Foucault 1977, p. 141) as the subtle power mechanisms and dynamics it gives rise to was a recurrent theme for the police officers I talked to in respect to the dynamics of, and views on, innovation. *Chapter 4. The view from the top: Doing it correctly*, demonstrates how innovation from a top managerial point of view tends to be strongly connected to the general discourse of innovation. This should also be seen in connection with the aftermath of a big police reform in 2007 which urges the Danish police to justify themselves as smarter, faster and a more accountable societal institution. This results in a top managerial concern to approach innovation *correctly*, i.e. in ways that support the challenges they face of meeting political demands and expectations. *Chapter 5. The view from the middle: Better safe than sorry*, shows how the more or less subtle workings of hierarchical power mechanisms discipline middle managers’ approach to innovation as one that serves top managerial priorities and risk-avoidance in the sense of official engagement/association with innovation that does not directly apply to strategic concerns. The view of innovation at the middle layer of hierarchy therefore tends to be that it serves as inventive managerial ‘tools’ for implementation/translation of top-down initiatives as well as a ‘safe’ selection (i.e. again aligned with

strategic demands and expectations) between subordinates' ideas. *Chapter 6. The view from the middle: Doing it 'real'* explores how innovation is viewed at the 'floor'. What becomes apparent is that frontline police identity tends to be constructed in opposition to the *correct* sphere of the office as being *real cop* is associated with the action-oriented sphere of the street, where hands on solutions are needed and invented *here and now*. This tension between office and street is reflected in their view of innovation a politically *correct* '*hurrah-word of management*' (i.e. rhetoric of little practical use for them) and *real* creativity in the form of hatched-together solutions that they come up with themselves. As police officers privilege is connected to their space to act out on the street, an antagonist positioning of this space against that of management informs us that innovation, both in the discursive sense of the term and in the sense of frontline police officers' notion of *real* creativity, is subjected to hierarchically produced power relations in the police.

**Part III: Gray zone creativity** is the second empirical part dedicated to an analysis of police officials' stories about the culturally embedded *gray zones* of policing and how this is closely related to how police in general make space for creativity/invention within a tightly knit disciplinary grid produced to fence it in and control it. The analysis in Part III is primarily informed by de Certeau's practice theory and his notion of tactical space that Hjorth has incorporated in Foucault's concept of *heterotopia* as a 'space for play and/ or invention within an established order' (Hjorth 2005, p. 387). *Chapter 7. Using space for creativity: Police discretion as improvisational space* investigates how police creatively make use of the improvisational aspects of their discretionary space as an inherent part of their role. We see how gray zones are recognized by police officers as an ambiguous and indeterminate space between correct (how things are done right by

the book, i.e. laws and regulations as prescribed by office) and real (the extent to which the specifics of the situations out on the street determines what is the best thing to do and how). *Chapter 8. Creating space for gray zone creativity* shows a number of ways in which police, in addition to using their discretionary space for creativity, also create spaces within the police organization. As we will see, *informal networks*, *broadcasts* of ideas via e-mails as frontline officers have given up on the slow chain of command processing, *hacking* of existing solutions and inventive ways to intervene against for areas of crime that does not attract strategic attention are examples of how police create space for tactical creativity within the margins of the system. In doing so, formal power relations are inverted, hereby creating openings for nonconformist creativity. Further, these gray zone activities are guided by a certain ethics which the chapter also explores. *Chapter 9. Formalizing explorative spaces: Gray zones as formalized heterotopias* has the purpose of nuancing our understanding of gray zones as something which primarily emerges as more spontaneous and single, situational cases of potentially innovative spheres, i.e. as ‘space without a place’ (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986). Such spaces for creativity/invention do seem to be more strongly connected with some managerially prescribed places (units) in the police than others. For example, some task forces and, local and central training units - which are also privileged spaces in certain ways - seem to be surrounded by an innovative atmosphere, or at least are reputed to be. At a closer look, we see how the managers of these units intentionally create informal spheres that allow both staff and managers to shelter and nurse heterotopian spaces with potential for creativity/invention.

***Part IV: Final reflections*** offers a discussion and conclusion of the study as well as a reflection on its perspectives in research and practice. In chapter 10 we focus

our discussion on gray zones and gray zone creativity in the police. I propose that, as a concept for the ambiguity between disciplinary order as it is represented by office and the ways in which this order is challenged by life as it happens out on the street, the police notion of gray zone offers a very specific opening to understanding how creativity/innovation emerges from everyday policing. Based on the empirical analysis in part II & III, I argue that the contemporary institution of the police, due to its function as an extended arm of the State, is subjected to an autonomy complex; that is, while the police are expected to respond to new types of crime through tactically creative and new practices, the space for autonomy that this calls for is also - and should be - densely regulated by a self-governing disciplinary body of control. With reference to Byrkjeflot & du Gay's (2012) division between what constitutes *responsive* and *responsible* government, respectively, we discuss the importance of variations of ethos inside government to ensure tension and debate between different rationales and concerns. I argue that the dichotomy between street and office that is constructed by the police should, rather than being considered as problematic and a hindrance to innovation per se, be understood as an expression of variations in police ethos.

The discussion of how the police institution, in its aim of becoming more responsive (i.e. innovative) while also maintaining a disciplinary apparatus that ensures its responsibility (i.e. hierarchy, bureaucracy, etc.), is put into perspective by the phenomenon of gray zones in policing. Accepting and exploiting gray zones allow the police organization to negotiate this tension between responsive and responsible in a way that is necessarily and perhaps beneficially difficult: Gray zones are there, thus allowing for responsiveness, but are also hard and demanding to work in, thus subjecting innovation to responsibility. However, gray zones also epitomize the dilemma of innovating in government, as they – if

ignored and unchecked – have the potential for turning police into something what it should not be.

My proposition is that gray zones constitute a considerable resource for the police organization, but that it is also something that managers must (and some already do) understand and engage with, as it is in many ways unavoidable in police work. In this spirit, I discuss the implications of appreciating gray zone creativity, both in relation to the theoretical frameworks informing the study and to public sector innovation scholarship. I also propose some avenues for future research to extend our understandings of it.

## **Chapter 1. Understanding government innovation**

As became evident throughout the field work, the subtle ways that innovation played out empirically call for explanations of how innovation acts at the social level and as a general discursive premise (as I will argue later in chapter 4 is reflected in the national strategy of the police and prosecution) and how the discourse is fueled by other prevailing beliefs and concerns within the specific setting of police in Denmark.

By examining these two levels, it became clear that what police officials demonstrate as *gray zone* creativity stood out from the myriad of empirical impressions, and how *gray zone creativity* could be ‘teased out’ of the shadows of repressed, somewhat institutionalized organization practices, often defended as being necessary, tricked formalized practices and strategic discourse.

To provide a dialectic conceptual framework, this study draws primarily on selected work of Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Michel de Certeau (1925-1986).

Through a research review<sup>4</sup> presenting dominant notions of innovation across public sector research in general and within the specific area of police innovation, I incorporate some key concepts in the writings of Foucault and de Certeau that will serve to explain innovation as respectively:

- 1) An aim of government formed as a certain *discourse* that works through specific *techniques* of government as it is being adopted and used by the Danish police.
- 2) Everyday creative practices that appear beyond the dominant discourse of innovation as they emerge from the margins of existing knowledge and institutional order.

## **Innovation in the public sector**

One often hears that it is essential for public organizations to be innovative. At the same time, though, innovation may seem hard to come by in bureaucratic public sector organizations. Academic literature on the subject often emphasizes this contradiction.

Consider, as an example, the following statements: ‘The conventional wisdom regarding the public sector is that public sector innovation is a virtual oxymoron’ (Borins, 2002, p. 467). Or: ‘The concepts of innovation and bureaucracy seem to be almost mutually exclusive. Much of the criticism of bureaucracy is that it does not suffer innovation gladly’ (Vigoda-Gadot et al, 2005, p. 57).

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<sup>4</sup> This review partly draws on my previously published paper written in Danish: Hartmann, M.R.K. 2011: Den tavse innovation. En balancering af innovationstænkningen med henblik på at styrke opmærksomheden på “den tavse innovation” i det offentlige rum. *Økonomistyring og Informatik*, 27. Årgang 2011/2012 nr. 1.

These scholars describe that public organizations exhibit most, if not all, the characteristics of organizations that have a hard time innovating. They are part of large hierarchies thoroughly governed by laws, rules and procedures. These are things that conventionally are thought to ‘kill creativity’ (Amabile, 1998).

Public organizations are also known as risk-averse because there is little to gain for the individual or the organization from innovating and doing better, and much to lose from stepping out of line and attracting the attention of the media and politicians. As opposed to these cautions, innovation requires an openness to risk (Brown & Osborne, 2013).

The importance of equity for citizens and due process in public organizations also impedes innovation by constraining the space for experimentation and testing of new ideas. Here, there is a bias towards avoidance of failure rather than pursuit of excellence (Potts & Kastle, 2010), which is furthered by the fact that public services, were they to experiment, would be experimenting on real people with real problems and, if things went wrong, there would be real consequences.

Over recent decades, however, the view has gained momentum that innovation is a necessity to public organizations and welfare models, and systematic efforts have been made to change the public sector.

### **The enterprise ideal**

In terms of reform efforts, the work of Osborne & Gaebler on ‘Re-inventing government’ (1992) to make government entrepreneurial has been particularly influential, especially in North America.

Formulating ten principles of entrepreneurial government, they propose, among others, that government must become less rule-driven and less hierarchical if



innovation is to thrive. Based on their assumption that innovation has been best done by private enterprises, they suggest that government should emulate private business by becoming more competitive, market-oriented, results-oriented and customer-driven.

Originating in the UK's Thatcher administration and eventually spreading throughout the OECD, government policies associated with the 'New Public Management' have had a similar intention. This doctrine, described but not advocated by Hood (1991), essentially seeks to make government more efficient by making it more like business.

Following this doctrine, we have seen efforts to expose public organizations to market competition and focus more on results rather than procedures. The implicit idea is that a change to market competition will create the incentives to innovate and the focus on results will create the freedom to do things in ways that are new, innovative and more efficient. Even if this shift fails to bring about more innovation by itself, it would at least create an impetus for adopting more of the 'best practices' developed elsewhere.

It is important to note the connection between innovation and efficiency in this doctrine: the kinds of change intended by such reforms aim primarily at making government more efficient and views innovation as a means of achieving this efficiency.

Increasingly, however, research into public sector innovation has suggested that the conventional wisdom is mistaken and that indeed public organizations *are* innovative, but that innovation is generally misunderstood (Potts & Kastelle, 2010).

These researchers would suggest that the problem of public sector organizations not being innovative is actually based on our inability to recognize the sort of innovation that public sector organizations create. So while there may be an ‘urgent need for public innovation’ (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011), there is also a need for re-constructing the meaning of innovation in public services.

Of seminal importance in this re-construction has been the work of the Ash Institute at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government (even if they do not often use the term ‘re-construction’). Through a research program relying on data from an innovation award scheme, the institute has collected a wealth of cases demonstrating that innovation *does* occur (and does so frequently) in public organizations in both the USA (e.g. Altschuler & Behn, 1997; Moore *et al.* 1997; Borins, 2008; Moore & Hartley 2008) and elsewhere (Borins, 2000a, 2001). However, as the respective authors point out, the things that happen when public organizations innovate are not what happen when private firms innovate. Because of the inherent challenges to public sector innovation, innovation, in their view, must be separated from ‘micro improvements’ of everyday creative endeavors and instead be seen as large-scale improvements of great and cross-contextual impact.

The key challenge, as Osborne (2010; Osborne et al, 2013) notes, is that innovation in public organizations is profoundly *different* from our implicit understanding of what innovation is, given that this understanding essentially draws on private-sector manufacturing models and not, as would be more appropriate, public services. As Hartley (2005) also argues, the meaning of innovation is also influenced by prevailing reform agendas that change over time.

To name but a few of the differences, public innovation is not the introduction of new (patentable) technologies to a market with the purpose of generating profit. A

public innovation is unlikely to be a ‘thing’ that can be produced and simply moved around. Public innovation also is not produced on an on-going basis by an established Research and Development organization.

What, then, is public innovation, in the view of those who argue that innovation is common in public organizations? What, so to speak, is the ‘dominant construction’ of public innovation?

In the work of the Harvard school, the innovations awarded highest recognition are often new *programs* or *organizations of work*, i.e. new ways of offering public services that provide greater value for citizens, or the application of new technologies in public services.

Examples (described in Borins, 2000a) include the Orange County Child Sexual Abuse Service Team, which re-organized the process of how children are examined following sexual abuse, or the Quick Courts in Arizona, where minor judicial transactions are handled in electronic kiosks.

However, given the typical data underpinning this work, there is also a tendency for innovation to be defined more grandiosely in terms of success and scale. Because the innovations studied have been submitted to a program with the intent of being awarded prizes, they are often examples that have been successful in solving particular problems. They also tend to be ‘large’ in the sense that they are easy to identify and have far-reaching impact, although discussions of what constitutes public value are ongoing (Benington & Moore 2011).

This might also explain another feature of the dominant construction of innovation in the public sector, namely that successful public innovations often cross organizational borders. In the Harvard work, the ability to work across agency

domains and with external (private or third sector) partners is often what makes new programs or technology applications possible.

In a more recent effort to enhance public innovation, Sørensen & Torfing have explicitly argued for crossing organizational boundaries with their notion of *collaborative innovation*. Emphasizing the innovative capacity of ‘governance networks’ and claiming to have shown that “[interorganizational] collaboration may strengthen all parts of the innovation process” (Ibid., 2011, p. 20), their recommendation – like that of the Harvard Kennedy school (e.g. Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004) – is to focus on multi-actor collaboration and networks as a source of innovation.

Equally important to the dominant construction are two other aspects of public innovation, namely its discontinuous nature and the role it affords managers.

The dominant construction of public innovation emphasizes that innovation can be sparked by many things, including the recognition of (performance) problems and the desire to do something about them (see also Wilson 1967).

However, public innovation is far from being a continuous process and something that gets done, or prioritized, in a systematic way. Rather, it arises and is pursued on an ad hoc basis (e.g. Sørensen & Torfing, 2011), although many (especially practitioners) advocate pursuing public innovation as a systematic activity (e.g. Bason, 2010).

Irrespective of what sparks off innovation, the dominant construction affords managers a central role in the innovation process. Importantly, managers are the ones that organize innovation processes after a need has arisen and bring actors together to solve difficult problems in innovative ways. This is clearly evident in the Harvard work where both high-level and mid-level managers tend to occupy a

central position in the case narratives (e.g. Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Borins, 2000b), where they either help an employee-initiated idea turn into a genuine innovation or originate novel ideas themselves.

Also during the innovation process, managers have a key role to play in creating organizational momentum and securing support and sponsorship, while also ensuring the efficacy of the micro-processes of innovative collaborations (e.g. in specific innovation workshops, if such methods are used).

As we will now see, these dominant understandings of innovation in the public sector are reflected in the literature specifically addressing policing.

## **Innovation in policing**

Literature on innovation in policing generally support the idea that innovation is needed in the form of new programs and best practices of policing as a crucial aspect of strengthening the legitimacy of the police in society.

Weisburd and Braga (2007) observe a significant increase in innovation in the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century which they ascribe to a ‘crisis of confidence’ in American policing: ‘the challenges to police effectiveness, rising crime rates, and concerns about legitimacy of police actions that developed in the late 1960s created a perceived need for change in what some have described as the industry of American policing’ (Ibid., p. 11).

The lack of legitimacy emerged, among other event, from a massive critique raised by both the public and scholars that the reactive ‘standard model of policing’<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> ‘The standard model’ of policing is proposed by Weisburd and Braga (2007) as a set of reactive strategies of policing, such as preventive routine patrolling, which has been questioned by researchers in respect of their effect, particularly in the 1990’s.

proved ineffective and that police failed to reduce or prevent crime while merely producing as a false sense of safety (Ibid.; Skolnick & Bayley 1986).

According to Weisburd & Braga (2007), the crisis in police legitimacy in terms of efficiency and effectiveness created an openness to innovation in American police; in a somewhat contradictory direction, though, they draw on a body of literature that argues that police demonstrate a particularly high level of inertia and evasiveness to the adoption of innovation compared to private companies and that there seems to be a tendency for police to engage in pseudo-innovative practices even while they stick to the good old ways of doing their job rather than following the new strategic lines of policing (see also Ashby, Irving and Longley 2007).

From this contextualization, the edited volume *Police Innovation - Contrasting Perspectives* presents and evaluates a number of different ‘dramatic innovations’ in American policing. The innovations include *community policing*, *broken windows policing*, *problem oriented policing*, *pulling levers policing*, *Third-party policing*, *hot spots policing*, *Compstat* and *Evidence-based policing*, which are innovative programs to policing in that they are increasingly knowledge-based practices (see also Rosenbaum 2007) and ‘strategic’ approaches in the sense that they ‘rearrange the priorities among the goals and add new ones’ (Braga and Weisburd 2007, p. 342). In Denmark, a study has been done on the citizen involvement initiative ‘*Tryk politi*’ (Shultz Larsen 2014). See also Skolnick & Bayley’s (1986) study on innovations in six American cities and how these developments have changed the role of policing locally.

The literature on innovation in policing tends to have a pragmatic take on the matter in that scholars typically evaluate best practice programs or approaches to policing. Examples of studies focusing on the latter are explorations of

*intelligence-led policing* (Darrock & Mazerolle 2012; Ratcliffe, Strang & Taylor 2014), and the more paradigmatic perspective of *proactive policing* (Hestehave 2013) while a few Danish studies address the epistemological aspects of police intelligence (Rønn 2012) and knowledge creating processes in criminal investigation (Hald 2011).

Often the best practice studies of policing reveal different institutional social dynamics involved with innovation.

For example, Ashby, Irving and Longley (2007) examine ‘inertia and resistance’ to technological innovation in UK police. Zooming in on the implementation of information management systems, such as GIS (geographic information systems)<sup>6</sup>, the authors problematize new public management (NPM)’s infatuation with mirroring private sector use of technology to improve organizational inefficiency.

On the managerial side of innovation, a dramatic (but unfortunately not uncommon) example of mismanaged NPM innovation is the manipulation of performance objectives as took place in the CompStat accountability project in the New York Police Department (Heskett 1996; Eterno & Silverman 2012). In these cases police managers terrorize their staff and encourage police officers to leave out or make up incidents so that the managers can look good at supervisory meetings with their superiors (Ibid.).

Innovation is generally seen as something to be managed top-down, though some scholars point to the dominance of *informal communication* among managers in implementation processes. For example, Weiss (1997) conducted a survey among police chiefs and executives showing that innovations in American policing tend

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<sup>6</sup> GIS are computer-based systems designed for the handling large amounts of geographical data and is used by law enforcement agencies to analyze and visualize crime and intelligence information to apply ‘smarter’ efforts of policing.

to be communicated to staff and colleagues through informal networks, rather than through formal channels. Also, Degnegaard (2010) observed that crucial information over the course of a comprehensive police reform in Denmark in 2007 was dealt with primarily through informal networks rather than formal channels of communication.

From a macro perspective, Morabito (2008) uses archival data to show the ways that different political environments affect the implementation of community policing.

Many studies have also been conducted on police reform initiatives that focus on the concept of *change* rather than innovation, although some scholars use the terms interchangeably (Balvig *et al.* 2011; Degnegaard 2010; Toch 2008; Skogan 2008; Bayley 2008; Christensen 2012 ). In the light of reform, innovation in the police is typically understood in terms of radical solutions at a structural scale in response to the criticism of skeptical reformists (see also Rosenbaum 2007; Weisburg & Braga 2007).

Further, authors have attempted to reduce the complexity and diversity of meanings associated with the term innovation in relation to police by suggesting a set of categories, namely *programmatic*, *administrative*, *technological* and *strategic* innovations (Moore, Sparrow & Spelman 1997). However, the categories do not adequately represent the multiple aspects in the development and use of new police initiatives and ‘assigning any one innovation to one category over another is often a judgment call’ (Braga & Weisburd 2007, p. 340).

The literature specifically addressing police innovation tends to reproduce an understanding of innovation as large-scale programs, or new models and technologies of policing; these innovations are typically studied as selected best



practices that dramatically change the role of the police in society. It presents police institutions as cross-sector collaborators, and given the high level of concern about its legitimacy, innovation is managerially controlled and communicated top-down.

Thus, this body of research strongly mirrors the dominant construction of innovation in the general literature on innovation in the public sector.

### **Foucault on government innovation**

*“Government is not just a power needing to be tamed or an authority needing to be legitimized. It is an activity and an art which concerns all and which touches each. And it is an art which presupposes thought. The sense and object of governmental acts do not fall from the sky or emerge ready formed from social practice. They are things which have had to be – and which have been – invented.”*

- Burchell *et al.* (1991, Preface)

This section presents a brief outline of Foucault’s conceptual framework focusing on his proposal of *police* as being a particular aim of government, a *police governmentality*, arising from post-war turbulence in 13<sup>th</sup> century Germany and taking the form of an actual police science of government, *polizeiwissenschaft*, which peaked in its influence on 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Century European governance (Foucault 1978b; Dean 2010a). The contours of today’s police institution emerged slowly, and, as we will now see, the changes of police from an approach of governing to the modern police institution in Denmark have been spurred by political and societal tensions which will serve as an important backdrop in the later empirical analysis.

Foucault and his successors addressed an important divide between the police as a particular pursuit of government emerging in European societies and as a modern law-enforcing institution. We also learn from his genealogy of police *governmentality*, spurring the idea that society and its inhabitants should be governed through the expansion of disciplinary control and self-regulatory techniques, that it sparked a variety of government innovations or disciplinary ‘arts of government’ that shaped how society is governed and how each one of us are socialized to think and act as good (or bad) citizens. This reminds us that the modern institution of the police is an innovation of government that itself emerged from certain aims and values in society, something we must take into account when studying innovation and creativity within this specific setting.

According to Foucault, the variations or hybrids of government innovation are constantly being produced, reinforced or resisted and replaced through subtle, dynamic relations of *power* (for example, Faubion *et al* (2000) have dedicated their compilation of Foucault’s work to the subject of power).

Further, power acts on each one of us by subjecting us to specific productions of *knowledge* about the world. Through the accumulation of certain types of knowledge, *discursive formations* emerge over time, such as for example the construction of *innovation* as a ‘natural’ call or program that is believed to strengthen government and society.

In spite of changing governmentalities, the police as an *institution* has preserved its mandate and overall function in society, at least to some extent, although its areas of intervention, its role and means have expanded and changed over the years.

Understanding the basic principles of how the police function in society sets the stage for this study and is crucial to understanding the empirical accounts of a highly self-disciplined institutional setting and the *gray zone* creativity that arise within it.

Therefore, I will briefly present a localized genealogy of the institution of the police in Denmark, although it should be noted that historical research on the development and evolution of the police in Denmark has been treated more thoroughly by scholars of history (e.g. Stevnsborg 2010; Christensen 2012).

My hope in drawing inspiration from Foucault is threefold.

First, we should keep in mind that the setting explored in this study, is itself a product of global and shifting aims of government and that its culture is not a fixed entity but has been constructed from a variety of institutionalized, disciplinary techniques which are otherwise often taken for granted by police officials as ‘*our tradition*’, ‘*our culture*’ or ‘*our system*’.

Second, critical attention to the ways that discourse acts through common notions such as ‘culture’ and ‘innovation’ is important for disclosing power relations at work in the police and what they privilege, oppress and silence. These dynamics shed light on some of the forces that spur police officials’ engagement in creative *gray zone* activities.

Third, as we examine the managerial aim of innovation, which encloses specific political aims such as that of *entrepreneurial governance*, we can discover the intersection between the inherent virtues, values and beliefs of innovation and the institutional vulnerabilities of the Danish police system. The frictions produced between competing governmentalities and discourses in the police will thus guide an analysis and discussion of the relation between the innovation discourse and the

forms of creativity already taking place as *gray zone* practices within the hierarchically and bureaucratically disciplinary police. In examining that gray zone, Foucault's focus on the more discursive aspects of power has been fruitfully supplemented by de Certeau's stronger emphasis on the dynamics of everyday creative practices.

## **Police governmentality**

In a number of his writings and lectures, Foucault traced how the *police* emerged from reformation events in 16<sup>th</sup> century Europe as an ideal and as an approach to government.

This aim should be seen in the light of the decline in the Catholic Church's power. The treaties of peace ending 30 years of war (1618-1648) in Europe redistributed the religious and political power of the Pope in Rome to the myriad of European states, thereby empowering the sovereign rule of the Prince (Dean 2010a). In Denmark, Catholicism was replaced by a Lutheran legislative system for the police centering legislative power on the King and aristocrats in 16<sup>th</sup> century Denmark (Christensen 2012).

In an essay first published in 1978, Foucault conceptualized the emergence of 'the art of government' as a matter of changing rationalities of government proposed as *governmentalities* (Foucault 1978a).

While Foucault was indeed interested in government as an activity, i.e. as the 'conduct of conduct' of social life, his elaboration of governmentality refers to 'ways of knowing what that activity consisted in' (Burcell *et al.* 1991, p. 3). As Foucault demonstrated, such rationalities of government comprise any given political domain and what it means to govern, who/what is governed and by whom/what such governing plays out (Foucault 1978a).

Tracing the art of government back to Machiavelli's *The Prince* from 1513, issues surrounding the notion of government were initially proposed as problems and solutions of how to secure and strengthen the rule of the sovereign (Foucault 1978a).

Opponents to Machiavelli's work, such as the French writer La Perrière, wrote in favor of more democratic arrangements and delegation of authority with reference to ancient Greece; central to this ideal of government was the community structured as the *polis*, the Greek term for town or city, which functioned as individual states structured around an urban center with a central sacred unit and fortress. Each polis had its separate legal, judicial, political and other socially regulatory practices. Among the challenges addressed by 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century political thinkers who sought inspiration in the ancient Greek *polis* were questions such as: 'How to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor' (Foucault 1978a, p. 202).

The *police* as a *raison d'État*, or 'the art of the state's splendor as visible order and manifest force' (Foucault 1978b, p. 314) was further developed in the area of German *Polizeiwissenschaft* in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century and spread throughout Europe, including Denmark (Christensen 2012). Here, the notion of *polis* or *polizei* (*police* in English and *politien* in Danish) acquires the meaning of the 'good order' of a state governed society (Dean 2010a).

As such, the *police state* model proposed several arrangements for how to best establish and use the state's forces to ensure the development of health, well behaved populations and resources: 'Police is basically concerned with society... Police is the set of interventions and means that ensure that living, better than just

living, coexisting will be effectively useful to the constitution and development of the state's forces... this circle, with all that this implies, means that police must succeed in linking together the state's strength and individual felicity' (Foucault 1978b, p. 326-327).

As an aim of government, police changed from being based on religious prescriptions of government to become a matter of more economic interventions; in Denmark this move was particularly enforced by the transition to absolute monarchy in 1661 as the Danish King Frederik III was eager to protect his creation from the harassment of old craftsmen (Christensen 2012).

To Foucault, the invention of 'the model of the police' was perhaps the most representative symbol of the modern *surveillance society*, where no one escapes the disciplinary and normalizing techniques of the 'carceral city' of our time, with its constant installations of panoptic self-discipline: 'at the center of this city, and as if to hold it in place, there is, not the 'centre of power', not a network of forces, but a multiple network of diverse elements – walls, space, institution, rules, discourse... a strategic distribution of elements of different natures and levels' (Foucault 1977, p. 307).

In Foucault's phrasing, the object of the police state, namely the population, needs to become obedient, 'docile' urban subjects (Ibid). This is provided for by an ever growing body of domains of knowledge and means of regulatory control such as 'religion, morals, health and subsistence, public peace, the care of buildings, squares and highways...' to name but a few from Foucault's listing (Foucault 1978b, p. 334).

Foucault's genealogy of *police* serves as one of many examples of how governmentalities have changed, multiplied and 'governmentalized' Western

countries. According to Foucault, the modern ‘art of government’ is characterized by the paradoxical and subtle workings of centralized democratic government, which rules without a center: ‘Maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mysticized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important for our modernity – that is, for our present – is not so much statization [étatisation] of society, as the “governmentalization” of the state’ (Foucault 1978a, p. 220).

Ruling governmentalities act upon individuals through the social in that ‘this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions – an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated’ (Foucault 1977, p. 26-27).

As such, the various forms and sites of governing powers act on their subjects through ‘techniques’, ‘tactics’ and ‘subtle processes’, delicately turning the subjects into their prophecies (Foucault 1978a). These disciplinary techniques of power act as ‘a new micro-physics’ and are not created by the State in a centralized form but by ‘a multiplicity of often minor processes of different origin and scattered location’ (Foucault 1977, p. 138).

Foucault’s famous diagnosis of today’s living as ‘an era of biopower’ (Dean 2013, p. 39) builds on the assumption that power is no longer individualized and localized through the reign of the sovereign but is now more fragmented with multiple sites of influence, such as the ways that academic institutions, the media, policies etc. construct ‘appropriate’ knowledge and thus prescribe how we should perceive what is right and wrong or good and bad.

*Power* and *resistance* to power are recurrent concepts in Foucault's work as an inseparable relation, a tense and productive force, *a process* by which forms of power are continually reinvented.

The concept of governmentality embodied Foucault's concerns of how government becomes displaced from the state to the subtle apparatuses it has created, hence producing self-affirming systems of power 'growing like a huge monster or automatic machine' with 'no hope of having done with it' (Foucault 1978c, p. 354). Nonetheless, in the case of the modern institution of police, we still witness certain continuities to earlier political rationalities of government, namely to ensure and manifest the splendor of the state as well as developing thoughts and practices that enable orderly coexistence of the population.

As stressed by Burchell *et al.* (1991) in the opening of this section, the 'arts' of government impose great power upon each and one of us and therefore deserve critical engagement; not least because of the subtleties by which they work.

### **Police as a societal institution in Denmark**

As the modern institution of the police took shape it did so together with the emergence of a new governmentality, namely civil society, whose 'objective will still be to increase the state's forces within an external equilibrium in the European space, and an internal equilibrium in the form of order' (Foucault 1978c, p. 348).

But whereas the governing mechanisms of the 'incentive-regulations' of civil society are one thing, 'the elimination of disorder will be the function of the police. As a result, the notion of police is entirely overturned, marginalized, and takes on the purely negative meaning familiar to us' (Ibid., p. 354).



Foucault was obviously not enthusiastic about the invention of the modern police, which to him represented ‘simply an instrument by which one prevents the occurrence of certain disorders’ (Ibid.).

Focusing on the case of Denmark, the police institution emerged from similar embryonic circumstances as Foucault described in France and which eventually led to first the French revolution in the last decade of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century.

The parallel process in Denmark was far less dramatic, with the dictatorial rule of the King being replaced first with a succession of relatively benign state coups, the so-called ‘enlightened aristocracies’, and later, as a result of the Danish Constitution of 1849, with modern democracy.

However, the first Chief of police (politimester), Claus Rasch (1639-1705) was appointed in Copenhagen as early as 1682 by a ‘police commission’ set up by King Christian V as the first Danish police authority. Centuries of war, the plague and poverty had filled the streets of Copenhagen with delinquents and the primary job of Chief Rasch and his growing force of *officers* (betjente) was to bring order to the streets (i.e. combat stealing, prostitution, violence) and to make sure that nobody violated the privileges of the aristocracy with respect of ownership and proper dress (Stevnsborg 2010).

The appointment of Rasch as Chief of police merely manifested and maintained the ‘splendor’ and ‘good order’ of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Danish Kingdom. Since the solo appointment of Chief Rasch the institution of the police has changed and the number of its staff has grown to about 15,000 employees, including civilian staff.

## **The emergence of a ‘modern’ police force**

The institution of the police in Denmark as we know it did not begin to emerge until the 18<sup>th</sup> century as the effect of regulations in the Police Act requiring supervision of local bailiffs, as police forces took over a job previously handled by landowners of keeping an eye out for delinquents and troublemakers (Christensen 2012). In the Police Act issued in 1793, uniforms were required to avoid any confusion as to who were appointed police and who merely pretended to be or ignored police authority<sup>7</sup>.

Already in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century the police force was institutionalized as a guarantor of national security law enforcement (Christensen 2012). In 1815 the first Minister of Justice was appointed and in 1821 it was decided by law that legal experts should be responsible for the courts and the state administration (Ibid.). Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the institution of the police in Denmark expanded, heavily influenced by German police science (*Polizeiwissenschaft*) (Ibid.).

In his historical analysis of reform-driven changes of the ideological foundation of police in Denmark, Christensen (2012) demonstrates how the modern Danish police force is a ‘hybrid’ of different attempts at reform over the centuries. This analysis is much in line with Foucault’s point that the state apparatuses transform in bricolage-like manners.

Thus, the modern notion of the police incorporates a Foucauldian notion of the police as an approach to building up the state and its apparatus and a Weberian notion of police as central to the exercise of physical enforcement of the territorial, national state, incorporating the state’s legitimate display of sanctioning force within its territorial borders. In addition, the modern notion of the police includes

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<sup>7</sup> The Act of police, July 5<sup>th</sup> 1793.

reference to more recent philosophical<sup>8</sup> notions of the police as an international actor of security, thus blurring or dissolving the distinctions between national and international territories (Ibid.).

Christensen analyses a number of major Danish police reforms while demonstrating that they are driven by certain tensions between political actors (primarily dominant unions, top managers and the Ministry of Justice) and general societal influences or *regimes*<sup>9</sup> of legitimacy. These regimes of justification are primarily *civic*, *industrial* and *projective*.

I will briefly run through parts of Christensen's (2012)<sup>10</sup> genealogy of the modern police in Denmark as this also serves to inform the reader about the rather complicated setting and conflicts that underlie the later empirical accounts.

The *civic* reforms of the Danish police in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century (1863 and 1871) were justified as a civic, liberal movement in support of the 1849 Danish constitution which marked, at least in principle, the end of the absolute monarchy. The liberal ideal was imported primarily together with the model of London's *New Police* and built on principles of a centralized, hierarchical police force monitored by a *Home Office* to deal with the total scale of crime, preventive patrolling, monitoring and disciplining of police officers through an advanced disciplinary and bureaucratic apparatus and a governance model grounded in statistics and quantified objectives of police performance. As such, this model of policing was justified based on *industrial* techniques of management that

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<sup>8</sup> Christensen refers to the philosophers Hardt, M. & Negri, A. 2000: *Empire*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

<sup>9</sup> Christensen's reference to regimes is inspired by the sociologists Boltanski & Thévenot's theoretical proposal of six 'orders' or 'economies' of worth (civic, market, inspired, fame, industrial, and domestic) in respect of how individuals are evaluated and justify their actions (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006 (orig. 1991): *On Justification: The Economies of Worth*. Princeton University Press); also with reference to the exploration of a seventh order of justification, namely "project" or "projective city" in the work of Boltanski & Chiapello 2005 (orig. 1999): *The New Spirit of Capitalism*. Verso.

<sup>10</sup> All quotations are my own translation from Danish.

emphasized efficiency as a prevailing legitimization of the police. This model is still evident today.

These reforms should be seen in the context of a general critique of the police force, primarily in Copenhagen, where the small numbers of very violent police officers were still serving the interests of the King by unpopular means.

While implementing the English police model that was partly inspired by the military, reformers in Denmark ignored the massive criticism the model was facing in England for violating the ideals of local autonomy and constitutional freedom. Danish proponents emphasized its civic value and down-played its military origin. For example, the new system replaced the old uniforms with neutral blue ones and symbolically armed the officers with short, colored sticks instead of the long bamboo sticks used earlier, even if in reality, these lead sticks were more dangerous. This superficial transformation was crucial for the legitimization of the police in Denmark.

In 1863 the police in Copenhagen was divided into three ‘branches’: police of order (Ordenspolitiet), health (Sundhedspolitiet) and investigation (Opdagepolitiet) which served to protect of the King’s interests while also systematizing preventive patrolling. The investigation unit provided the new institution of prosecution with evidence materials, interrogations etc., and was primarily a privilege granted to older and more experienced officers who were also paid a higher wage.

These reform initiatives were expanded to include the rest of the country in 1871, although implemented at slow speed.

The 20<sup>th</sup> century, according to Christensen (2012), was dominated by more extensive *industrial* reforms of the Danish police. In 1911 a *state police* reform

took place which was justified with reference to an industrialization of police work. The state police was to manage the movement of delinquents, arson, and the national investigation of serious crimes such as murder. In the area of criminal investigation, police developed and used quasi-scientific methods, such as fingerprint identification, and their performance was measured by a series of parameters, not least with respect to activity and detection rates. Also, parallel to the general industrialization of society and the rise of labor movements, the first Danish police union was formed in 1902.

During the 1<sup>st</sup> World War, the state police undertook larger numbers of primary intelligence-based tasks and the position of the central state police was strengthened in the reform of 1919, which was justified as a process of implementing a general administration of justice and rational, uniform and flexible management of the police. This reform created a significant and ongoing divide between a still growing apparatus of a national police and a local district police that has been subject to conflicts regarding its division of tasks, degree of autonomy and decision making power ever since that time.

In addition, a training program for police officers was established as a way to legitimize policing as a general profession. The investigative police organized themselves as a separate union and were employed directly by the state, unlike other police officers, who were employed by district municipalities at a lower wage, a divide that caused tension between the two groups of police employees and their unions. A third union emerged as the chiefs of the police districts (all educated as lawyers) organized themselves to strengthen their political influence.

The financial crisis in Europe in the 1930s resulted in a general critique of the government and capitalism that involved violent confrontations between the

unemployed and the police in Denmark. Over the next decades, post-war Europe saw a further governmentalization of the welfare state with the state as the central coordinator and employer of the entire Danish police force, and this centralization was manifested in the appointment of a national police commissioner (Rigspolitichef) in 1938. Further consolidation of the hierarchical organization of the police was justified as the means of creating a more modern and balanced police force across the nation.

During the 1960's and 1970's the role of policing changed in the Danish setting as an increasing pattern of internationally related types of crime emerged; this was also an opportunity for the police to re-justify themselves in regards of drug control, intelligence work and even peace keeping in international missions: 'The intensified focus on complicated forms of crime in both Denmark and the EU suddenly made it possible for the police to re-justify their practice... the police now took a central position in the fight against the new enemy of the global world: the terror and the organized crime' (Christensen 2012, p. 184).

These developments led to the creation of additional central units up through the 1990's, such as a national center of intelligence (nationalt efterforskningscenter (NEC)) which was to coordinate international cooperation and support the districts with an overall monitoring of intelligence and investigation expertise. Another quite dramatic change has happened in the Danish police as a general tendency to reduce local municipality units, and is reflected in the merging of police districts through consecutive reforms from 277 in 1970 to 12 after the reform of 2007.

The 1973 oil crisis in Europe mobilized further initiatives for rationalizing the public sector and together with the agenda of Thatcherism through the 1980s the

way was paved for new line of economic thinking which eventually positioned the Danish Ministry of Finance as a central and powerful actor.

### **The police organization today**

This opens the most recent époque of the great reforms of the Danish police, which Christensen (2012) characterizes as *projective* in the sense that external demands and expectations focus on cross-institutional, cross-sectoral and international collaboration, adaptability, flexibility, analytical capacities, and innovation.

In 2003 the Minister of Justice appointed a *vision committee* with representatives primarily from external organizations with the following mandate (my translation):

‘Based on the demands which the citizens rightfully should make to the police in a modern society founded on the rule of law, the committee is considering how the development of society is expected to influence the work of the police during the future decades and which overall objectives should apply to the police in order to ensure that law enforcement develops in line with the legal thinking of society.’<sup>11</sup>

On the basis of citizen surveys and consultant studies the committee published a report in 2005 with suggestions for a new reform of the police. The report portrayed a police force which was seriously mistrusted by citizens and lacked managerial, budgetary, performance and educational (primarily managerial and analytical) competencies and technological capacities. The total responsibility for

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<sup>11</sup> The homepage of the committee: [www.fremtidenspoliti.dk](http://www.fremtidenspoliti.dk)

professionalism, budget and administration was centralized under the authority of the national police commissioner (on behalf of the Minister of Justice).

These suggestions informed the comprehensive reform of the Danish police in 2007, which has been criticized for its overly ambitious attempt to transform the police (Degnegaard 2010). Although some reform objectives were met, such as short and equal responses to calls across the country and a stronger connection to local communities through the establishment of district- and local councils, the police have met with strong criticism, not least because of a dysfunctional call system, which led to a number of cases of police failing to serve citizens, and a budgetary deficit of 265 million Danish Kroner the next year. Also, in 2010 the Danish Evaluation Institute rejected a request for accreditation from the police education service. This rejection forced the Danish Police School and State College to upgrade their staff in terms of education and competencies and by meeting these demands, the accreditation issued the next year. In addition, training for police managers was outsourced to Danish universities.

As in earlier reforms, a renewed attempt was made toward a unified police by removing the division between criminal investigators and uniformed police officers to create 'a single police force which was actually capable of solving police tasks rather than being caught up in old power structures or outdated visions of the police work' (Christensen 2012, p. 212). It should be noted, however, that the unions representing the two branches of police staff had merged in 1999, because the union of criminal investigators had lost influence as the Ministry of Finance demanded a greater range of competencies from state employees and instituted individualized and performance related pay based on managerial evaluation rather than on union negotiated standards.



Whereas the reformers furthered the ideal of a well-coordinated, flexible and efficient police force, the general tendency in the state was to open up top public sector managerial positions to experts other than lawyers, such as economists and political scientists. With the 2007 reform, the provision in the earlier Police Act establishing the monopoly of lawyers on top management positions was abolished, although most top positions in the police are still filled by lawyers: ‘To the lawyers, in spite of the formal removal of their monopoly, the reform could be a win by signaling a symbolic openness parallel to a *de facto* continuation of the managerial monopoly of the lawyers while at the same time securing the managerial autonomy of the police directors in relation to the National Police. As what goes for their access to the police directors’ office much indicates that they were right’ (Christensen 2012, p. 210). Even at the time of writing, more than seven years after the 2007 reform, all police directors are still lawyers.

In addition the impact of rational economic thinking is clearly apparent from the Ministry of Finance’s somewhat unreflective citation of a concluding remark from a report on performance contracts published by the consultancy firm PLS Consult that claims that ‘(it) has been documented that even highly complex activities are measurable and documentable’ (The office of the Ministry of Finance quoted by Christensen 2012, p. 187).

Also, a coordinating executive meeting forum (politiets koncernledelse) was established headed by the national police commissioner with participation from the police directors of the police districts and the heads of departments in the National police.

While some responsibilities were centralized, such as the management of both the Prosecution and the National police with respect to budget, staff allocation and

overall strategic and professional directives, the police districts were also empowered by the decentralization of a number of tasks and decision making functions.

In many respects, the 2007 reform subjected the police institution to the wave of New Public Management – one might be surprised that the Danish police had managed to push off this tendency until this point, though a quantitative evaluation system of performance objectives was implemented in 2004 (PRES, Politiets Resultatevalueringssystem). The reform was justified with reference to increasingly ‘intellectual’ forms of organized and international crime (Christensen 2012).

However, Christensen argues that the new team-based and ‘academized’ police institution generates a new elite, namely staff, projects and departments dealing with the investigation of complicated, organized, and international crime.

As we have seen, the police force in Denmark has moved from a particular governmentality or program of totalitarian government in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries to become a modern police institution transformed into a ‘hybrid’ containing earlier political and societal tensions and reforms.

This brief genealogy of the police as a Danish institution lends depth to understanding the setting in which the present ethnographic study plays out.

### **Tensions and themes across reforms**

The responsibilities of the police have changed significantly with the development of international police collaborations. Besides policing Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, the Danish police are involved with a range of international

missions. And new forms of crime and threats to the state have an increasingly global aspect to them and have become the focus of politicians and policing strategies, including cross-border organized crime, terrorism and cybercrime.

Nonetheless, there are several persistent themes of tension that run through the transformation of the Danish police into a modern institution.

These tensions seem to relate to what we might call the ‘conditional legitimacy’ of police in that the modern institution of the police serves to support the goals of democratic government as a guarantor of ‘order’ in society (and internationally). In this context, the police force is indirectly accountable to the Danish people, and internal or shady autonomous practices that violate principles of law, ethics, human rights, transparency, etc. conflict with that accountability. The *civic* justification of the police force addresses this basically conditional legitimization of the police in democratic society. In effect, one condition for policing is policing the actions of the police themselves through a dense apparatus of discipline and supervisory control, seeking to ensure that police officials stay within their discretionary space. Today, police officials are subjected to a range of political, managerial and cultural disciplinary techniques.

In Denmark executive and judicial powers are separated into police and prosecutory authorities, which are both under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. This close coordination is in line with Foucault’s analysis that ‘police and justice must work together as two complementary actions of the same process – the police assuring ‘the action of society on each individual’ and justice ‘the rights of individuals against society’ (Foucault 1977 (partly citing Duport), p. 96). This divide serves to ensure the impartiality and objectivity of the judicial system of power.

Police practices are formalized within a comprehensive legal, bureaucratic and hierarchical framework, including the Danish Administration of Justice Act (*retsplejeloven*), the Act on the Processing of Personal Data (*persondataloven*), the Law on civil servants (*Tjenestemandsløven*) and the latest reformulation of the Danish Police Act (*Politiløven*) from 2004, which states that ‘The police must ensure safety, security, peace and order in society. The police should advance this purpose through preventive, assisting and enforcing activity’<sup>12</sup>. As such, police practices are closely governed through a massive disciplinary grid. If there is suspicion that an official has violated one of these laws, he/she will be subjected to disciplinary investigation (*disciplinærundersøgelse*), and this might lead in turn to disciplinary punishment.

The ranks and titles of police officials are assigned with disciplinary power, such as that of ‘inspektør’ (Eng. *inspector*), and ‘betjent’ (from German *Bedienter*, meaning ‘servant’ and in English ‘officer’).

Also, the police are regulated and disciplined through detailed guidelines of proper behavior. For example, a flyer issued by the National Police on ethics for police officers states that ‘it is important for the task performance of the police that you as a police official demonstrate professionalism and that you are able to communicate with all groups of the population. The police uniform should be a guarantee for authority as well as your personal anonymity, and therefore it is important that you wear it as prescribed by the dress code. Those rules have been manifested in the interest of your own safety and the general reputation of the police’<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> <http://samples.pubhub.dk/9788757492996.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> Original statement written in Danish at <https://www.politi.dk/NR/rdonlyres/87B3E395-4AE2-4598-8878-D5244CA53391/0/Etikipolitiet.pdf>

These are a few examples of the disciplinary apparatus set up to ‘police the police’; in line with this it should be noted that whereas Chief Rasch was infamous for his corrupt methods (Stevnsborg 2010), police in Denmark have generally been well disciplined, contributing to one of the lowest corruption indexes in the world (Transparency International, 2013).

However, as justifications for the police have become more *industrial*, reformers have introduced the notion of the taxpayers’ right to get value for their money, so the efficiency of police work has become central to the social legitimacy of the police. The ongoing tensions between local autonomy and centralized efficiency and the implementation of performance measurement systems were recurrent themes preoccupying police officials at all ranks during my fieldwork.

The industrial reorientation of the police into the elite branch of criminal investigators and the more recently invented cadre of ‘investigators of organized crime’ has generated internal tensions in the police between higher-level investigative officers and uniformed police officers, and the police Union has feared the development of a split between ‘*A and B police*’. I witnessed this rhetoric in several discussions about new departments and task allocation within the police force, as we will see in greater detail in the empirical second part of the thesis.

Other noteworthy tensions solidly rooted in history include power struggles between layers of police professionals and the conflicts and dynamics reflecting the profound dichotomy between office and street as it is presented by the police. The workings of the hierarchy with its privileges of power and the bureaucracy of the office will be the specific subject of the first empirical part of the thesis.

## **The politics of innovation**

As already indicated, *innovation* did not just pop out of a fortune cookie served one day on the desks of the Public Prosecutor or the National Commissioners. Somehow, the way was paved for innovation to ultimately appear in the strategic document.

The term ‘innovation’ carries different meanings over time, which are closely tied – if not produced by – changing goals of government, such as neoliberal policy and the regime that seeks to manage public sector institutions in emulation of enterprise models. Acknowledging that innovation is a political program on the part of government knit together by the dominant academic construction as previously presented means treating innovation as a particular, politically infused *discourse*.

Foucault tends to avoid definitions in his work; his conceptualization of discourse is no exception, and this ambiguity of definition has led to many scholarly elaborations and attempts to ‘clean up’ the sometimes lax and uncritical academic use of the concept of discourse.

Knights and Morgan (1991, p. 253) define discourse as ‘a set of ideas and practices which condition our ways of relating to, and acting upon, particular phenomena. Because a discourse is always embedded in social practice, it cannot be *reduced* to its ideational content any more than be seen as devoid of theory... when subjects come to understand the world in these terms, then social practices develop which reproduce this perception of ‘truth’.

Within this framework, it is important to critically question innovation and the truism associated with it since, for Foucault, a term that travels across nations and invades policies and corporate strategies cannot be viewed as mere coincidence.

In this section I argue that innovation, as a government program, encompasses discourses of enterprise and the entrepreneurial spirit as they have been fueled by neoliberal governmentality, but innovation has moved beyond its political authorship; that is, it has to become quite natural to rethink government practices in terms of *innovation* in the face of globalism the financial crisis of the West.

Understanding innovation as a discourse of government provides a background for studying how innovation is perceived, received and practiced as a managerial goal within the institution of the police in Denmark. An awareness of the politics of innovation is also important to (auto-) critically engage with the subject.

Although it is new in the Danish police force to explicitly highlight *innovation* in its strategy, the term has gone beyond Western government and industrial policy for decades, and its meaning has continuously changed.

For example, Perren and Sapsed (2013) have conducted a linguistic analysis of the meaning of innovation in the UK parliamentary discourse over the past five decades. They suggest that ‘the meaning of the word innovation was established by policymakers pursuing an increasing range of sectoral policies, which they rhetorically linked to innovation’ (Ibid., p. 11). Innovation thus seems to work as an ‘empty signifier’, a sort of rhetorical remedy that allows policymakers to code different political messages into the term.

According to their analysis, the innovation discourse has changed from focusing on ‘lack of innovation’ in 1980s to ‘access of innovation’ in the 1990s, whereas the 2000s seem to demonstrate a specific concern with global and future economy as a matter of ‘lack/lost opportunity for innovation’.

As demonstrated earlier in the section on dominant lines of thought in the literature on public sector innovation in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, academic

pronouncements and political ambitions have mutually reinforced each other in praise of entrepreneurial governance. Recall for example how the proposal for ‘Reinventing Government’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) was to shake off the dead weight of the innovation-indifferent, budget-maximizing bureaucrat also described in Niskanen’s work (Niskanen 1994).

Over time, as there is greater agreement that government, too, can and should be innovative (see. Hartley, 2005; Osborne & Brown, 2013), the persistence of certain problems in the public sector can now be blamed on innovation that never happened. It has become quite natural to assume that any problem could have been solved by the abstract promise of more innovation.

Perren and Sapsed’s (2013) study lends support to the idea that innovation has become more central to government policies and is presented in increasingly positive and promising terms since the 1980’s: ‘The word innovation has come to be unreservedly used with positive associations signifying a desirable goal. Thus, the successful introduction of novelty is seen as a worthy and important task in itself, and it has therefore become politically expedient to associate innovation with multiple agendas’ (Ibid., p.12).

Further, innovation is now more often associated with government as its co-driver as opposed to an earlier emphasis on industry as the primary force of innovation: ‘In the parliamentary corpus, ‘innovation and autonomy’ are linked in the 2000s (...) ‘earned autonomy, relaxation of external monitoring and reporting justified in terms of freeing the public institutions to innovate’... ‘innovation and partnership’ appear as phrases that seem to infuse legislative programs with a positive aura of innovation’ (Ibid., p. 9).



In line with this association with government, the definition of innovation in government has changed from one restricted to technology to a much broader view that includes ‘the successful exploitation of new ideas’ (Ibid.). Arguably, it is questionable how well the idea of innovation as technology is relevant to public organizations given the dominance of services in public production. Hartley’s (2005) history of public sector innovation and improvement argues that each ‘epoch’ of public reform has had its own logic of innovation. In none of these logics does technology play a dominant role.

Traditional public administration in the post-war period was about large-scale policy changes and the building up of institutions; New Public Management is about organizational change and new forms of organizing, and about the emergent idea of governance focused on citizen-directed services. This discrepancy between a (roughly speaking) private, technology-focused definition of innovation and a public, service-focused definition also demands considerable translation effort whenever the rationale of innovation-related benefits is transferred between the two sectors.

Thus, the term innovation carries with it a discourse that is woven together from neo-liberal aims to govern public sector institutions as enterprises, an aim which seems only to have been spurred on by the latest Western financial crisis. It springs from the desire of governments to become more like enterprises, more entrepreneurial and less bureaucratic (Du Gay 2000).

As early as in 1990, Miller and Rose recognized that praise of autonomy and self-fulfillment was a central rhetorical figure embedded in the entrepreneurial enterprise discourse, which has also had a major impact on public sector rhetoric and reform: ‘The vocabulary of enterprise provides versatile tools for thought: the

worker is no longer construed as a social creature seeking satisfaction of his or her need for security, solidarity and welfare, but as an individual actively seeking to shape and manage his or her own life in order to maximize its returns in terms of success and achievement. Thus the vocabulary of entrepreneurship does not merely seek to shape the way bosses calculate and activate business strategies in the external world of the market, but also can be formulated by the experts of management into a new set of techniques for ensuring business success' (Miller & Rose 1990, p. 26)

At least since the 1980's, Western government strategies have viewed innovation as a key cross-national competitive factor (European Act of 1986). Technological material product innovation has been a prime focus of development, although some scholars argue that priorities have shifted toward the area of knowledge production (Fonseca 2002).

Government strategies on innovation describe the need to rethink services and to form partnerships with external partners, typically private sector organizations, and develop broadly applicable solutions (Obama 2009; Danish Government 2010 & 2012; Government of Canada 2002; Liljemark 2004; European Commission 2009).

As an example, in the US government's 2009 innovation strategy, President Barack Obama encouraged more collaborative product innovation between public and private partners as the one of the answers to the financial challenges and the future of the country:

'History should be our guide. The United States led the world's economies in the 20th century because we led the world in innovation. Today, the competition is keener; the challenge is tougher; and that is why innovation is more important than

ever. It is the key to good, new jobs for the 21st century. That's how we will ensure a high quality of life for this generation and future generations. With these investments, we're planting the seeds of progress for our country, and good-paying, private-sector jobs for the American people' (Obama 2009:1).

Innovation is directly connected to the hope of ensuring future economic growth and welfare, an aim that is also found in a report by the European Commission (2009) evaluating the innovation progress of the European Union; not surprisingly, the discourse was echoed in the Danish government's innovation strategy for the period 2010 to 2012:

'The Danish welfare system will be increasingly under pressure to solve more tasks and improve the quality within a limited availability of resources. The pressure on the public sector might create an increase in the demand for solutions both by citizens, municipalities, social institutions and the hospitals' (Regeringen 2010, p. 22).

Danish policy makers perceive innovation as salable, profitable products, and a market development strategy, which must ensure 'as great an effect as possible' (Ibid., p. 21).

The discourse has manifested itself even more broadly in the Danish government, which published an "*ambitious innovation strategy*" in December 2012, more or less reflecting the performance measures of the latest Innovation Union Scoreboard and declaring that "*Denmark must be the land of solutions where innovative solutions to major societal challenges are turned into growth and employment*"<sup>14</sup> (my translation).

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<sup>14</sup> <http://fivu.dk/aktuelt/pressemeddelelser/2012/regeringen-praesenterer-danmarks-nationale-innovationsstrategi>

A few months later, the name of the ministry announcing this goal was changed to *the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Higher Education*, and in March 2013 it was announced on the Ministry's webpage that Denmark is among the leading European countries of the European Union in innovation, although overtaken by Germany<sup>15</sup>. The performance measures, as defined by the Innovation Union Scoreboard 2013<sup>16</sup> count 25 indicators including technological and non-technological innovations as well as public (primarily education), private and joint sector outputs – not least highlighting the importance of ‘*entrepreneurship*’. It also implies that European countries are actually competing to be *the* most innovative.

In 2014, the Government established a Center for Public Innovation (Center for Offentlig Innovation) with the purpose of collecting, recognizing and sharing innovation across institutional borders in Denmark.

As such, the political goal of innovation has become ‘natural’ beyond any need for further elaboration or argumentation. In line with Foucault's writing, innovation *acts* upon the social in subtle ways that align the rhetoric of heads of government across nations and political positions, in that innovation signals progress, responsibility and foresight.

It is no coincidence that innovation has become a central theme for the police as well, which is reflected in many a national strategy for police institutions, including the overall strategy for the Danish police and Prosecution for the period 2011-15.

As we will see in chapter 4, initiatives have been carried out by the top police management in Denmark that mirror the political discourse.

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<sup>15</sup> <http://fivu.dk/aktuelt/pressemeldelser/2013/danmark-stadig-blandt-de-forende-innovative-eu-medlemslande>

<sup>16</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/ius-2013\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/ius-2013_en.pdf)

In their genealogy of the discourse of corporate strategy, Knights and Morgan (1991) explain the emergence of business strategies over the past five decades as ‘irrational’ responses to overwhelming logic’ in the sense that strategy ‘negates and devaluates alternative approaches to organization... For those who accept the logic of the discourse, it provides them with a subjective identity that is expanded, through participation in its reproduction’ (p. 262).

Strategies produce power relations and subject identities and practices of organizational life to managerial concerns. In line with this, Miller and Rose (1990) propose ‘intellectual technologies’, such as government strategies, as *programmatic*: ‘Programmes of government are idealized schema for the ordering of social and economic life. As such they are not simply ‘applied’ through techniques such as national planning and accounting. Programmes constitute a space within which the objectives of government are elaborated, and where plans to implement them are dreamed up’ (Ibid., p. 14).

The innovation discourse is being *installed* in the police setting, so to speak, through the publishing of an innovation strategy as an example of ‘explicit programmes for reforming reality’ (Ibid.).

The installation of innovation reveals a curious ambiguity. At one hand, if innovation is considered to act as a technique of government, innovation carries with it a discursive promise of the autonomous entrepreneur, the potential creative savior slumbering in us all, and yet, on the other hand, innovation simultaneously arrests or colonizes autonomy by acting through the *governed* subject as a *governing* installation.

It is one thing to explain that managerial governing techniques, such as the politics surrounding innovation, are being installed in organizational settings. It is another

thing to grasp and explain how the ‘innovation technology’ is being ‘activated’ in the everyday organizational life of the police force. What do police officials make of ‘innovation’? How does the discourse of innovation act upon them in their everyday organizational life?

Before we can pursue these questions any further, we need to move beyond the abstractions of the innovation discourse and closer to the everyday practices of the Danish police.

### **Moving closer to innovation as everyday creativity within the police**

Public sector innovation, as it is prescribed by the discourse and its inherent politics, can be roughly summarized as creative best practice solutions and reform-minded changes that serve the current aims of creating efficient and entrepreneurial welfare apparatuses.

However, Foucault invites us to be critical about such discursive formations, ‘to tear away from them their virtual self-evidence, and to free the problems that they pose...’ (Foucault 1972, p. 26).

In order to move beyond the ‘virtual self-evidence’ of innovation, we need to take a closer look at the everyday endeavors of the police *doing* innovation. As we will see, the understandings and concerns that the police associate with innovation are multiple and fragmented; I will argue that engaging with innovation beyond the present discourse can provide important insight into the kind of creative practices it silences.

To accomplish this goal, we first need to supplement our understanding of innovation as a discursive managerial goal with some attention to other spheres of organizational creativity.

The sociologist and philosopher Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) was said to have silenced Foucault with a critique entitled '*Forget Foucault*' primarily directed towards Foucault's theory of power and discipline proposed in *Discipline and Punish* originally published in French in 1975 (Lotringer in Baudrillard 1977).

Baudrillard's point was that Foucault's own work was also guilty of producing a totalitarian - and particularly at that time indisputable - discourse, namely that of *power*: 'Power, then, is still turned toward a reality principle and a very strong truth principle; it is still oriented toward a possible coherence of politics and discourse (power no longer pertains to the despotic order of what is forbidden and of the law, but it still belongs to the objective order of the real). Foucault can thus describe to us the successive spirals of power, the last of which enables him to mark its most minute terminations, although power never ceases being the term, and the question of its extermination can never arise' (Baudrillard 1977, p. 31).

Whereas Foucault's '*Discipline and Punish*' has been critiqued for over-emphasizing repressive dimensions of power, Foucault himself was aware of this as he invited readers (and perhaps himself?) to focus on the more creative and productive aspects of power: 'We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production' (Ibid., p. 194).

In addition, Foucault's later work focused more on the production of 'biopower' and 'micro-power' as discursive means of power 'mechanisms' within the sphere of modern governmentalities.

Yet, power and discourse remains central to Foucault's attention and studying innovation solely as a discursive 'art of government' would only serve to illustrate how innovation, in Baudrillard's sarcastic rendering of Foucault's understanding of power, 'operates right away like Monod's genetic code, according to a diagram of dispersion and command (DNA)' (Ibid., p. 46).

Moreover, Foucault vehemently disparaged the conceptualization and 'anthropologization' of *culture* and *tradition* for falsely fixating historical events in time and constructing speculative categories of understandings (e.g. Foucault 1972; Foucault 1977).

However, as Alvesson & Kärreman (2002, p. 1144) point out, studies of '*grand discourse*' in organizations are intertwined with the same risk of "... *gross categorization – the suppression of variation and nuance through matching 'data' to a pre-ordered framework and the wish to structure empirical material and sort it into fixed categories*".

Yet Foucault's genealogy of discipline and power is most helpful for understanding innovation as a 'Grand discourse' and carrier of certain politics. Also, Foucault provides an in-depth understanding of the disciplinary mechanisms that characterize the cultural setting of the police force. As we will see in the first empirical part of the study (focusing on the workings of hierarchy), there seems to be a tightly knit web of disciplinary micro-powers that surrounds and hijacks the discourse of innovation and produces auto-responses from the police officers such as: "*We are our own worst enemy when it comes to trying new stuff*".



More recent Foucauldian studies have recognized the value of embracing and engaging with culture, including governmentality studies. But as it is pointed out by Bratich, Packer & McCarthy (2003) their attention to culture has been reserved to the tendency of reproducing neo-Gramscian perceptions of culture that address hegemony, which, as summarized by Ang, 'is mostly used to indicate the cultural leadership of the dominant classes in the production of generalized meanings, of 'spontaneous' consent to the prevailing arrangement of social relations - a process, however, that is never finished because hegemony can never be complete' (Ang, 1996, p. 116).

Ang continues: 'As a form of cultural critique, this kind of ideological analysis [inspired by Gramsci] (...) is ultimately propelled by a will to demystify, denounce, condemn; it is a deconstructive practice which presupposes that the researcher/critic take up the aloof position of critical outsider' (Ibid.) and, in line with this critique, she and Stratton argue for 'a revision of the Foucauldian notion of power as a pandemic force' in order to better understand the specifics of resistance as they argue that 'its politics are always partial and provisional and require vigilant interrogation' (Ang & Stratton 1996, p. 75).

We are now moving closer to studying culture, yet with a critical awareness to how culture might also work as a discursive technique. For example, Barinaga (2002) demonstrates how the term *culture* was used in reference to ethnicity and gender to cover up discrepancies among the members of a multi-cultural work team. In this case, *culture* was being used rather 'creatively' by some individuals as a rhetorical act to override objections from the other group members.

Therefore we might have to move beyond discourse to explore what other elements might *also* be at play in cultural and organizational life.

In addressing the tendencies in more recent Foucauldian discourse studies, Alvesson & Kärreman (2011) problematize the ways that scholars often reduce organizational endeavors as being discursive, thereby leaving out non-discursive aspects of organizational life. As the authors point out, there is more to the story than that - practices which are not necessarily best regarded or described from a discursive perspective: 'From an organizational analysis point of view, perhaps the biggest drawback with Foucauldian discourses is that they are claimed to constitute reality - not only in its ideational dimension, but also in its practical-behavioral dimension - yet without being able to spell out how - and perhaps even if - this actually happens. In other words, the Foucauldian take on discourse does not include a clear idea on how discourse influences people to act in the prescribed way' (Ibid., p. 1131)

Baudrillard raised a similar point of criticism when he questioned Foucault's concept of discourse, which he exemplified in regards of sexuality: 'If sex exists solely when it is spoken and discoursed about and when it is confessed, what was there before we spoke about it?' (Baudrillard 1977, p. 45). Something, obviously.

And something does lurk in the shadows of the innovation discourse. As I will portray in part two, gray zone creativity can only be found if we move beyond the blind pursuit of innovation. These are institutionalized forms of creativity that existed long before the call for innovation within the police force, and that became apparent in the fieldwork guided by Michel de Certeau's work.

De Certeau called for us to study culture, because he explicitly valued ethnographic detail to explore seemingly ordinary everyday practices beyond discourse. He offered, what Highmore (2006) suggests as a 'meta-methodology', a set of attention to methods, aimed at engaging with the study of cultural life, for

moving intellectual engagement with objects closer to everyday life and away from privileged and self-referential theorizing.

With de Certeau's theory of everyday practices it becomes possible to break out of the powerful discourse of innovation and zoom in on everyday creativity in the police force.

### **Michel de Certeau on the silent forces in the margins**

Whereas Foucault was primarily engaged with the dynamics of power in shaping and governing social life, Michel de Certeau (1925-1986) pleaded for a more detailed engagement with everyday practices and the potential subversive forces arising in 'the margins' *within* dominant patterns of social life.

De Certeau assembled his multifaceted approach from different academic fields that included classical studies, philosophy, theology and psychology (psychoanalysis). Together with Foucault, he was preoccupied with the *production* of writing history or, more precisely with 'the ways in which history is re-authored, re-inscribed and re-configured' (Napolitano & Pratten 2007, pp. 2-3).

De Certeau primarily worked with written empirical material in the form of historical documents (which is also the case for Foucault) and has been known to be among the greatest theorists of practice and culture (Highmore 2002 & 2006).

His book from 1984 (orig. 1980), *The practice of everyday life*, was specifically dedicated to privilege the creative forces played out in everyday life by 'the common hero' (that is, any one of us). He proposed a theory of practice, invoking 'a science of singularity; that is to say, a science of the relationship that links everyday pursuits to particular circumstances' (Ibid., p. ix).

Together with Foucault's view of the police as governmentality and modern governmental authority and of innovation as a managerial discourse, de Certeau provides a crucial understanding of practices that *differ* from discursively colonized practices.

As such, he shared Foucault's concern that totalitarian depictions of the world are saturated with meaning to the extent that they merely subject everything into their tautological formulations: 'A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre – a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape; a general history, on the contrary, would deploy the space of a dispersion' (Foucault 1972, p. 10).

But whereas Foucault's aim was to genealogically trace, expose, and challenge power production and relations, de Certeau sought to multiply stories, accounts and approaches to demonstrate the eternal variations and recombinations of human experience and meaning that spin off from everyday life. His theory of practice is an appeal to explore and privilege the singular so as to make it stand out from its anonymous camouflage and thereby celebrate the silenced heterogeneous ways in which social life is being *lived*.

De Certeau wanted to move beyond Foucault's historical production of a 'zone in which technological procedures have specific *effects of power*, obey their own *logical modes of functioning* and can produce a fundamental *diversion* within the institutions of order and knowledge' (de Certeau 1984, p. 49).

What he pursued instead were 'other, equally infinitesimal, procedures, which have not been "privileged" by history but are nevertheless active in innumerable ways in the openings of established technological networks' (Ibid.).

For de Certeau, creativity is pervasive, yet it is often silenced by the dominant forms that precede and surround emerging innovation. He explores the hidden or disguised ways of submitting to the rules of dominant social orders, such as in his example of Native Americans who, when the Spanish colonizers imposed their culture upon them, merely ‘*made of*’ the rituals, representations, and laws imposed on them something quite different from what their conquerors had in mind; they subverted them not by rejecting or altering them, but by using them with respect to ends and references foreign to the system they had no choice but to accept’ (Ibid., p. xiii).

In using what was already known and of concern to them together with what is imposed on them, the Native Americans invented means of dealing with the new system imposed upon them, or, as de Certeau noted: ‘They were *other* within the very colonization that outwardly assimilated them; their use of the dominant order deflected its power, they lacked the means to challenge; they escaped it without leaving it’ (Ibid.)

This move beyond the ‘zone’ of historically embedded power relations is crucial in noticing the silent practices of *gray zone* creativity among the Danish police, as I will discuss later.

## **What is creativity without space for variation?**

Jumping into the driver’s seat of the patrol car, the police officer immediately stretches his legs while his entire body stiffens into the shape of an arch and he bangs his head against the car ceiling. He removes some stuff from the pockets in his uniform trousers: a mobile

phone, keys, a small flashlight and some other stuff. *“Shit, I hate these pockets, they turn my balls blue”*, he groans.

According to him, the uniform pants used to have spaciously bellowed thigh-pockets which have now been reduced *“by some desk-monkey (skrivebordsabe) who got the idea that those of us who actually use the pants look like cowboys”* (i.e. that stuffed pockets look unauthorized and messy).

As a consequence, each time the police officers put too many things into their trouser pockets, which is the only place they have to carry smaller things with them when on patrol, the pants tighten across their thighs, which can be quite painful and uncomfortable, especially when on patrol duty for several hours.

*“Why is it that we can’t have two pair of pants, or even more; One pair for the street cops and one pair for those dancing around on the polished floors in the management corridors”*, he complains.

As this incident demonstrates, bureaucracy does not favor variation; In fact, bureaucracy weeds out variation and replaces it with standardized, uniform solutions to meet values and principles of equal service to all.

To de Certeau, however, variation is exactly what happens on an everyday basis as we make use of standardized solutions or ways of organizing the social. To him, variation is what eventually creates new combinations and innovation, even though it might - at least for some time – appear as nothing but a small deviation from the norm.

Using ‘the street’ as a metaphor for organization, de Certeau (1984) drew attention to how authorities represent the city (i.e. ways of organizing the social) as a unified whole, e.g. through the production of city maps (i.e. formal organizational structures and roles). He refers to these institutional planners as *producers* of strategies.

Meanwhile, individual ‘walkers’ in the street *act* in the city as *consumers* of defined strategized places by producing ‘tactical spaces’ - the seizing and creation of gaps and openings in the strategic grid. This multiple and creative usage or effectuation of strategy through innovative tactical practices is central to de Certeau’s project.

So when de Certeau writes about ‘tactics’ and ‘strategies’ he uses these terms differently from the way they are used in military and police settings, although, as Highmore (2002) points out, he does play with the metaphor of war when defining *strategy*: ‘I call a *strategy* the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated. It postulates a *place* that can be delimited as its *own* and serve as the base from which relations with an *exteriority* composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors, enemies, the country surrounding the city, objectives and objects of research, etc.) can be managed’ (de Certeau 1984, p. 36-37).

*Strategy* is associated with ‘proper conventions’ and ‘practices of colonization, or the bleak protocols of ‘scientific management’’ (Highmore 2002, p. 158).

A *tactic* is to be understood as ‘cross-cuts, fragments, cracks and lucky hits in the framework of a system’ operating at the margin of discourse; Yet ‘it must play on

and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign power' (de Certeau 1984, p. 37-38).

Insisting that everyday practices are fragmented and constantly come together in new formations, de Certeau moves beyond the 'docility' of Foucault's subject to one that 'uses' or 'consumes' the system in which it is embedded: 'By leaving the obscure stratum in which Foucault locates the determining mechanisms of a society, it would be in the position of institutions slowly "colonized" by still silent procedures' (Ibid., p. 49).

Thus, de Certeau proposed that everyday practices, *tactics*, performed in the margins of existing order were the creative forces that depose and replace power domains from within. To him, no systems are total in the power they exert upon the subject, because of the subject's ever-present capacity to make use of this power in new ways. As such, de Certeau provides an 'ontology that eludes the powerful' (Pratten 2007).

As illustrated by his exploration of the different ways in which 'ordinary people' engage with daily routine practices such as cooking, reading, writing and walking, he points to the easily overlooked *differences* in how we do these things. When cooking while following the same recipe a number of times, you may add or leave out ingredients, which makes the meal turn out slightly or completely different from the previous one. And when reading, your memories and imagination add meaning to the text: 'Words become the outlet or product of silent histories', he writes in his introduction, hereby enforcing 'a play of spaces' or 'a different world' silently and rather unnoticed emerging from your routine.

The political aspect of de Certeau's point of view may be seen as a matter of addressing potentials of multicultural coexistence 'between persons and social



groups who were separated by their differences eager to preserve them' (Napolitano & Pratten 2007, p. 3).

The inexhaustible variations of practices create space for 'otherness', for creativity. The tactics are 'playing with spaces' (de Certeau, 1984). They 'hack' strategic place as it is represented as strategically carefully planned, scheduled and ordered mappings of social life.

The '*users*' of the city, i.e. those who walk and live in it 'make use of spaces that cannot be seen... It is as though the practices organizing a bustling city were characterized by their blindness' (Ibid., p. 93).

Foucault also touched upon the subject of space for creativity and otherness, and he has been cited for proposing a 'heterotopology' (Foucault & Miskowiec 1986). He elaborated the term *heterotopia* as an extension of the historical and cultural fencing-in of the concept of *space*. Complementary to *utopias* or 'fundamentally unreal spaces' Foucault highlighted *heterotopias* as 'counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia' (Ibid).

Bringing together de Certeau's notions of strategized place and tactical space and Foucault's notion of *heterotopias* or *other spaces*, organizational creativity can be understood 'as a form of social creativity, as a tactical art of creating space for play and/ or invention within an established order, to actualize new practices' (Hjorth 2005, p. 387).

So, to both Foucault and de Certeau, what is crucial for organizational creativity and innovation is that the actors make space for varieties of knowledge and practices.

But in stepping aside from the Foucauldian preoccupation with the subtle techniques of power - the artful workings of government - de Certeau reminds us to look and listen for alternative stories of how ‘the weak’ also use ‘the strong’ by acting on the techniques of power and creating space for other practices. The tactics are played out in organizational settings in the form of silent and singular innovative potentials. They also have a certain ethic of autonomy to them, to which we shall now turn.

### **An ethic of autonomy**

*“Only if mankind possessed a universally recognized goal would it be possible to propose ‘thus and thus is the right course of action’. For the present there exists no such goal. It is thus irrational and trivial to impose the demands of morality upon mankind.”*

- Nietzsche cited in Ansell-Pearson 1991, p. 284.

De Certeau called for the study of culture and emphasized the value of ethnographic detail in demonstrating how unofficial practices are as influential in shaping the dominant discourses of social life: ‘only in the **local** network of labor and recreation can one grasp how, within a grid of socio-economic constraints, these pursuits unfailingly establish relational tactics (a struggle for life), artistic creations (an aesthetic), and autonomous initiatives (an ethic). The characteristically subtle logic of these “ordinary” activities comes to light only in the details’ (De Certeau 1984, p. XXX).

But the proposal that autonomous and silent practices operate at the margin of undermine discourse does not mean that ‘tactics’ are necessarily to be regarded as deliberate organizational mutiny, although Highmore (2002) does point out that the military notion of tactics leads toward an association with ‘guerrilla combat’.

De Certeau’s notion of tactics is well conveyed in the following phrase: ‘Tactics is the inventive employment of possibilities within strategic circumstances: disguise, surprise, discretion, secrecy, wit, play, bluff and so on. Crucially, tactics don’t operate outside a strategy that they confront; to do this would require a counter-strategy, they are in the ambiguous position of being inside but ‘other’’ (Highmore 2002, p. 159).

As de Certeau suggests, tactics imply, an ethic by virtue of their autonomous initiative. In this paradigm, I would detect an unstated connection to Nietzsche ‘who allows otherness to be affirmed without incorporating it within some grand dialectical system of political thought... Nietzsche shows us the subject is not simply the self which establishes its independence and self-transparency, but it is also the self that is required to respond to the demands of modernity by interiorizing a complex set of socially imposed standards and to regulate forms of otherness in itself and in society which deviate from established social norms’ (Ansell-Pearson 1991<sup>17</sup>, p. 282).

What de Certeau’s ethic of autonomy shares Nietzsche’s is that its ‘conceiving society in such a way that the emphasis on formal legal equality does not result in a culture where creativity and individuality become stifled’ (Ibid., p. 281).

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<sup>17</sup> With reference to William E. Connolly 1988: *Political Theory and Modernity*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Drawing upon this parallel to Nietzsche, ‘tactics’ implies a ‘will to self-responsibility’ (Ibid.) even though our autonomous will and action will always be self-regulated by the social sphere by which we are culturally imprinted.

To sum up, we have now presented the theoretical framework that guides the study as a balanced movement between complementary forms of attention.

Based on Foucault’s genealogy of government and the multiplication of governmentalities and techniques of government, we can understand the foundation of modern police authority as emerging from *police governmentality*. The *institution* of the police arose from this kind of governmentalization of the state, and has served society across changing governmentalities and a series of different reforms. Today, the modern institution of the police can be considered as a *hybrid* apparatus of government, serving a more complex set of political agendas and means of justification of police practices. As such, the *strategic place* of the police (with reference to de Certeau) is governed by multiple concerns and self-regulatory disciplinary techniques of which the managerial and discursive strategy of innovation is merely one (with reference to Foucault).

As we will later see, the workings of these institutionalized disciplinary techniques set the stage and script for how police officials interact with ‘innovation’ as well as the sorts of practices they associate with ‘real’ creativity.

Further, in attending to innovation as a *discourse*, a politically charged agency, we will see that it does not act upon a ‘blank slate’; rather, the subtle workings of the highly disciplinary setting of the police force are amplified as they are confronted with the somewhat contradictory discourse of innovation.

Finally, with de Certeau we are guided to be on guard for creative endeavors outside of the strategic grid of disciplinary culture and the discourse of innovation.

In bringing voice to the silent practices taking place at the margins of organizational life, we can get a glimpse of everyday creativity that is not yet culturally recognized or ‘baptized’ as ‘innovation’. Within these *other spaces* of organizational life, the police will demonstrate to us their gray zone creativity.

## Chapter 2. Methods

*The approach to culture begins when the ordinary man **becomes** the narrator, when it is he who defines the (common) place of the discourse and the (anonymous) space of its development*

- Michel de Certeau 1984, p. 5.

One has to acknowledge that studying everyday life in the setting of the police force sometimes conforms to the metaphor of the police as ‘*a bureaucratic Kafkaesque nightmare*’ (Moskos 2008) or, as a Danish police officer described it, ‘*a Monty Python nut case factory*’ (Da. *en Monty Python tøssefabrik*).

What these metaphors suggest it that, a lot goes on in large police bureaucracies that lies beyond the perceptive capacity of any individual. An individual police officer might feel estranged from decision processes and other activities that are taking place in other spheres or even within his/her own department.

For example, older colleagues often respond to the bewilderment of young police officers with the mystifying phrase: “*nothing is what it seems to be*” (intet er som det ser ud til at være). The implication is that there is a hidden logic behind life in the large, sometimes chaotic police organization.

Although many police officers insist upon the existence of some sort of cultural uniformity among police - that they are *one* force, *one* brotherhood, *one* family - the cultural setting of the police is highly fragmented (Hunt 2010). No two units are the really the same. No police officers or managers I had in-depth conversations with shared completely the same values, hopes and dreams about their work, even if they shared a culturally ingrained ‘mindset’; at least when it was convenient to construct and benefit from such a ‘blue’ bond.

As a ‘whole’, the police organization is impossible to access and grasp, even for the police themselves, and this is reflected in a recurrent piece of advice I was given by mentoring police officers starting from my very first day – that it is crucial to build a ‘*strategic network if one wants to survive in the system*’.

Thus, it was no simple matter to access the everyday life of the police; nor was it straightforward to study *innovation*, since the many versions and examples of what constituted innovation reflect the heterogeneity of police cultures and tasks, how they are organized, and how they are performed.

This chapter describes the ways in which the study has found its methodological inspiration from Foucault and de Certeau, and how this original framework expanded even further as I was confronted with daily realities of the life of the police in Denmark.

That is, the closer I came to the everyday cultural life of the police in which I was embedded, the more this study took the form of ethnography. After a reflection on the terms and conditions of the study in terms of its formal arrangement and how that shaped the empirical process I will elaborate on what ethnography implies in respect of this study. In particular, ethnography contributes with a semiotic approach the emergence of practices and meanings as varying and co-existing

within organizations that may makes it possible to intensify the weak voices of marginal practices even further.

Further, I will unfold some of the challenges of access negotiation within an organizational setting that is notoriously known to be closed to non-members. Given the somewhat strange role as a researcher working for and in the police - and in my case different settings - I repeatedly experienced a need to justify my presence. That is, not necessarily as a researcher, but someone who might be at some *use* to the police from their point of view.

Finally, I provide an outline the ethical concerns and precautions involved with the study.

### **‘Making do’ with guidance from Foucault and de Certeau**

The study combines and expands methodological frameworks from Foucault and, primarily, from de Certeau, which eventually led the focus on gray zone creativity within the police.

Foucault’s conceptualizations of governmentality and discourse will serve to contextualize both *police* and *innovation* within the arc of the subtle power relations and practices that inhabit and surround them.

At the same time, the study also tries to look beyond (or ‘beneath’) this discourse by taking a more micro-oriented perspective on police practices. This approach follows the reservations expressed by Alvesson and Kärreman (2011) about focusing on discourse exclusively at the macro-level. They differentiate *micro-discourse* approaches, focusing on local production of discourse through language based interaction, from the *macro-discourse* approaches suggested by Foucault.

As they state it, ‘Discourse in the Foucauldian sense is less about everyday linguistic interaction and more about historically developed systems of ideas that form institutionalized and authoritative ways of addressing a topic, to ‘regimes of truth’’ (Ibid., p. 1130).

From this vantage point, this study explores how innovation and other disciplinary techniques act and interact as macro-discursive forces in different settings within the police force. I go beyond the limitations of merely studying the conversations of police officials by also including demonstrations of the ways that the innovation discourse and other less dominant productions of creativity manifest themselves in practices that are not necessarily articulated (for a critique of the reductionism resulting from an exclusive focus on language, see Alvesson and Kärreman 2002 & 2011).

The discourse-analytic approach is primarily used in Part II to better understand the disciplinary mechanisms of hierarchy as one particular culturally embedded element in how the innovation discourse is being received differently in the police. However, Foucault did in fact invite us to pay attention to micro-level aspects of disciplinary power: ‘Describing them [the disciplinary techniques] will require great attention to detail: beneath every set of figures, we must seek not a meaning, but a precaution; we must situate them not only in the inextricability of a functioning, but in the coherence of a tactic... discipline is a political anatomy of detail’ (Foucault 1977, p. 139).

Given his strong reservations about anthropology, it is quite noteworthy that Foucault himself (Ibid.) draws heavily on the vocabulary of anthropology as he unfolds his genealogy and grounds it in historical texts. He analyses written accounts of historical events with attention to ‘ceremony’, ‘ritual’, ‘symbol’,



‘tradition’ and ‘sign’, and this approach might indicated the methodological space he leaves for himself and others as he calls for detailed studies of the mechanisms of discipline while abandoning anthropological techniques and tradition.

De Certeau’s premise that creativity is produced through varying everyday practices differs from Foucault’s with respect to the role of power/resistance. To de Certeau, resistance is not a matter of directly opposing power relations. Rather, resistance takes place at the margins of the organization and the ways that such marginal practices evade formal representation. This is what he means when he refers to the creative tactics of everyday life as ‘silent’ (de Certeau 1984); silent practices do not necessarily reflect the desire to be seen or heard but merely to ‘do’.

In accordance with this premise, another important effort of this study has been to try and bring voice to the silent and fragmented everyday practices as creative endeavors that happen beyond dominant discourse.

As I will later demonstrate in part III, it is this inquiry that led the way to the ‘*gray zones*’ within the police force. However, these are practices that are notable for being silent and hidden, not least among certain groupings of individuals in the police.

So from which ‘actions’ did the *gray zones* slowly become apparent to me as a researcher? Having reviewed the kinds of attention that made it possible to *see* and *hear* them on the basis of the theoretical attunement as it is presented in chapter 1, how did I actually go about *looking* and *listening* for them?

De Certeau offers hints at a methodology for engaging with everyday creativity, but he does not provide a scholarly ‘tool box’ or a ‘best practice’ for doing so. He

prefers to deliberately leave space for the reader to add his or her own interpretations of how to make use of this method.

The spaces in de Certeau's working method that this study occupies and expands are threefold.

First, I argue that there is a potential for bringing voice to a poetics of everyday creativity that is produced by the people whose practices we are studying rather than belonging exclusively to scholars and academics.

Second, I will explain how the spatial metaphor of the city, as de Certeau uses it (1984) in his demonstration of walking as a creative everyday endeavor, can serve as an entryway to narratives and examples of marginal creative tactics in the police force, described by the police as working in the *gray zones*.

And third, I will further unfold how this study took shape into ethnography.

### **Lending a voice to the 'common heroes of everyday life'**

De Certeau wrote in an intricate and verbally complex manner, even in the context of French innovative scholarship and philosophy. The argument for this 'poetics of the oppressed' would be that 'if everyday is inventive it also required an invention by the writer of a language that will make possible the registering of the everyday' (Highmore 2002, p. 153).

What impelled de Certeau to use this kind of writing style was his disdain for the dumbing-down of readers 'who are supposed to be satisfied to reproduce the models elaborated by the manipulator of language' (de Certeau 1984, p. 169). He writes with the aim of including the reader as a critical and co-producing

‘consumer’ of culture. He pursues this ideal by his own invention of a poetics that lets readers weave their own stories and meanings into the text. By this practice, he provides his readers with a demonstration of the ways that everyday practices can contribute to the issues with which they are currently engaged: ‘The reader takes neither the position of the author nor an author’s position. He invents in texts something different from what they “intended.” He detaches them from their (lost or accessory) origin. He combines their fragments and creates something unknown in the space organized by their capacity for allowing an indefinite plurality of meanings’ (Ibid.).

The written is merely a subjective representation; an attempt to mirror something that plays out in the setting we study, as de Certeau points out himself and as ethnographers have pointed out before him. He experiments with words and phrases in ways that are meant to open up the text to ‘co-authoring readers’.

Reading de Certeau ‘against’ a body of fieldwork experiences, the writing of *this* text will seek to pursue a different poetics of the everyday.

My suggestion is that, in ethnography that seeks to bring voice to everyday practices, we should be careful not to colonize the poetics of the field with the ethnocentric vocabulary of academia.

What I wish to highlight throughout the empirical chapters of the thesis is the poetics as it is produced by those who *live* the potentiality of everyday life. That is, rather than using a distanced vocabulary, remote from the language used and invented by the police as they engage with discursively dominant and marginal innovative practices, I try to attend to *their* words, sayings and invention of concepts as they demonstrate their everyday engagement with innovation as discourse and *gray zone* creativity.

As will become apparent from the analysis, especially in Part II, police officials associate quite different understandings and practices with the term innovation. Some informants, primarily front-line personnel, were even reluctant to speak about the term, as illustrated in the introduction.

I will now explain how de Certeau's metaphor of the city came in helpful in lending a voice to marginal innovative practices in relation to more dominant practices of innovation and how it is discoursed about in the police.

### **The powerful metaphor of *the city***

In mentioning *innovation* to police officers, the word often seemed to ring a bell in relation to some peripheral social reference. Perhaps they heard it from their superiors at a meeting. One police officer believed he had heard the word in a tooth paste advertisement on TV. But in general, they found it difficult to say what the word actually means. It is not a word they would use and often, the police officers I talked to expressed strong reluctance to the term because they associate it with the rhetoric of external consultants and other people who they think are ignorant of what police work is really about.

One way of continuing our conversations about innovation anyhow was to offer a different entry point to the topic by asking: "*So, does this mean that **nothing** new has happened at all while you were here in the department? And that you have **never** done anything creative in your work life yourself?*"

This would usually help them think of one or two examples. However, I found out an alternative method that was more helpful in engaging police officers in intensive conversations about their daily creative endeavors at work.

In one of my first interviews with a patrol officer, I found it quite challenging to speak with him. He was obviously skeptical about ‘innovation’ as a term, and his impatient gestures made me want to bring something substantial into the conversation. But at that time, I knew very little about actual police work myself and I couldn’t come up with any questions that would link more directly to his work.

Having recently read de Certeau’s 1984 book from, I was stimulated by the way he explained creativity as a metaphor of the lived life of the city, one that eventually expands and changes the city from within.

As I struggled to explain that I studied innovation in everyday police work, I started drawing a rough sketch of a city on a piece of paper with main streets, alleys, an underground, and matchstick figures of people.

His eyes lit up as he interrupted me, saying: *“Oh, why didn’t you just say that before? This is what it is like! We have to be creative out in those alleys [he points at the drawing] because that’s where the bad guys operate!”*

The interview lasted for two hours and he offered to demonstrate some of the new things he had been personally involved with. As I left the room, I was high on caffeine since he kept pouring me more cups of the black acidified coffee that Danish cops brew to make me stay and hear him out.

From then on, I used the city drawing as a metaphor for the police organization and the relationship between strategic places (main streets) and tactical spaces (alleys, paths, bridges and underground subways) because it offered different and creative ways of communicating about everyday creative endeavors that each individual could relate to his/her own work experience.


The city metaphor had some immediate appeal for almost everyone I spoke with. If I got the fairly typical response: *“Innovation? No really exciting new stuff happens here except for what is pressed down over our heads from the National Police”*, I would start the conversation by referring to the city metaphor, and asking for examples: *“Have you ever done anything different that would blaze a new trail or alley?”*; *“If you were to describe how this metaphor applies to the police organization, what would then be the main streets, subways, etc.?”* or *“If you and I were to exhibit and present an idea in the main street so that it would not just be run over by others, what would we have to do?”*, etc.

A couple of managers told me that they thought I was talking rubbish when I presented the city metaphor to them. But luckily for me, they would go on to do their very best to explain what *they* thought I meant, which actually turned out to be a great point of entry to the topic as well.

So, if some interviews became too ‘smooth’ in the sense that some managers in particular simply aped the overall strategy or offered other rehearsed replies to my questions, I drew on the ‘odd effect’ of the city metaphor. Through the metaphor, the conversations would become more original, and it let us ask questions that invited the use of our collective imagination and reflect on ‘odd’ questions together. In other words, the city metaphor provided a reference to the police organization, which allowed the production of different and unconventional conversations.

Sometimes, the persons I interviewed would jump to the whiteboard or write on my paper drawing to illustrate their point, as in the drawing below, where the dotted circle at the right bottom of the drawing was added by a police manager; in this particular case, he was showing how he sometimes had to create development

projects '*under the radar*' which he '*barricades*' from other parts of the organization (we will look more into these dynamics in part two).



Almost everyone I talked to was generous with their time and the energy they put into helping me understand the aspects of creativity and innovation in the police. Most often, they would invite me for demonstrations and introduce me to others with whom I might wish to talk. I learned that what mattered more than being formally cleared for security matters and being an intern was the approval from '*the right people*' who sent me to talk to others through their personal network. This meant that I would meet people who were deeply passionate and proud of their work and their efforts to improve things and make a difference; it also meant that their fences were down and they met me with a greater amount of trust.

### **Terms and conditions that framed the empirical process**

As already mentioned in the introduction, the opening for this study happened as I wrote a research proposal for the National Police in Denmark back in March 2011. The research center I worked for is self-funded and the university did not provide funding for the project. Therefore my proposal for a three-year PhD study on innovation in the police had to be externally and fully sponsored by the police.

After I sent the proposal it resulted in a few meetings with representatives from the national police, the head of the research center that I worked for at Copenhagen Business School and myself. The final meeting before the police finally approved the PhD project took place at the office of a department chief in the national police in April 2011. By 15<sup>th</sup> of June 2011 I was employed as a research assistant in his department in the national police and the PhD research formally took off from October 1<sup>st</sup> that year.

The unit I was affiliated with was at first a part of the police academy and counted about twenty employees, half of them police officers and the other half young academics primarily educated in sociology and anthropology along with a few law students. I had to agree upon certain terms and conditions first, though.

First, I had to become a '*real member*' as one of my managers phrased it; that is, I had to be formally employed *by* the police. While I was affiliated at the Copenhagen Business School as a PhD student where I complete the required courses (one semester's courses altogether) and received continuous supervision, the National Police sponsored the education, payment and additional costs. This also means that instead of teaching at the university, the police 'owned' the dissemination requirements, a total of 640 hours. In agreement with my managers in the National Police, I spent these hours communicating existing literature on innovation in the police as well as my own hypothesis at management seminars, in internally and externally published articles and other forms of communication. These sorts of activities provided me with crucial feedback on how particularly police managers relate to innovation, the challenges they face, what is and is not legitimate to debate in the police, etc.



I was generously granted '*full access*' to the organization by the top management of the national police. This meant that I was also cleared to access potentially sensitive information I might come across. Parts of the thesis has been read by legal experts in the police, who have been kind to make sure that concerns of confidentiality are not being violated.

Since my first day in the police I was subjected to the 'micro-politics' of what should or should not be said to whom and how both within and outside the organization and I cannot deny that this omnipresent paranoia has been influential in what stories I have chosen *not* to write about and what issues that are *not* being raised in this thesis.

Nevertheless, I have been encouraged by some of my colleagues in the police to 'tell the truth' or, as a researcher colleague put it as she passed on an advice she herself had been given from a police officer: "*Although police don't like to hear the truth about themselves, they will never believe a researcher who doesn't put things the way they are!*"

One aim of this study is to lend a voice to various points of views on innovation in the police organization while I am well aware that there will no doubt be further perspectives and disagreements to what is being presented here and how it is presented.

Now, the gesture from top management to provide me with full access is one thing is; it is another thing to actually work one's way into the daily life of the police.

For example, it turned to be problematic that I was listed as a 'development consultant'. The Human Resource department could not provide a job title for a PhD student or researcher (not that any of these titles would have done me any good either, in this respect). And as my title as 'development consultant' was

included in *Polnet*, an internal open search database of all employees in the Danish police, I was often met with more or less obvious precautions, particularly by police officers in the districts. Apparently, police officers were highly averse to ‘consultants’ in the aftermath of a series of external investigations and criticisms of the police surrounding the 2007 reform.

As I will further explore in chapter 6, ‘real membership’ of the police is something you earn on the street, not something you receive together with your police ID plastic card. And of the possible positions that could perhaps have been more advantageous as I later did my field work in the police districts, working for the national police as an externally affiliated researcher and ‘consultant’ were not among them.

I was employed on June 15<sup>th</sup> 2011 but did not get a chance to begin my field studies in a police district until January next year. Because the National Police is the central and strategically governing organization of police in Denmark, a study of police that takes place only in the National Police is necessarily one that misses essential aspects of operational, frontline policing.

I will later return to the implications of these disadvantages of my formal employment in the police as well as my efforts of building rapport and negotiate access as I gradually became more knowledgeable of the more implicit cultural aspects of the police.

Since my PhD program formally started in October 2011, what happened in the months leading up to my first visit to a police district was that I was incubated in a small office in a building adjacent to the police training academy. During this time my managers in the national police told me to wait but I never managed to get an explanation of why or for how long. In the meantime I tried to get in touch with

police out in the districts through a short questionnaire I sent to my police colleagues hoping they would pass it on in the form of an e-mail chain letter. This did not work out well; I received only a few brief responses from individuals working in my own department; they probably wanted to protect their colleagues from my novice antics.

After several impatient requests on my behalf, my bosses agreed to have me '*thrown to the lions*', meaning that I could present my research plan at a meeting forum for police chiefs representing the different police districts. Then, we would see if anyone wanted me around for a longer period of time, I was informed.

After this presentation, I waited restlessly for a couple of weeks for some of the police chiefs to get back to me. Luckily, one middle manager who had been a stand in for his boss at the meeting called me and invited me for a meeting in their district. As it turned out at the meeting, he had already written a detailed 6-month plan (which was my initial plan) for what he considered '*a proper introduction to what police work is really like*', cleared it with the district management and offered to take care of the practical arrangements. The field work plan included four to six weeks of 'internship' in one operations and analysis department (a crime statistic monitoring staff function referring to the district top management), in two different local police stations of varied volume, and in the emergency call center including day, evening and night shifts.

I was grateful for this agreement, and although it meant that I would have a much more intense and fragmented setting to do my study in than I had imagined it was also the *only* possibility I would perhaps get to learn about innovation in a police district.

But as the field work took off, the six months of field work in the district turned into one year and even after that, I continued to follow up on interviews and accept invitations for demonstrations from police officers who believe I might be interested in their creative work.

In sum, the period from when I first began as a police employee until I formally withdrew from the field in January 2013 which was the time I did my field studies, first as an employee of the National Police and later as an 'intern' in one of the police districts, comes to a total of 18 months plus additional empirical collection and member checking. In this period of time, I spent 6 intense months in the police district where I joined different units and police officers in their daily work for about 8 to 10 hours a day, sometimes weekends too.

The remaining part of the 18 months of my field work, I worked from my office in the national police, travelled back and forth between the National Police and different police districts to do interviews. Or I attended training, education or other events that I was invited to participate in by rank and files and managers who thought that I might learn something valuable about their culture or some innovative aspects of their work. I also did most of the presentations, workshops, etc. that I was required to do in the police in this period, joined staff meetings and social arrangements when possible and my daily presence in the police was only interrupted by a total of a few weeks of academic obligations and vacation and days when I had to prepare my presentations and articles for the police (managers).

I kept a diary throughout the period of my field work and frequently took notes by hand or on my computer depending on the situation. It became obvious to me pretty early that police officers were uncomfortable with my note taking, and

sometimes I solved this by jotting down quotes and other relevant observations in the bathroom or other discrete places.

I digitally recorded a total of 59 in-depth interviews, one third of which were with middle-managers in different police districts, one third were an equal mix of operational (uniformed) and investigative rank and file officers, seven interviews were with top managers from the police districts and different departments in the National Police (including the heads of two task forces), and the remainder were with administrative managers, academics, former police officers or group interviews with between 2 to 8 people. The recordings last between 45 minutes and two hours.

I also draw on e-mail correspondences and my daily interactions with rank and file officers, managers, as well as academic and administrative staff. I had the opportunity to talk to retired or former police employees, which contributed with additional perspectives from their retrospective reflections on the police.

## **An ethnographic engagement**

I should clarify why this study relies on ethnography and why this is appropriate.

The American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, suggested that 'culture is not power, something of which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be casually attributed. It is context, something within which they can be intelligibly - that is thickly - described' (Geertz 2001, p. 63).

Geertz' note on culture very precisely articulates the process of this study as a continuous effort to detangle a fragmented and very implicitly agreed cultural setting.

I soon realized that without a dense description of some of the contextual meanings to which ‘innovation’ becomes subjected in the police organization, we would end up with a thin and wobbly understanding of the dynamics of innovation in the police.

The cultural fragments within the police do not lend themselves easily to be interpreted by a researcher but it was crucial to continuously have them explained to me and to learn from own experience. I learned that studying innovation in the daily work of police officers meant that I had to become a co-actor in a wide range of situations and to subject myself to the workings of very different cultural arenas.

In his ‘ethnography of ethnography’, Van Maanen (2011, p. 219) summarizes ethnography as ‘a social practice concerned with the study and representation of culture (with a distinctly small c these days). It is an interpretive craft, focused more on ‘how’ and ‘why’ than on ‘how much’ or ‘how many’. Ethnography claims a sort of informative and documentary status – ‘bringing back the news’ – by the fact that somebody actually goes out beyond their ivory towers of employment, libraries, classrooms, and offices to ‘live with and live like’ someone else. These are ironclad matters, more or less given, not up for grabs. One becomes an ethnographer by doing it. Fieldwork of the immersive sort is by and large definitional of the trade’.

In embracing de Certeau’s contribution to anthropology, Napolitano & Pratten link his methodological approach to that of anthropologists exploring ‘the *irreducibility of practice* that is a thorn in the side of the crafting of hegemonic knowledge’ (Napolitano & Pratten, 2007, p. 5).

But whereas de Certeau *theorizes* about cultural life of everyday practices, ethnographers embed themselves in the cultural life they study; as an ethnographer, you actively engage with the multiple cultural aspects of organizational life, you enact and embody the culture and you embarrass yourself and others in trying (Van Maanen 2011). In other words, the longer you stay within the cultural setting that you study, the more embedded you become and the better you are able to position yourself as a researcher and add valuable meaning and respect to relations and events in that specific setting.

As I was formally employed in the Danish police for more than three years, and although some of that time has been spent in my ‘ivory tower’ office writing and reading, my continuous aim and efforts were directed towards ‘knocking on doors’ to the different cultural arenas that are somewhat protected among the police.

This process was complicated by a reshuffling of managers, which is a common experience for employees in the police. In fact, during the little over three years of my employment in the police, the department I was affiliated with was restructured and changed its name two times and had a continuous flow of managers at varying ranks. This was partly an effect of the aftermaths of the reform in 2007 that eventually led to changes in the national police as well as the police districts. After a while, though, the constant flow of managers and the varying degree of priority they accorded to research meant that I had to learn to maneuver on my own and find alternative ways to access the organization and find the necessary support and access for my field work. That is, although I was affiliated with the same department throughout my employment, that department and the managers and staffs who worked in it were continuously replaced.

Although I chose to extend my field work another half a year due to the continuous invitations I got from police managers and rank and files to talk to them or their colleagues or to join those I already had gotten to know on different occasions, this somewhat fragmented study process poses both some limits and strengths in respect of its ethnographic qualities.

I did not have the possibility to develop my role and membership position as for example Van Maanen (1975) Moskos (2008) and Hunt (1984 & 1985) had with the police officers in the settings they studied in.

On the other side, this somewhat fragmented picture of the police provided insight in very different aspects police work, cultures and world views across ranks. Also, in my constant efforts to gain the trust and access, I needed to quickly develop a sense of the different police cultures. That is, in engaging with cross-cultural maneuvering I got a rich insight to different spheres of life in the Danish police that I believe has also added a depth to my empirical work and analysis.

In respect of ethnographic approach and how that plays together with the practice theory suggested by de Certeau, recall how de Certeau's concern was to give voice to and thus 'unsilence' practices that are 'indeterminate' in that they do not fall into well-plowed social representations of the world. That is why he experimented with making the practice of writing and reading, i.e. the making and doings of his own book, the focal point of his analytical engagement. Many experiments have been carried out by ethnographers in their attempts to move closer to understanding and depicting the world and doings of the cultural *other* (Emerson 2001). And in studying people's everyday marginal practices in local cultural settings we need to take into account how different interpretations of why and how some practices are positioned as marginal and new (i.e. 'tactical') in relation to



others that are conceived as dominant and conventional (i.e. as representative of 'strategic place').

What characterizes contemporary ethnographic pursuits, although there are of course different epistemological approaches, is the general post-colonial conception that cross-cultural description inevitably involves 'interpretation of interpretation' (Emerson 2001). That is, the ethnographer is guided by his or her prior assumptions about the world that shape the selection and analysis of how what people do and their interpretations of those doings. Or as Van Maanen puts it: 'one could not pick up rocks without some sort of theory to guide them' (Van Maanen 2011, p. 222).

As such, the cultural practices that we study are interpreted and written by the ethnographer, a process that Geertz therefore suggest as *inscription* rather than 'description': 'The ethnographer "inscribes" social discourse; *he writes it down*. In so doing, he turns it from a passing event, which exists only in its own moment of occurrence, into an account which exists in its inscriptions and can be reconsulted' (Geertz 2001, p. 67, emphasis in original).

In doing ethnography, according to Geertz (and in accordance with de Certeau's pursuit), one must engage with the singular *thick descriptions* of the social discourse that he or she investigates. To engage with thick description of an event, he explains, implies an attention to the *actors* and the detailed 'webs of significance' that make up the local cultural context. 'Culture is public because meaning is' he suggests (Ibid., p. 62) and elaborates: 'culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly - that is, thickly - described' (Ibid., p. 63). As such, thick description is the

thorough ‘combing’ of social action and how it is interpreted by the different actors in a specific situation and context. Ethnography is ‘fiction’ in the sense that cultural analysis is ‘guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses...’ (Ibid., p. 68). That being said, what ethnography makes possible more than less engaged approaches is an inquiry into not *etic* but *emic* accounts of what participants associate with social phenomena where ‘the former involves descriptive accounts based on concepts that come from outside the culture studied; the latter involves descriptions that use categories from within that culture that would be used or recognized by its members’ (Emerson 2001, p. 31).

The fictive and endlessly complex ethnographic endeavor may come forth in a style that Van Maanen’s (1988) suggest as *impressionist tales*. Analogous to impressionist painting, impressionist ethnography ‘sets out to capture a worldly scene in a special instant or moment of time. The work is figurative, although it conveys a highly personalized perspective. What a painter [ethnographer] sees, given an apparent position in time and space, is what the viewer [reader] sees’ (Ibid., p.101).

Similar to de Certeau’s postmodern inspiration and awareness of the fragmentation of everyday life, attention to symbolic and impressionist aspects of the doing of ethnography thus evoke the subjectively fragmented processes of experience, selection and portrayal that go into the creation of text.

It should be noted, however, that the ‘imaginative rendering’ of impressionist ethnography does not mean that the researcher makes up events that never happened or persons who were never there in ways that distort and overwrite the experience of others in the field. The effort required is to write about culture and

events in such a way that at least some of the protagonists will recognize their experience in the narrative, while at the same time leaving the stories open to interpretations other than those of the researcher.

Thus, weaving together a variation of perspectives and voices from the field serves the purpose of studying the ‘singular’ while embracing the fragmented sphere of creativity and innovation.

To thicken my interpretation of the interpretations of the police officers, I engaged with *member checking*, what is also known as *member validation* (Emerson and Pollner 1988). Checking relevant anonymized parts of the written work with different actors in the field is a method based on the assumption that the deepest knowledge of what happens in the cultural setting lies with those who live it (Ibid.). This process of passing interpretations back and forth between the ethnographer and those whose cultural practices are being ‘inscribed’ was very helpful to me in engaging individual police officers and managers in co-authoring this thesis.

My approach during the field work and interviews was to collect accounts in hand- and computer written field notes and from these continuously observe patterns or themes I could work from in a ‘flying thoughts’ document. For this purpose I also transcribed and coded about half (thirty) of my digitally recorded interviews with help from a law student, and coded them into categories that emerged from the interviews using the computer program Nvivo. Examples of such emerging categories were ‘tensions between managers and employees’, ‘managerial support’, ‘gray zone tactics’, ‘real police identity’ and different categories for examples of innovation/creativity.

Based on these emerging interpretations, I presented them as my analysis of anonymized stories to different audiences that I thought would be likely to agree or disagree with the interpretation. In this way, I invited a variety of different responses in on the same themes to deepen my understanding and thick description of events. Sometimes, this process would lead to major milestones in my understanding until that point when I began to feel a degree of saturation, and I was no longer truly surprised by what I learned.

At one point I wrote down 8 characteristics of different types of managers as articulated by both rank and files and police managers, and how these sets of behaviors influence creativity and development in the police and I then used these 'profiles' to member check with previous and new informants. This process resulted in continuing enthusiastic conversations and e-mail exchanges which further enriched my understanding and has been integrated in the thesis.

From this process of zigzagging back and forth between theory, field work, interviews, and member checking, certain patterns emerged that helped focus concerns, practices, and understandings that guided my inquiries during the fieldwork and my selection of empirical material and themes during the writing process.

In these ways, ethnography contributes with a semiotic approach to the emergence of practices and meanings as varying and co-existing within organizations that may makes it possible to intensify variation and the weak voices of marginal practices even further.

## Building rapport

As noted earlier, accessing the police and building up trust is a very demanding effort as a researcher (see also Hunt 1984). When my PhD proposal was initially accepted, I got a call from my new boss who wanted to congratulate me on the job. “*Welcome to the family*”, he solemnly announced, a phrase that was repeated a few days later by the national commissioner when I shook his hand at an internal police conference.

Although I was welcomed as a ‘family member,’ the role of the ethnographer is perhaps more one of a *professional stranger* (see Agar 2008 and Simmel 1908) meaning that you constantly have to negotiate membership and earn the trust of those who live and work in the culture you study.

Some police officers would go so far as to check my background in KR, the Danish criminal register (*kriminal registret*) before meeting with me, most likely to make sure I did not have any dodgy intentions to use the sort of information they would provide. I know this because a young police officer jokingly revealed to me that some of his colleagues wondered why there was nothing on me.

At one point, representatives of the police union asked to have a meeting to know ‘*why I was sneaking around in the police station*’. This resulted in some collaborative effort, since they had decided to put innovation at the agenda for their next annual member meetings and my management at the time decided that I would have to deal with the combative union pretty much on my own. Luckily, the collaboration went well.

Also, some police officers would begin their conversations with me as an interrogation of who I am and what I was doing in the police while lawyers typically demanded definite clarification of - and bulletproof - argumentation and

a list of my ‘results’ although, as many ethnographers may agree, such cannot be readily given during the empirical work.

The police officers’ efforts to try and fit me into some category of reference that was known to them resulted in many interesting insights into how they responded to me as a researcher. Consider the following example:

A uniformed police officer comes up to me in the large lunchroom at the central police station of the district. I interviewed him before, when I stayed in his department for six weeks. He looks at me as though he just got a revelation saying: “*I know what you are... Have you ever played Stratego?*”<sup>18</sup> *You are the secret weapon in that game – the agent or whatever it is called – who can either win or lose the whole shit and nobody sees you coming!*”

When I got home I checked out the rules of the game and as it turns out, the *agent* or *spy* is the character piece with no rank but with the potential to kill even a Marshall (the most powerful piece in the game) if played skillfully. However, as the rules state, the spy is rather useless otherwise.

This metaphor of the researcher as a *secret weapon*, an *agent* or a *spy* is similar to Hunt’s (1984) experience of being suspected as a ‘management spy’ when she did her field work in a US police department, and how challenging the process of negotiating rapport (trust) with police officers proved: particularly being a young woman confronted with the pronounced cultivation of masculine identity-enforcing ideals very characteristic of uniformed officers.

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<sup>18</sup> *Stratego* refers to a board game simulating 1800’s warfare in which two “armies” on a row are facing each other. The armies take turns marching towards each other until one of them conquers the other’s flag.

After a very short time in the police district I began to dress myself in gender-neutral clothes (sneakers, jeans and sweatshirt) and - after a couple of comments on my loose long hair - arranged it in a tight ponytail. I never wore a uniform or a gun as this would be indefensible because I was never trained to be a cop.

I avoided becoming engaged with top managers with the exception of a few interviews, partly because of this concern, and because I wanted to avoid being seen as a 'management spy', as some police officers thought of me. It did not further my research to be held accountable for managerial interests, even though this was inevitable to some extent due to my formal obligations.

In addition, my obligations to Copenhagen Business School were challenging in that I was expected to write articles about my study in progress that could be presented in the public media, something I also tried to avoid as best I could.

However, at one point I did write a short paper that was published on the Internet while I was doing my field work at a local police station. A few days later, a rank and file police officer came up to me in the local police station and told me that he had recently linked to my article on his Facebook page, something which got negative responses from his colleagues. They felt it was unacceptable for top managers to think they could get away with hiring '*a young, blue-eyed little girl from outside*' instead of doing something to seriously promote innovation themselves. According to the police officer, he had responded with the comment: '*Friendly fire*' and defended my work. I asked if I could read the discussion, as I found it quite interesting, but he preferred not show it to me.

What I learned from episodes like this, however, is that innovation (as well as my role as a researcher) was highly fraught in the setting of the police. *Innovation*

somehow evoked hope, confusion and rejection, sometimes all at once, even when talking to the same person.

I will now reflect on the usefulness (or perhaps the uselessness or potential threat) of the ‘researcher spy’ as earlier pointed out by the police officer, for it turned out that the role as a researcher is often considered as a potential receptacle by police officials and manager who were eager to make some use of me and keep me occupied while I was doing my field work.

After that I will share some examples of the kind of ‘testing’ that I experienced as a very basic aspect of trust among police officers is expressed in the phrase that one has ‘*to keep standing up when the wind blows*’ meaning that you should not give in to pressure in physically or mentally challenging situations.

## **Being useful**

I will now describe the part of the trust building process during my field work in which I continuously had to deal with police officers’ suspicion of me being a ‘snoop’ (snushøne), as a police district manager called me, and how the most effective way of deflating this suspicion seemed to be to find ways in which I could be of some practical use for them in relation to their work.

For ethical and legal reasons I could not take part in the kind of ‘*real*’ police work that requires a license to use physical force or specific training or knowledge about the detailed aspects and dilemmas involved with policing. Therefore I generally did my best not to be in the police officers’ way when we were out on patrol. This does not mean that I did not participate whenever I spotted a chance to help out, such as house searching for drugs, writing rapports for managers, facilitating



workshops etc., but that there were good reasons for why I did not partake in all aspects of their work. Given my role as a researcher, which I was very transparent about, and because of the ‘nomadic’ character of my field work as I went from unit to unit throughout the process, perhaps the only people who considered me as a colleague were a few individuals in the unit I was formally affiliated with as well as those who informally met with me and supported the project throughout the process.

When transferring from one setting to another, I would typically be asked by the local managers to present the nature of my role and what I was doing to a selected group of people, typically at various kinds of staff meetings, management meetings or even at video briefings (comparable to a group meeting on ‘Skype’ or ‘Face Time’). The latter proved quite awkward, since the medium made people at the other locations, especially younger officers, forget that they were on camera too. So I would witness their uncensored responses to my brief presentation, such as shaking their heads disapprovingly, rolling their eyes, whispering remarks to each other while laughing, or pushing each other’s shoulders while clearly indicating with their gesture that this was a young woman - i.e. sexual object or an alien - speaking, etc..

The downside of these ‘road show’ presentations was that they were staged in official settings. Although I would present my research project in pragmatic terms while censoring them from as much ‘*academic crap*’ (akademisk ævl) as possible, I felt ethically obliged to tell that the research was sponsored by the top management of the National Police who were my employers, and that the deal was that I would study ‘innovation’ in the daily work of the police. I learned from my very first couple of days in the police district that the fact of me being an academic, employed by the National Police doing research on the abstract topic of

‘innovation’ did *not* work in favor of developing trust or opening access to the everyday life of the police, at least not in the districts.

The deep-rooted historical tensions between the National Police and the local police districts are played out on a daily basis, for example in the form of continuous complaints from district managers and rank and file police that the National Police departments fail to cooperate or provide the statistics, analysis etc. the districts need. For their part, managers in the National Police speak about the districts in demeaning terms, such as ‘*the trivial police*’ (trivialpolitiet). There are divides opening up at all levels of the police as they struggle to clarify tasks, deliver services, and develop space for autonomy and decision making.

On a few occasions, local managers would subvert my presentation by telling the staff that I was a ‘*spy sent by the National Police*’. Some of the rank and file police officers would poke at me with similar comments. It is possible that they actually thought I was a snoop and that this is perhaps their general opinion about researchers studying things inside their organization. I know for certain that some hoped that this was the case. Sometimes, when I ran into rank and file police officers I had talked to earlier, they would ask if I had gotten their message about whatever issue they were frustrated about through to the managers or the National Police. When I told them that this was not necessarily part of what I do, they were obviously disappointed.

On the brighter side, my official presentations often resulted in interventions by the managers to demystify my presence to the staff, with the hope that they would then feel more comfortable having me around. Sometimes, when local staff did not know who I was, they would ask me if I was lost (i.e. if I was a citizen looking for the reception), if I was a journalist (i.e. if I needed to be put in an office or

somewhere where I would not stick my nose in confidential stuff); or they would ask if I was some sort of consultant looking for the managers.

During some of my presentations I mentioned my background as a psychologist, not knowing whether this would also trigger negative prejudices. This revelation sometimes paved the way for interesting events, such as in the following case.

One of my first days in the emergency call center, an officer waves me over to his desk and puts the phone on speaker. A woman is on the line. She sounds terrified. She whispers something about a man standing outside her window, watching her. He wants to kill her, she says. Her words are incoherent and the officer tries to calm her down to get a hold of what she is saying. She tells him that the man has tried to kill her before. The police officer tells her in a calm voice that he will send a patrol out to see her: *“Miss, in a very short time two officers will come and look after you. You will have to open the door for them, okay, and then they will make sure that everything is fine...”* He sighs as he hangs up and informs me that she is a mentally ill person who calls the police every once in a while when she does not know who else to call. He calls a patrol, briefly informs the officers about the situation and then says: *“The psychologist is here today, you should bring her along on this one”*.

Two young patrol officers pick me up and we drive to the woman’s apartment. *“It sure is one spooky guy peeping outside her window if he is able to see her from outside that window, no balcony or anything* (the officer points at her window on the third floor, implying that it would be impossible for anyone to stand outside her window as

she has reported)", one of the cops sarcastically jokes. They are supposed to bring her to a mental institution voluntarily, which is usually a time consuming affair because she often refuses to go. The cops say they think she is lonely and that they feel sorry for her. But they are also a bit annoyed because few patrols are on the streets and it is a busy day.

One of them knocks on her door a couple of times before she opens it. As the door opens, both officers silently move behind me. I feel a hand pushing me in the back to move forwards into the apartment. The young, lightly dressed woman stares at us. She rushes back into a corner in the sparsely furnished apartment. She is trembling, holding her arms up in front of her for protection. She cries out that we should stay away from her.

The cops stay behind me. I look at one of them, who nods back at me as a sign that I should go ahead and say or do something. There is a sofa bed in the middle of the room and I slowly move toward it and sit down while I try to calm her down. I ask her to sit with me for a little while, if that would be okay for her.

The cops are standing in the same spot, stiff and silent. I tell the young woman that I understand that she is afraid and that we mean her no harm; that we are with her because she has called the police who have now come to be sure she is safe. She sits down next to me, trembling. I tell her that I am worried that she hasn't had anything to eat or drink for some while. She has not eaten for a very long time, she says and I tell her to eat anything she feels like while we talk. She

grabs an apple from her bag. I ask one of the cops to get her a glass of water. I can tell from the look on his face that he is uncomfortable with what I am doing.

While he gets her a glass of water from the kitchen, the other cop discretely slides across the room and grabs the woman's bag from the floor in front of her, searching it. The woman seems to ignore it. She tells us that she did not know who else to call and that we cannot understand what it is like [to suffer the way she does]. A couple of minutes later she is dressed and goes with us to the metal institution.

Afterwards the cops are very talkative. They tell me that they have never seen her so collaborative before and they are surprised that she just went with us like that. They want to know why she acts the way she does and we share our hypotheses. One of the cops stresses a couple of times that it was a good thing they had been there since I totally ignored the risk of sitting so close to her in the sofa when her bag hadn't been searched. All kinds of things could have been in that bag.

I soon realized that situations like this, where I was able to be of some use from their perspective, created a far stronger bond than any declarations of good intent would ever do. Cops are often action oriented and bond through joint action, not mere talk.

## To “keep standing up when the wind blows”

Besides being useful, another important aspect of building trust with police officers across ranks is to prove that you will “*keep standing up when the wind blows*”, and expression they use to describe that colleagues are resilient to stressful and dangerous situations (and therefore trustworthy partners that will cover your back). I experienced several forms of ‘testing’ by which police officers tested my resilience to different kinds of precarious situations.

This was for example the following case:

Two patrol officers and I are called to an apartment where an elderly lady has not been seen by her neighbors for several days. As one of the police officers opens the door to her apartment we are met by a terrible smell. The police officer in front looks at us and nods discretely to signal that this is the smell of a dead person. The other younger police officer moves behind me as we enter the apartment. The woman lies lifeless on the floor in her bedroom. It looks as though she has lost her balance, fallen over and hit her head seriously. The older officer bends down to feel her leg, and says: “*Yep, this one’s cold!*” The younger officer does not come into the bedroom. He looks pale. The other officer quickly walks up to the lady’s head to take a look at her head injury when she suddenly moans: “*water!*” She tries to move her head but can’t because a wound in her forehead has grown into the carpet on the floor and is infected which. The officer is obviously chocked, while the situation becomes too much for the younger officer who goes outside to get some air. “*Should we get her a glass of water?*” I ignorantly ask the older officer and he looks tolerantly at me while he responds that the medics will take her

from here. As we drive off, the young officer sits quietly in the front passenger seat while I am at the back seat. The older officers turn his head, looks at me approvingly and says: “*Okay, you’ll quickly get it. Now, the only stupid thing you did was to wear a jacket like that (it was made with down), because you’ll get a hard time getting the smell out of that!*” After this incident, the older officer asked me several times if I wanted to join him and his partner on patrol.

Other types of testing was when young patrol officers would make rapid turns with the police car to see if I would throw up in the back. Or they talked trash to me “*to learn where your soft spots are so we know how to push your ‘stop buttons’ if you start to get too smart*” as one officer explained when I asked him why he and some of his colleagues were harsh on me.

Irrespective of the efforts put into building a relation of trust with the police, however, the deepest trust forms among ‘*those who have been in the trenches*’ (de der har været med i skyttegravene), i.e. police officers who have been exposed to some of the difficult situations that police sometimes encounter. In these situations, colleagues will prove whether they ‘*run away when the balloon goes up*’ (stikker af når ballonen går op), i.e. if they turn out to be cowards when put under great stress. As was pointed out to me several times, ‘*academics*’ will rarely gain that kind of trust from cops since they are seen as mere ‘*paper pushers*’ or ‘*weird beings*’ (skæve eksistenser); at least, this implied a being of *some* sort.

## **Research ethics**

There is something peculiar about studying the practices of police officers who are themselves often engaged with close observation of other people.

I was confronted with this as I realized the challenges involved with trying to conceal the identities of my informants. On different occasions, I presented my work-in-progress to rank and file officers and managers, including citations and observations from my field work, and they were often very keen on trying to make me reveal or guess who said what, where it happened, and who had been involved.

In this thesis, I sometimes mix references to gender in the interest of anonymity, although the gender balance in the Danish police is highly tilted to men (in 2008 88,8% of Danish police officers were men (Rigspolitiet 2008) although almost one third of new recruits were women in 2013). Also, instead of referring specifically to the formal ranks in the Danish police, I describe the ranks and functions of individuals in broader terms, such as *chief*, *head of department*, *middle manager*, *rank and file*, *operational officer*, *investigator*, *etc.* With respect to anonymity I have not noted specific dates for my interviews in this thesis, as it would be possible for colleagues within the police to look up the dates in our shared electronic calendars and see who I talked to on which days.

As there is only one overall head of the Danish police, the National Police Commissioner is mentioned briefly but only with reference to public appearances. Also, some events might reveal the identities of participants more than others, and in those cases I consulted the persons involved to make sure that the story was presented in an acceptable way.

In-depth ethnography involves certain problems with respect to the informed consent of those who are involved with the researcher on an everyday basis in the field, especially in the case of the researcher who is formally working as an employee in the same setting he or she is studying (Moore & Savage 2002). Some ethnographers argue that covert research methods, in which the researcher hides



his or her research agenda, may be necessary when examining certain marginalized or stigmatized cultural settings where revealing one's role as a researcher would keep informants from sharing more sensitive information (see for example Li 2008).

However, I was highly aware of communicating my role as a researcher, an intention that was only compromised a few times when I was on a scene with patrol officers and others would arrive who thought I was a civilian officer or treated me like a rookie (which some police officers did anyway). In situations like these it would be inappropriate or even dangerous to announce my presence as a researcher, since it might upset troublemakers and people taken into custody.

## **PART II. Three worlds of policing: How hierarchy disciplines innovation.**

Focusing on one dominant disciplinary characteristic of the police, namely its hierarchical stratification into ‘top’, ‘middle’ and ‘bottom’, this chapter shows how police engage with innovation in remarkably different ways across organizational layers<sup>19</sup>.

As I experienced innovation demonstrated and explained to me in different organizational settings, I noted an emerging pattern of the effects of hierarchy and how it shapes each individual’s understanding of the meaning of *innovation*.

Hierarchy produces and fixates different concerns and power privileges, and these go on to shape how innovation is understood and practiced at different hierarchical strata.

It is important to note that in my analytical categorization, I condensed the highly fragmented cultural setting of the Danish police into three hierarchically disciplined worlds of policing. Of course, many other nuances are at play beyond those presented here.

Following de Certeau’s advice to single out and home in on a particular site of interest, enables us to learn more about the multiple factors that radiate from this point of focus. In this first empirical part, the aim is to discern certain dynamics of the hierarchy to demonstrate the ways it subjects the discourse of innovation into its well-consolidated grid and production of power relations. Moreover, the

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<sup>19</sup> My deep gratitude goes to Professor emeritus Robert M. Emerson at the Department of Sociology at UCLA, for taking the time to discuss the empirical material for this study and suggesting the analytical composition of ‘three worlds of policing’.

hierarchical structure plays an important and predominant role in many aspects of the overall sphere of policing.

After a brief introduction to Foucault's perspective on hierarchy in chapter 3, we will see in chapter 4 how top managers are primarily concerned with innovation as a politically correct discourse, and with practices that reflect and assure justifications for the work of the police in society as well as managers' privilege to *know* and *know best*.

As we will see in chapter 5, innovation occupies a more ambiguous position in the perspective of middle managers, because they are held responsible for executing new political and managerial initiatives while also mediating and selecting ideas between the hierarchical layers and across institutional boundaries. The view from the middle about innovation is primarily one of 'playing it safe', i.e. not taking any chances with new initiatives that might affect one's career or cast one's unit or superiors in a bad light. Middle managers have the privilege of *selecting* between ideas that are presented to them by subordinates, but at the same time, they are being bombarded with new initiatives from top management, and their primary efforts are devoted to the latter.

Chapter 6 demonstrates how frontline police officers are subjected to the cultural values of '*real policing*', that is, to the action of the street, where creativity consists of the number one rule of thumb – do a good job – and to be capable of responding to the unpredictable and diverse challenges of police work. With the responsibility and privilege that comes from their work at the front line, police officers often invent and make use of new solutions in their everyday work and they tend to see these solutions as having more pragmatic value than the ideas management stages and privileges as 'innovation'.

What becomes evident from these different perspectives, as summarized in the conclusion in chapter 7, is a profound dichotomy between the street perspective of ‘real policing’ and the managerial and bureaucratic perspective of the ‘correctness’ of office. That is, there is a large gap between what front line police officers view as ‘correct innovation’ by management, which seems to them to be primarily about new ways to control their work or to make managers look good to each other or the public, and ‘real creativity’, which reflects their front line commitment to make the best of things and to feel proud about their work.

In this way, the segmentation of concerns and tasks as produced by hierarchy (among other disciplinary ‘micro physics’) partially overrules the discursive powers of innovation. Hierarchy co-produces a divide between frontline police and management/office, which in turn shapes different perspectives on innovation and the value of new creative solutions for their work.

### **Chapter 3. A few words on hierarchy**

*“...the origins of hierarchy should not be too clear. If origins were not shrouded in mystery, they might be questioned as mere fabulation”*

- Martin Parker 2009, p. 1285.

In Foucault’s genealogy, ‘discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space’ (Foucault 1977, p. 141) in that techniques of discipline are ‘assuring the ordering of human multiplicities... discipline is to fix’ (ibid., p. 218). One such disciplinary technique is to separate people and movement into vertical hierarchies so as to ‘neutralize the effects of counter-power that spring from them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to dominate it; it must neutralize the effects of counter-power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts,

spontaneous organizations, coalitions – anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions.’

Hierarchical power relations are brought to bear ‘as discretely as possible... to substitute for a power that is manifested through the brilliance of those who exercise it, a power that insidiously objectifies those on whom it is applied’. Through the subtle workings of power, such as disciplinary knowledge production about those who are subjected to the power, classification and hierarchical surveillance, wild multiplicities are tamed into controllable units. In evaluating subjects according to sub-dichotomies of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, governing power is projected, disseminated and amplified as people internalize the parameters it constantly produces.

Parker (2009) traces the tripartite division of pyramidal hierarchy to the writings under the pseudonym ‘Pseudo-Dionysius’ in the 5<sup>th</sup> Century with the divine throne, the authorities and the angels at the bottom. According to Pseudo-Dionysius, ‘Each rank functions as a messenger for the one above it, and each subordinate is uplifted and held in place by the message that they receive’ (Ibid., p. 1278).

This representation was reflected in the ordering of Christian and Catholic Church, the sovereign monarchies of medieval Europe, and was later applied to the organizing of military and ‘as machinery for adding up and capitalizing time’ to increase obedience and productivity through effective means of centralization and supervision (Ibid.).

During the era of the police state, hierarchization and other means of discipline were widely applied as ‘a question of organizing the multiple’ and a ‘carefully measured combination of forces’ which ‘requires a precise system of command

(...) Discipline sometimes requires enclosure, the specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and enclosed in upon itself. It is the protected place of disciplinary monotony' (Foucault 1977, p. 141). With the development of the capitalist economy, labor forces were subjected to a form of hierarchization similar to that of the disciplining of the military and centralization of state power. As noted in chapter 2, the civic reforms of the police force in Denmark paved the way for the implementation of managerial technologies borrowed from industry, including an intensified hierarchical organization.

The invention of *ranks*, which are symbolized through emblems and privileges marking hierarchical positions in the military, the police and elsewhere, serves a double disciplinary purpose. It is a system of rewards and punishments in that promotion is a technique of making examples of good behavior, while demotion is a means of publically displaying unwanted behavior (Ibid).

Thus, in a Foucauldian sense, hierarchy is a disciplinary technique which produces power relations while protecting and projecting power interests.

In the Danish police, the triple layers of hierarchy are reproduced in different constellations and complicated by a powerful dichotomy between a centralized directorate (styrelse) – the National Police – and a decentralized structure of 12 police districts. Staffing of departments and units is typically organized according to the top, middle, and bottom segmentation.

*Top management* refers to several centers of governance. The highest authority is the Ministry of Justice, as represented by the Minister. Within the police, *central* governance is executed by the police commissioner and an appointed Board of Directors while *decentralized* top management is represented in each of the 12 districts by a Police Director, an Assistant Commissioner (chefpolitiinspektør), a

head of administration, and the head of Prosecution. The head of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (politiets efterretningstjeneste) reports to the Police Commissioner and, in some cases, directly to the Minister of Justice.

However, who is considered on a day-to-day basis to be ‘*at the top of the food chain*’ (øverst i fødekæden), as police say, depends on how far up the line of command you can actually reach. For example, rank and file officers in the districts rarely, if ever, encounter the police commissioner, and mostly receive local interpretations of his managerial initiatives from their superiors.

To many members of the rank and file and middle managers, the formal top management of the police force is a mere abstraction, and the vast distance between ‘*top*’ and ‘*bottom*’ is at times a subject of great irony.

For example, many rank and file police officers refer to the national police commissioner as ‘*Rigs Peter*’ (which would translate into something like ‘Commissioner Joe’ or ‘Com. Joe’). This ironic eponym illustrates that rank and file police really don’t care who the top boss is, and vice versa. “*At the floor we are merely small and easily replaceable screws in the big machine*”, as one police officer said.

When I speak about ‘top management’ in this chapter I am referring to formally and strategically responsible central and decentralized groupings of upper-level managers located in the National Police and in the police districts.

What follows is partly a Foucauldian power analysis of the everyday workings of the pyramidal hierarchy in the police and the ways that it subjects individuals to its disciplinary grid. However, the issue of hierarchy is inseparable from the effects of bureaucracy and other techniques of ‘policing the police’ that have been developed over the course of time.

As I engaged in conversations and worked together with police officials across hierarchical strata, it became evident that individual concerns, practices and power privileges associated with innovation and creativity within the police are, in fact, disciplined by the impact of hierarchy. It became clear that this was the most critical theme to engage with here.

## **Chapter 4. The view from the top: Doing it correctly**

This part of the chapter illustrates how top police managers make use of innovation to justify the role of the police in contemporary society by protecting political interests and fulfilling strategic responsibilities.

The responsibilities and duties of top managers come along with certain privileges granted by discretion and hierarchical status, such as decision making and licensed autonomy (within a politically, legally, morally and ethically defined framework). By assigning a high level of responsibility to top managerial positions, the hierarchy works to personalize concerns of political *correctness*, which, as I will show, also shapes the way top managers view and deal with *innovation*.

Another powerful ‘art’ of hierarchy is the implicit assumption that the manager knows *best*. As demonstrated, this power to know and to know best is a highly effective disciplinary force, which supports top-down decision-making (and thereby re-affirms managerial privilege, as Foucault has reminded us).

However, as a discourse favoring entrepreneurial governance, autonomous creativity, and a strategy of distributed creative activity, innovation challenges hierarchical privilege. This challenge creates a dilemma for top managers: they have to preserve correctness and thus limit innovation among the rank and file



police that could compromise public appreciation of the police while at the same time making it possible for everyone to act creatively.

I would argue that the way that top managers deal with this dilemma is by ‘nesting’ innovation, that is, by using and inventing managerial techniques, such as advanced suggestion boxes, that invite ideas from their employees but do not compromise top-managerial control, supervision, or other parts of the disciplinary apparatus.

By inventing such techniques (which let the rank and file disclose ideas to management, and let managers evaluate and use them as they wish), top managers assure that they retain control of what happens with the ideas that the rank and file suggest.

### **Concerns of legitimacy**

Top managers at the district level and in the National Police are strongly motivated to keep the police force on track in responding to both demands for reform and other urgent strategic or spontaneous demands. Top managers also have direct responsibility and are obliged to answer parliamentary questions through the legal committee of the Ministry of Justice and to be readily available to the press.

Thus, top-managers have to maintain a delicate balance between external and internal communication and decision making in support of a legitimate, responsible, and modern organization, an organization that at the same time relies heavily on culturally embedded practices and perspectives.

Therefore, what seems to dominate the view from the top of the hierarchy are concerns about the external and internal legitimacy of the police and how it is managed. In this process, top management has taken up *innovation* and inscribed it into an overall strategic plan for the National Police and prosecution for 2011-2015. Innovation thus serves top management as a political discourse and a rhetorical signal to internal and external audiences that the police will ‘*strengthen the organization from within*’ as the police commissioner has emphasized on different occasions.

The macro-political discourse of innovation mirrored in the joint strategy installs entrepreneurial ideals that empower every individual to contribute to the fulfillment of ideas within the organization, increase creative performance, and thereby ensure the national welfare.

The strategy is issued as “... *a natural step in the midst of our change process and which should result in a better and more effective business*”, and *strategic innovation* is emphasized as one of six strategic responses to a range of growing internal and external challenges. In the strategy, *strategic innovation* is operationalized as follows (my translation):

*“We must ensure that we have the capacity to adapt in line with emerging new technologies, types of crime, patterns of crime and the overall development of society. This demands that we constantly - at all levels and together with our partners – challenge the possibilities to develop and diffuse new methods and approaches to solve our tasks while to an even greater extent draw on international experiences. We will be working with initiatives within the following areas:*

- *Innovation inspired by managers, employees and external partners*

- *Diffusion of “best practice”*
- *Systematic evaluation of solutions and results*
- *Technologization (teknologisering) and IT-support*

For the first time innovation is cited as a separate strategic objective for the Danish police. In describing police as a *business* (virksomhed), the strategy echoes the discourse of enterprise (see chapter 1). In response to the tendency for reform rhetoric to focus on the faults and dangers of public institutions (Miller & Rose, 1990) and in line with the set of strategies developed by the government and other public agencies, innovation is staged as an abstracted and universal solution to a complex of societal challenges.

More specifically, *innovation*, as presented in the strategy and signed onto by the national police commissioner and the head of prosecution, is rooted in the aim of top management to have the police force perform according to the ideals of a lean and profitable enterprise. Mirroring the ideal of the enterprise, the strategy rhetorically subjects individual organizational members ‘*at all levels*’ and external partners of cooperation to the politics of innovation.

On several occasions, the national police commissioner has repeated his invitation to innovate at ‘*all levels*’ and to ‘*make ideas penetrate through the Rockwool<sup>20</sup> layers in the organization*’ (få ideer til at trænge igennem organisationens Rockwool lag).

Many public and private executive boards have appointed an ‘innovation manager’, established a ‘center of innovation’ or, in the case of the police, a

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<sup>20</sup> Rockwool refers to isolation for buildings and is the name of the Danish isolation company that produces it.

department of 'Business Development' (Da. *Forretningsudvikling*) led by a 'business development manager' (Da. *forretningsudviklingschef*).

When one of the top managers presented this new department to some of the employees in the National Police, he suddenly fell silent for a moment, looked down, and said: "*Frankly, I **really** don't like the new name of the department. I believe we are offering a public service, not products produced in an assembly line. But the reason for getting a business development department is that this is what others have outside [of the police organization].*"

Even if this particular comment may have been made to make the manager look good in the eyes of his staff, this skepticism toward politically driven 'privatization' of the police in conformity with rational economic thinking is widely shared by the Danish police. At least at this point, they complain that such rhetoric undermines the unique and proud tradition of their work, which in many other respects, is constantly threatened by external critique.

The shift in rhetoric also reflects neo-liberal governmentality, and its push for public sector agencies to prove their market value and optimize their value to stakeholders in the society at large (see also Dean 2010a).

Top police managers describe '*strategic innovation*' in internal and external media, conversations and interviews as new (or at least different) ways of formulating strategies, announcement of new standards and conceptual programs (such as crime prevention guidelines), new educational reforms, new managerial concepts, policing paradigms, policing programs, and other initiatives that encompass a broad scope of change.

Innovation works as a discursive *means* of meeting the demands and expectations of politics and the public as top managers make an effort to justify the police force

as a responsibly managed government agency. However, this message does not achieve an easy landing as it hits the institutional ground.

For example, the delegation of responsibility to innovate is an implicit departure from the culturally embedded privilege of management to *know* and to *know best*, which has continued to be cultivated in police management training to this day.

### **The power to know and to know best**

In his presentation of governmentality in 1973, Foucault proposed, with reference to Nietzsche, that ‘if we truly wish to know knowledge... we must look not to philosophers but to politicians - we need to understand what the relations of struggle and power are’ (Foucault 1978a).

The ways that knowledge works as a managerial privilege was a recurrent theme for the people I encountered in the police force, including the managers themselves. As an ironic police saying goes: “*your knowledge shows from the number of stars on the shoulder*” (din viden fremgår af antallet af stjerner på skulderen).

Top managers act as final judges between *good* and *bad* suggestions and initiatives that fall within their domain of responsibility. And the cultural practices surrounding hierarchical privilege play a significant role in shaping how top managers understand, practice, and discipline innovation down the ranks.

One particularly noteworthy power struggle plays out between police and lawyers, as was earlier emphasized in the outline of the history of the modern institution of the police in Denmark. As we saw in chapter 2, lawyers have historically been assigned exclusive hierarchical privileges, and have managed to maintain this

position until this day, despite the external Vision Committee's statement that a higher degree in Law does not necessarily make a competent manager.

Until recently, it has been a legal requirement that top police managers must have a master's degree in law, something which has not been the case in other Scandinavian countries. However, this requirement has recently been changed in response to a statement by an external review committee that a higher degree in law does not necessarily make for competent leadership.

One argument for placing legal experts in top positions is the value of their in-depth legal knowledge when dealing with affairs of state, including the monopoly on, violence and deprivation of personal liberties.

Knowing the legal framework, specifics and innovation of law and ethics is a fundamental aspect of contemporary, just policing. Therefore, knowledge about legal practices and systems of disciplinary means of control and inspection do serve 'higher' principles of disciplinary and democratic governmentalities, such as transparent and just means of policing.

However, because top managers are hierarchically granted the right to know, this right automatically colonizes other areas of expertise.

In the case of the Danish police, lawyers have, at least until recently, been granted the privilege to know about a wide range of subjects, including the law, human resources, and finance. De Certeau explained this as a dynamic of knowledge displacement. The privilege to know and to know *best* goes beyond the expertise of an authority, which can result in 'mistaken identity'. In the police force, where a manager assumes the role of expert qua his or her position within the hierarchy 'He misunderstands the order which he represents. He no longer knows *what* he is saying' (De Certeau 1984, p. 8).

Hence, those areas of knowledge that lie beyond an authority's actual knowledge, are at risk of being neglected, as de Certeau pointed out: 'Since he cannot limit himself to talking about what he knows, the Expert pronounces on the basis of the place that his specialty has won for him' (De Certeau 1984, p. 8).

Confrontations arise especially when legal experts interfere with professional assessments that lie beyond their area of expertise. This is a common frustration throughout the police organization, expressed in the phrase, '*at university, law students get a chip operated into their brain programming them to think they know it all*'.

As de Certeau makes clear, however, the managerial privilege to know more than one actually knows is a general theme, and this also applies for managers with a background as police officers. For example, in an interview, a rank and file police officer in his early thirties expresses his frustrations with a managerial decision to organize patrol officers into larger units:

*"So, there is no doubt that this idea comes from the very top; but I mean, to cops, trust is crucial. In large units you can't know everybody. And there are certain situations when you need to know your partner to feel safe if all hell breaks loose. If a colleague you don't know sits in a corner and looks like shit, you don't just go to him and say: "Hey, what's up? Do you want to talk about it?" Maybe he is just weird or something and the next thing you know, you end up on a shitty job with him where he might put you in a bad and dangerous situation... But in order to satisfy some duty management system or something, top managers decide about stuff they don't know anything about. I mean, if they ever arrested someone themselves you can be damn sure they forgot everything about what life is like on*

*the streets by now. And things have changed. But who cares but us who have to do the job?”*

Due to concerns of efficiency, the sense of safety that younger uniformed officers in particular derive from knowing their partners well is overruled. When I confronted police managers with this issue, some responded that this happens because managers who have not been ‘on the street’ themselves micro-manage without knowing what it really means in practice. One police manager, however, responded that *‘this is just some sort of ‘touchy feely stuff’ from the young colleagues’* implying that there is no need to take their concerns into considerations in regards of this matter.

Legal expertise is often regarded as more sophisticated than the expert knowledge of police, whereas some police professionals tend to consider their knowledge to be better grounded in *‘reality out there’* (virkeligheden derude) and the *‘dirty job’* it sometimes involves. Although some lawyers and police officers are able to distance themselves from this divide, it is repeatedly staged in everyday scenarios, as indicated by the following story.

At a Christmas party in the National Police, people would first meet in their departments and then congregate in larger rooms. As we started to gather, the lawyers would herd together in a hall where they socialized in a loud and stiff manner, primarily with each other, while drinking alcohol (probably cognac) from small glasses. The police officers, on the other hand, moved around talking to almost everyone they knew or wanted to know, while drinking draft beer from large plastic cups; as they drank more beer, some of the male cops hit on the young and stylish female lawyers who clustered together in the



bar, often with no luck. One cop vomited against the wall in the hall right behind a group of head-shaking lawyers, and had to be carried out and put in a taxi to drive him home.

Police are notorious for their wild partying, and lawyers enjoy pointing out that characteristic of cops.

Until recently, legal knowledge has also dominated police management recruitment and training.

A rank and file officer describes how he opted out of earlier management training opportunities in response to that same divide:

*“I was asked if I wanted to be a manager, and I thought: why not? Then I joined a course on police knowledge (politikundskab). They wanted me to write twenty assignments, pure police stuff. This is twice as much as what you write during PG3 [last year of basic training for recruits]. I was supposed to sit and read stuff about a case from the eighteen-hundreds, something about a dad who wanted his money back because his son had lost too much money in Tivoli [a Danish amusement park] without his dad’s approval. I mean, I was thinking: this is really far out! What the fuck am I doing here? This has nothing to do with leadership; this is basic police knowledge. They [those who were in charge of the training] truly believed that a manager is someone who knows everything about the law! I knew it was like that, that knowledge is power in the police, but if this was really how they trained their managers I didn’t want to be one. So I told them that I didn’t want to do it. To me, leadership is about managing and distributing work and to motivate your employees by asking: “How was it with the foreigner proceedings (udlændingesagen). I don’t know about the specifics, I take care of general stuff”. As a result managers today just look at the stars on their own*

*shoulders counting 'one-two-three', "oh I am the expert here!" There is no involvement of other people's knowledge because who is there to learn from when you have been fooled to think that you are the king of knowledge?"*

Apparently, knowing 'everything about the law' has been a criterion for access among police professionals who had the ambition to climb up the ranks.

This is supported by a member of a group of district top managers who explained how selection and motivation of police professional talents used to be based on legal expertise:

*"One of my former team leaders was a fabulous administrator and a lousy manager. But this was the only means available for us to reward talented employees: by promoting them to managers so that they could get a higher salary. I don't think that it's quite like that today, but it means that we still have a great number of those people in charge."*

As a professional field, policing is governed by legal expertise. To promote justice, as this notion has evolved particularly over the past two centuries, legal scrutiny should weed out any initiative that would compromise justice. Therefore, in the process of approving any new practice, technology or other means of policing, it needs to pass through a review by legal experts to make sure that it is proper and right to use. This is an important procedure for securing both legal and ethical principles, such as the protection of human rights and personal data. But to police officers and middle managers, who often think that their pragmatic concerns are being overruled by legal and financial arguments, some of which make no sense to them, the privilege of legal knowledge over police knowledge can cause many frustrations.

And in some cases, the principle of ‘any lawyer will do’ does not match the particular demands of new practices, technology, weapons or other material, which 1) call for highly specialized legal competencies 2) call for a certain level of authority because they potentially lead to modifications in law and regulation 3) call for interdisciplinary collaboration and complex process development; something that might be difficult to achieve in a setting with very limited diversity of professional perspectives.

As a result, lawyers are notoriously known as ‘nay sayers’ (nej sigere) and ‘party spoilers’ (lyseslukkere) when it comes to seriously considering the merits of suggestions from other domains of the organization. Some of the lawyers I spoke with pointed out that they do not necessarily see it as part of their job to get involved with the time-consuming process of solving these complicated but often low status issues.

Thus, as we have seen, the privilege to know has primarily been granted historically to legal experts, who have also been granted the privilege of appointment as top managers.

But as Foucault points out, power is not something that one possesses, it is enacted. ‘The more one possesses power or privilege, the more one is marked as an individual, by rituals, written accounts or visual reproductions’, he wrote (Foucault 1977, p. 192).

The techniques used by top managers to sustain their privilege to know have a major effect on the disciplinary setting that one experiences in everyday life in the police force.

For example, the power to know among top managers is closely related to being excused for failure, as suggested by common sayings among employees and

managers, such as *'shit runs down-hill'* (lort glider nedad), *'chief superintendent is difficult to become but easy to be'* (politiinspektør er svært at blive men nemt at være) and *'a police inspector never fails'* (en politiinspektør fejler aldrig).

When I participated in a management meeting where the discussion was how to implement a politically chosen new means of evaluation that the managers knew would be highly unpopular among their staff, a police manager who had recently been promoted leaned back in his chair and said:

*"That is not our headache. We who sit around this table decide everything. Luckily we still live in a system in which we can still kick down through the ranks and if they don't eat what we serve them we just kick harder"*.

Although this remark was received with varying degrees of support from the other managers, it echoes a legacy that is evident among some managers, of having a sovereign power to know what is best to do, irrespective that those at lower ranks might know differently.

When I talked to top managers who were known among their staff and other colleagues to be particularly open to modern ideas in their management style, they would often still reserve to themselves the privilege that their knowledge, and hence their authority, should never be directly challenged. When I asked a well-liked top managers about how he would advise a young recruit to present his or her ideas to their managers he replied:

*"Most importantly, you must not be 'Mr. or Mrs. know it all'. It is okay to contribute with good ideas. However, you need to be convincing and what you present should of course make sense. We are talking here about something which in reality seems like a good idea and will benefit and move the organization"*.

Yet, the knowledge to assess whether a suggestion for innovation is ‘a good idea’ that ‘will benefit and move the organization’ is basically a hierarchical assessment made in keeping with the formal structure of the police force; it is difficult for *anyone* to predict the likelihood of success.

Another prevalent disciplinary mechanism is constant threats or reminders not to challenge authority and the line of command. I personally sensed a growing paranoia over time, and I found it difficult to articulate *why* I felt this way when I withdrew from the field. When listening to my interviews, I noticed how I would sometimes be corrected by means of more or less subtle warning messages from both managers and rank and files. For example, I interviewed a group of top district managers and one of the managers warned me not to be critical by saying: *“Just so you know, if you begin to ask us the wrong questions we will make sure than the rest of your research process will be hell for you”*.

Colleagues and informants would also warn me not to share any e-mails expressing any critique of the system, because one’s work e-mail account is accessible to central IT-system administrators and will be examined in the case of a disciplinary investigation.

The result of all this pressure is that while top managers, including the National Commissioner, call for putting an end to ‘the culture of intolerance for failure’ (nullejls kulturen), supervisory managerial techniques and myths keep it alive and well.

The cultural intolerance for failure is evident in everyday interactions between superiors and subordinates; for example, in the form of the disciplinary techniques that earn some managers the (culturally embedded) title of ‘*cutthroat*’

(strubesnitter) or ‘*dragon*’ (drage) when there is a woman among their colleagues and staff.

‘*Cut throats*’ and ‘*dragons*’ figure in various narratives as middle managers and staff consider the pros and cons of bringing creative suggestions further up the line of command.

These managers have an aura of a mixture of fear, hate, admiration, and respect, and are typically described as ‘ambitious’, ‘arrogant’ and ‘dominant’ and as someone who sets high standards for the staff that he/she carefully selects and recruits.

Thus, the tales of the *cutthroats and dragons* are used to promote efforts toward professionalism, carefulness and thought down the ranks.

In some situations, bringing in potential opinions of the non-present *cutthroat* or *dragon* into discussions of new ideas serves to justify personal interests among subordinates.

But most often, the culturally embedded managerial archetypes serve an important role for police management by instilling self-governance down the ranks. These techniques are subtle and surreptitious, and thus difficult to set down on paper, and they sometimes work without anyone even noticing it.

Consider the following example.

A couple of days before I was to give a talk about my research in progress to a group of top managers, I was interviewing a middle manager. I told him about the upcoming event and he looked at me in terror and warned me to be careful if a particular top police manager would be at the talk.

*“If he doesn’t like you he will not hold back from ripping you apart in front of the entire group! If you want to get your message through about innovation, you better prepare your arguments very carefully. He never cut my throat directly, but I know I stepped on his toes by refusing the last job offer they gave me. I am sure he wanted me in that position, but there is no way I am taking that job just to be the slave of anybody. I will just be doing all of the work while he gets the credit, I am too old to fall for that. So, I have been kept out in the cold for some time. That is why I am still here [middle manager in the department]. Be careful. He will scan you for sure. I have seen him cutting throats. He once humiliated a colleague of mine who could not account for overspending his budget. But if your argumentation is good and you are robust, he likes you. He will bite at you to see what you are made of. Just don’t ever show him that you are scared of him and don’t fight him. He does not like to be humiliated in front of the others. My friend Thomas knows how to handle him. He respects him. They are very similar, actually. It’s not that I want to scare you or anything. Just make sure that you are well prepared and for the sake of God: don’t burst into tears, they hate that. They will laugh you out of the room”, he warned me.*

In the following vignette I describe a personal encounter with a *cutthroat*.

As I arrive at the conference hall where I am giving my talk, one of the ‘cutthroats’ I’ve been warned about is standing in front of a tall glass door with a serious expression in his face. It is late summer and the glass door leads out to a small patio. This is a good spot to be seen by everyone from either side of the glass door, and he is obviously being noticed. He doesn’t approach anyone. Every once in a while the

others glance at him discretely. A couple of managers who appear to know him well walk up to him, and he leans his head forward as though he expects them to tell him some kind of sensitive information. His lips rarely move.

Most of the managers lower their head and eyes when passing him in the doorway.

As I give my presentation, they laugh when I least expect it, and they stick their heads together to share their reactions whatever they might be. Every once in a while I notice how the managers glance at the cutthroat as if to mimic his reactions.

At one point I catch myself speaking directly to the cutthroat. As I turn my eyes away to address the other participants he interrupts my talk with a train of questions, followed by the others. I walk up close to the table where the cutthroat is sitting and look him directly in the eyes while answering him. He smiles cunningly as I speak.

Then he raises his hand to indicate that he wants to say something, and tells the others to stop asking questions because it is more important to hear what I have to say.

As I end the talk, the room is uncomfortably silent for a little while. The cutthroat breaks the silence by asking for a copy of my power-point slides.

Then they all applaud.



Both the myth and the reality of the *cutthroat* manager, as depicted above, had the effect that I chose my words much more carefully than what I had planned, even while trying to avoid the label of a ‘*Ms. know it all*’. Even for the most modest and well-disciplined researcher, this is hard to do, since your job is essentially one of ‘knowing’ within an organization that sometimes seems to favor ‘doing without knowing’ as Wikström (2007) argues.

Criticism is a highly sensitive matter within the police force, and careers are built upon great efforts to cover errors and mistakes. As Degnegaard (2010) has pointed out, police managers sometimes avoid taking minutes at their meetings to reduce the range of issues for which they may be held accountable.

Other ways of escaping potential criticism include widespread resistance to qualified evaluations of the way police are handling particular events, target areas, or new approaches, technology, or materials. Those in charge fear all the ways they might be held accountable for mistakes.

The panoptic subjection to management concerns is amplified by a variety of disciplinary techniques, such as when managers in strategic positions anonymously order the relocation of managers, staff, and departments. ‘*Cutthroats*’ and ‘*dragons*’ function as corrective means of disciplinary power to align the thinking and practices of their staff to strategic and political concerns.

Subjected to disciplinary managerial practices of this kind, subordinates go on to engage in self-regulatory techniques, which are then activated down the ranks.

Police officials have an expression for the ceremony of correction, namely ‘*to be called on the carpet*’ (at komme på tæppet). This refers back to a time when police officers who had violated norms and rules were called into the office of the local Chief of police (politimesteren) for an earful. The boss typically had a carpet on

his office floor, an artifact that symbolized his status, marking his superiority to the dirty work of cops. Even today one will find both polished floors and carpets in some managerial offices.

This describes the way of functioning of the self-affirming hierarchical privilege to *know* and *know best*, supplemented by techniques of power that reinforce supervision and self-supervision down the ranks.

However, when it comes to the strategy of innovation, the discursive call to individualize creativity challenges these institutionalized hierarchical privileges and (self-) disciplinary practices.

Next, we will consider the sometimes ambiguous character of autonomy in the sphere of management in the police.

### **Autonomy as a double-edged sword**

Many top police managers regard autonomy as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the national strategy for the police and prosecution prescribes that creativity should be empowered at all levels of the organization. In addition, top managers are encouraged to grant some degree of autonomy. It is a well-recognized feature of police work that it also requires considerable discretion at the street level (Lipsky, 1969). For example, a former head of department at the police academy explained that together with his boss, with whom he had worked closely for many years, he had a tacit agreement that he could experiment with the training of recruits if he got indications from the police districts about the emergence of new types of crime or other potential scenarios. He explained that:

*“Often when we got a request from the Parliament like “what are police doing to prepare the police officers for this and that possible scenario”, my boss knew that I would have something up my sleeve that I could provide them with”.*

On the other hand, some managers - and this does not apply only to those in top positions - perceive autonomy among certain subordinates as both distracting and dangerous. As one manager expresses it:

*“If the search for the “good idea” is not structured but merely “free play” for everyone interested, it might very well end up disrupting the daily production which is the core task of the organization”*

These reservations about autonomy are woven into concerns about performance, budgetary savings, and societal legitimacy.

While top managers have been instructed and instruct others to welcome ideas from subordinates as reflected in the national strategy, demands for reform have led them to tighten their reins of control by introducing counter-intuitive management technologies, most of which have more to do with operations management and external validation than with innovation management.

The implementation of performance measurement, in particular, has required a great deal of organizational effort, including among top managers.

To most of the top managers with whom I talked, performance demands are set according to statistical benchmarks and they are left with only a narrow space to delegate for autonomous initiatives, whether they fall within or outside the strategic goals. As a district police director expressed it:

*“Until we have become real confident with this performance measurement system we do not begin to move the limits or space for creativity among our employees.*

*The idea to perform according to rather specific goals is something that is not in the backbone of the people here”.*

Other circumstances, such as scarce resources, laborious bureaucratic processes, and tight monitoring of employees’ working hours also generate paradoxes for top managers in their incentives and possibilities to acknowledge and allocate the necessary time and resources to bring about new ideas and initiatives from within the organization. Also, some managers at different levels think that ‘*pulling the economy card*’ (at trække økonomikortet) actually relieves their responsibility when presented with ideas from their staff, because it preempts a lot of argument.

As indicated by the low tolerance for failure in a political system, the personal incentive for managers to avoid risk is simply higher than the personal incentive to take the inevitable risks involved with innovation. “*In the police, your successes are always shared if not stolen by others, but your failures are exclusively on you*”, one manager says.

In an interview, another top manager explains:

*“One strategic dilemma is the risk... Strategic innovation is not without its risks. Private companies waste hundreds of millions [kroner] on initiatives that turn out to lead nowhere. But in a public setting we must constantly justify all the money we spend. They would give me a hard time if I went out in the public saying: “Yes, we stuck our necks out (vi vågede pelsen), we gambled and we lost, this is at the expense of the tax payers out there!” We do not represent ourselves, we represent public interests.”*

Acting on behalf of government is a responsibility that comes along with being appointed a top manager in the state.

According to this manager, top managers have to personally offer the employees examples of taking the risk to innovate, and deal with the ever-present paranoia of ‘*offending others in the system*’ even if they are of higher rank. He explains that he recently approved a local initiative, and his boss had called him on the phone, reminding him that now he had to explain to the press why the initiative had not been rolled out in other districts too. He continued:

*“Operational police officers are extremely creative, they have to be; it takes a skewed mindset to solve and act against crime. But when it comes to administrative innovation, we often experience the story about the monkeys and the bananas, do you know it? It’s the one where the monkeys try to get a stem of bananas hanging from the ceiling, but every time they attempt to climb the ladder someone give them a splash of cold water. Eventually, they stop trying. One after the other the monkeys are replaced and they end up with five monkeys who never had a splash of cold water in their face. Still, none of the five monkeys try to get the bananas because it has become part of their shared experience that they shouldn’t bother. Perhaps I am one of the new monkeys who never got that splash of cold water but is curious enough to continue trying to get the bananas.”*

What this story also highlights is that the national strategy has been accompanied by few explicit rewards for those who ‘stick their necks out’ and experiment, as expressed by another top manager:

*“We do not get rewarded for sitting on our asses thinking big, new thoughts! What really pays off is when you manage your operations and reach your performance results. So why bother with innovation, really?”*

Views like this are not uncommon among top managers. Legal concerns, financial concerns and fights with the Union are time- and energy consuming when suggestions for new material, technology and practices try to find their way through the system. The process of having all the different parties to agree about one solution that fits the concerns of all often results in '*lowest common denominator solutions*' (laveste fællesnævner løsninger).

This dynamic played itself out several times during my field work and is a common accusation made by people in the districts about the centralized development departments in the national police. They find that the solutions are sometimes much less useful than what is provided by the market, but they cannot purchase such market solutions, at least not officially, because of the principle of uniformity.

Another challenge experienced by top and middle-level managers related to the empowerment of innovation at all levels is their fear of police subculture. There is a long-held belief that certain subcultural prejudices (in particular among rank and file police officers) have a strong informal influence on the police mindset and behavior, and this belief extends to other countries as well.

For instance, Berkeley professor of Law, David A. Sklansky, argues that lawyers, scholars and police reformers in the US suffer from a 'cognitive burn-in' from the cumulative hypothesis "... *that police officers think alike; that they are paranoid, insular, and intolerant; that they intransigently oppose change; that they must be rigidly controlled from the outside, or at least the top...*" (Sklansky 2007, p. 20). He shows the problems stemming from this 'Police Subculture Schema' in that it maintains a reductionist and rigid understanding of professional police culture

which fails to acknowledge the great diversity of occupational backgrounds, ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation and a culture of discussion that has actually flourished within the past few decades. “*When we look at the police, all we see is blue*”, he states.

A similar ‘Police Subculture Schema’ is evident among some top managers and middle managers in the police, often in association with references to a group of violent and corrupt police officers known as the BRAVO patrol that worked with gang crime in Copenhagen in the 1990’s. Individual members of the group had earned themselves infamous nicknames such as ‘*the deep freezer*’ (kummefryseren) and ‘*the upper arm*’ (overarmen) because of their preferred means of violence, and these officers were accused of violence, racism, abuse and filing fictitious reports. Some of the accused officers were dismissed, while others were sentenced and fired. The scandal resulted in numerous cases of compensation, damage to the reputation of the police in Denmark, and dismissals and demotions up the ranks.

Another incident attributed to the police subculture took place in May 1993 when cops, uttering the now infamous words: “*shoot at their legs*”, opened fire on a group of independent youth demonstrating in central Copenhagen.

Several police managers who are now in top position recall the days when they served as rank and file police officers themselves. “*When I started as a young cop in criminal investigations, bad stuff like drinking, private shopping and visiting ladies was a common thing. It was quite extreme if you think about it*”, one police top manager says.

Although individual police officers in Denmark do occasionally violate ethical and legal boundaries, reports of such cases are rare.

According to Sklansky, the *Police Subculture Schema* has been mistakenly used to promote the argument of reformers to strengthen top-down control mechanisms at the expense of rank and file autonomy (Ibid.). The process of disempowering the police might end up being a self-fulfilling prophesy, which he highlights by asking: “*How can police misconduct be addressed by police officers themselves, when the root problem is the shared mentality and culture of the police?*” (Ibid., p. 28).

In Foucauldian terms, one could argue that the ‘Police Subculture Schema’ works as a disciplinary ‘art of government’ to keep the police in their place. Police authority is an *instrument* for the state and hence its autonomy should be kept continuously in check.

Top managers’ reservations about autonomy do not keep them from engaging with and supporting participative innovation processes. Many top managers in both the national police and the districts actively develop and employ a range of process management techniques, which they demonstrated to me as innovation.

As we will see next, these innovations are primarily deployed to support the interest by top management to ‘do’ innovation *correctly*, i.e. in ways that meet demands for reform.

### **‘Nesting innovation’**

In justifying frugal and ‘*smart*’ policing, top managers tend to understand *innovation* as a common denominator in managerial techniques that promote continuous organizational restructuring, performance accountability, and efficient, low-cost solutions.



Following the logic of hierarchy, top managers are responsible for activities within their purview but are not necessarily directly involved with implementing the pragmatic details. This calls for supervisory means of disciplinary control down the ranks, such as the privilege and power to know, as we have discussed above.

In response to what they see as sloppy project management, inefficient development, and failed implementation processes, top managers in the National Police and the police districts have instituted several management techniques and hired external staff to qualify project management and development.

The rationale is that development projects approved by top management should be managed according to standard procedures and templates. Any suggestions for changes that might have a broader effect proposed by subordinate members of the organization need to be formally documented in the form of a '*business case*'.

Until recently this process was formulated as a casual guestimate involving a cost-benefit analysis and primitive SWOT analysis (the assessment of Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats). Police have a self-ironic term for these sorts of analysis, '*SPT analyse*', an abbreviation of '*slag på tasken analyse*', which is a Danish expression for a very rough guestimate.

Many internal forums and internal committees have been set up over time to formally work with parliamentary requests, innovative ideas, and suggestions of relevance to their specific professional area. But because of their poor efforts at communicating their work and developing and implementing new solutions in relevant areas in the rest of the organization, many of these committees have been disbanded and an internal evaluation of the formal networks is planned.

'*Working groups*' (arbejdsgrupper) of more or less expert individuals have been established and assigned tasks most often defined by top managers who will

eventually make their decision based upon the recommendations of the group. The results of such development work are typically communicated in reports, handbooks, and publicized through internal and external news media.

The most common examples of innovation pointed out by top managers, particularly in the police districts, are process management techniques intended to support the delegation of innovation down the ranks. These initiatives are intended to *‘harvest the ideas of the employees’* as top managers often put it, and provide transparency to both managers and employees regarding initiatives and processes of development. One top manager describes this tendency in terms of managerial *‘nesting’* innovation:

*“As managers we have to arrange for nests where the employees can put their ideas and we can incubate them and see if the ideas hatch”*

The metaphor of *‘nesting’* illustrates the way that top management supports the adoption and creation of managerial *‘tools’* that make it possible to sustain hierarchical and bureaucratic procedures and privileges when formally arranging participative processes.

What both top and middle managers would point out as examples of innovation in their departments included large whiteboards that would hang in common rooms where employees could write their suggestions for improvements. This initiative was inspired by operations management training for middle-managers that introduced the managers to LEAN, a Japanese management *‘philosophy’*, and tools intended to maximize customer value in enterprises by gradually improving productivity and processes.

The idea is that managers should frequently meet with their staff and work with their suggestions while informing them about the progress on previous suggestions.

Below is an illustration of an initiative of this kind called ‘the wheel of improvement’ (forbedringshjulet) from one of the police districts.



Since around 2012 another management trend has spread through the police districts, to develop and modify various digital versions of the traditional suggestion box. These systems are administered via local intranets, and allow employees to submit their ideas.

The digitalized suggestion boxes are typically managed and supported through classical bureaucratic arrangements of formal managerial forums, executive boards, meetings, etc. In some cases, there is a response system open for other employees, who are able comment or ‘like’ the ideas, inspired by social media such as Facebook, and it is possible to track the progress of the idea as it advances.

Of course, the idea of the suggestion box is far from new; departments have had both physical mail boxes and trays where the staff can hand in their ideas for improvements as well as links on local Internet servers where people could suggest ideas.

Whether new or not, management techniques such as a whiteboard, a ‘wheel of improvement’ or digitalized suggestion boxes provide ways to separate and displace innovation processes from daily organizational life, and to ‘*tame the wild ideas among the staff*’, as a manager put it. They make it possible for managers to ‘nest’, control, and supervise innovation according to their strategic concerns.

What is central to these ‘nesting’ practices is that managers encourage employees to share their ideas as soon as they think of them. This effectively moves the work of actually experimenting and developing an idea into a ‘prototype’ from the worker’s hands to the manager’s.

In a written assignment for a management education course, a manager from a police district states that innovation is valuable when it represents ‘*a strategically managed process*’ supporting his ‘*interest in innovation as a strategically decided and managed process; in other words to what extent the innovation tool can be used as a conscious process controlled by managers as part of management’s implementation of the district strategy or in support of this.*’

These ‘tools’ of management serve, according to him, to ‘*limit unwanted and irrelevant innovation – understood as suggestions for development which are beyond the focus of the strategy, which are in conflict with strategic aims or the vision of the organization*’. That is, nesting innovation supports the agenda to control ‘*free-flowing*’ and ‘*unstructured*’ innovation, as he puts it.

It is a fairly common view among the top managers I encountered that innovation should represent a controllable and handy managerial ‘tool’ to help them fulfill strategic purposes.

However, challenges arise as the ‘innovation tools’ of top management tend to ‘lose momentum’ after a while, as the contribution of ideas fades out.

According to the police officers with whom I talked about this issue, this fade-out occurs because their ideas are only recognized by the managers if they basically fit into politically prioritized intervention areas, if they immediately free resources, or if they will make their bosses look good in the media.

In one case, a suggestion was posted describing a way that citizens could avoid having their license plates stolen by petrol thieves, by attaching them with an extra set of screws, thereby making it more difficult to remove them. One of the top managers in the police district was enthusiastic about this idea, but he complained that his staff didn’t approve of it, so a team of managers ended up doing a road show at ‘local flea markets’ to demonstrate the idea themselves.

What tends to truly engage the rank and file police are suggestions for new equipment, technology, tactics etc., that the police officers believe will improve the quality of their work, but these suggestions have to prove themselves worth the investment over a longer period of time. Otherwise, they simply don’t bother to write up suggestion that are more tangible, or that they think the managers won’t understand or care about.

With the detail-oriented strategic focus of the new performance measurement systems, painful dilemmas sometimes arise down the ranks, since some areas of crime receive greater attention while others may be neglected. Sometimes this gives rise to managerial cynicism as explained by one district top manager:

*“In some districts they are actually cynical enough to read their [performance] contract and from that alone decide what to do: “Okay, I get most points from solving the easy cases so I chose them”... I have tried to talk to the others [top managers] about this by saying that there are things we **have** to do and then there are some things we would **like** to do. I was told to forget about the latter.”*

In fact, several top managers describe that their mandate to prioritize areas of intervention has been greatly reduced following the implementation of performance contracts. An assistant commissioner told me about his meeting with the Minister of Justice at a time when he had confronted the Minister with the dilemma that policy-driven areas of attention tie the hands of top managers in making situational decisions about what kind of crime to fight and prevent locally:

*“I raised the problem to him that we can’t say that there are some things that police are not handling but what we can say is that at the moment some things are more important than others. He just nodded but didn’t comment on it. He knows it is right. He just read the latest 24-hour report of 80 pages of incidents so it is obvious that we cannot respond to all of it. We just can’t. And I dared to say it but it was not a comfortable thing to say. But I will never tell my staff what it is that we will not deal with although they often ask this question. I tell them to do the important stuff first and then see what else they have time to get their hands to.”*

At the same time, top managers are concerned about their staff becoming too inventive, as the police unit might end up ‘*drowning in our own success*’, as they often put it. This means that if police become too effective in catching organized criminals and burglars, their caseloads become too heavy, the prison service cannot handle the number of inmates, and the investigational processes become hasty or jammed.

Therefore, top managers are also responsible for setting up a framework for initiatives that matches the available resources. Another assistant commissioner explains a similar dilemma in regards of the span of investigations:

*“Today I ordered an end to the observations of a guy who we then arrested with about one kilogram of cocaine and he probably gets two years in jail. This makes sense. We can’t keep shadowing him. Some drug officers get creative ideas. They believe that if they just work hard and long enough they can find the drug barons in the middle of South America. Forget about it! The other solution is fine.”*

Besides an exclusive focus on ‘*harvesting*’ ideas that will ‘get the most points’ and save resources here and now, organization of such managerial technologies also constitute miniature models or systems set up to mimic and preserve the world of bureaucracy and hierarchy at it is already playing out in the police force.

According to another manager, who assists top management in a district, the views about innovation among top managers are skeptical:

*“... managers do not have very great expectations regarding the potential of the innovative suggestions they receive; on the contrary they expect to receive a number of ideas about rationalization or efficiency”*

Although the managers do not explicitly exclude any of ideas beforehand, they tend to only select ideas that are in keeping with their primary views about strategic aims, resource savings, and interest in legitimizing and enhancing the profile of the organization. This may explain why staff becomes disengaged in the suggestion process over time, as they simply stop sharing their ideas.

Other challenges that are reported by managers in relation to their efforts for ‘nesting’ innovation have to do with the fact that the participatory aspects of these

arrangements, such as when an idea receives many ‘likes’ from colleagues, are experienced as a problem by managers who feel that they thereby ‘*lose their managerial space*’, as one managers expressed it.

Despite the challenges that come with the techniques favored by top managers for ‘nesting’ innovation within the police force, these practices mirror their concerns with ‘*centralizing control*’ and demonstrate ‘*efficiency*’, words that are often repeated in speeches and presentations.

## **Chapter 5. The view from the Middle: Better safe than sorry**

Whereas top managers tend to approach innovation as tools or techniques to protect from external liability and assure internal discipline and control, the concerns and practices of middle managers tend to be governed by slightly different dynamics.

The middle layer of the hierarchy is most frequently perceived as the so-called ‘*Rockwool layer*’, as referred to earlier by the National Commissioner, what some rank and files call ‘*the middle manager wall*’ (mellemleder muren), or ‘*concrete ceiling*’ (betonloftet); these designations reflect the fact that middle managers more or less intentionally isolate top management from what is happening and emerging from lower levels of the organization while also functioning as a buffer for top-down initiatives.

This section explores the concerns and privileges that reveal the dynamics at play as middle managers engage with innovation and creative initiatives in different ways.

I especially focus on the concerns of middle managers to effectuate new strategic concepts and initiatives and to promote their personal careers, which are important



in this context because they shape how middle managers view and deal with innovation and creativity; also, these issues are echoed down the ranks, thereby influencing what is initiated and shared and what is not, as we will later see in the second empirical part of the thesis.

As the intermediate layer between the ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ of the organization, hierarchy grants middle managers the power to *select* between ideas that are suggested from their staff; also, because of the ways that the hierarchy urges them to prioritize time, resources and align with what is being announced top-down, middle managers find themselves left with little room to support and facilitate ‘bottom-up’ innovation.

### **“Play it safe and keep your trolls inside their box”**

Middle managers are constantly balancing a range of concerns from their superiors and subordinates while also managing daily tasks. Particularly in the aftermath of the 2007 reform, a flood of new initiatives and regulations have been produced by political and centralized departments in the National police, including the performance and educational demands mentioned earlier, new concepts and technologies of management, demands for more qualified documentation, restructuring of departments and work procedures, etc.

Much time and effort is spent on figuring out how to ‘digest’ new top-down concepts and regulations, which often consist of generic ideals created in settings other than the police, such as ‘Leadership Pipeline’ and performance measurement systems.

As a result of the turbulent and sometimes hard-to-apply top-down initiatives, some middle managers do not associate innovation with something positive. To

them, innovation is at best a euphemism, a ‘dressing up’ of a steady rain of top-down initiatives landing on their shoulders and making life more difficult for them and their staff rather than easier or better.

When asked to demonstrate what innovation means to *them*, middle managers would point to methods and techniques for translating and effectuating top-down demands and expectations to “*massage new stuff from the top into the heads of our staff*”, as one middle manager from a police district expresses it.

Examples of what middle managers regard as innovation also include ‘bottom-up’ creative maneuvers that translate operational concerns and needs into other organizational domains. In this relation, middle managers sometimes lobby for permission to run projects or pilot projects to develop and test ideas and solutions at the local level which they know will otherwise get killed by administrators and lawyers who do not face the same tasks or needs for innovation of certain police practices as they do.

But whereas top managers’ primary concerns tend to center around overall strategic and political means of legitimating their initiatives, middle managers do not necessarily have access to what top managers know. As we just learned from looking at the perspectives and privileges of top managers, ‘*knowledge is power*’ as middle managers often say, and strategic information is often jealously guarded until managers find the best time and setting to share their knowledge strategically.

Much could be written on the politics of knowledge in the police setting. Of particular relevance to innovation is that middle managers often have to ‘*listen to the water pipes*’ (lytte på vandrørene), i.e. sniff out information through their

personal '*informal network*' (see also chapter 8), and '*turn on the radar*' (tænde for radaren) in order to sense whether the timing is right for a new suggestion.

I will now present the paranoia of the middle manager and how it works as a disciplinary art of governing police in the face of innovation.

At the middle strata of the hierarchy, paranoia and uncertainty discipline middle managers by individualizing concerns about their personal careers. Most middle managers are afraid to '*step on the toes of the wrong person*' (træde den forkerte over tæerne) and thereby risk being '*put out in the cold*' (sat ud i kulden) or '*left out of the row of numbers*' (sat udenfor nummer), expressions that refer to the more or less subtle promotion procedures in the police.

For example, in response to the 2007 police reform, a police manager from one of the police districts wrote an opinion piece for a newspaper stating that the police reform made it possible for more qualified managers to access managerial positions in the police. When his superiors heard about the article they ordered him to withdraw it, but it was too late as it was already in print. He was transferred to a position at the other end of the country and it took him years to work himself back into a career track.

Thus, the paranoia of the middle manager is not purely fabricated; many practices are actually being carried out to discipline and manage police staff and encourage them to keep their critical opinions and creative ideas to themselves or at least not present them to the public without clearing it along the line of command.

Internal critics and whistleblowers can be silenced through direct or indirect threats to their career and reputation and by cultural emphasis on loyalty to 'the system', i.e. political and personal concerns of '*looking good to the outside*' (se

godt ud udefra), which some managers value more than actually handling tasks through open debate.

The paranoia manifests itself down the ranks in that middle managers do *not* want to get in trouble if they or their staff becomes unpopular in the eyes of an internal or external audience. In an interview, a middle manager very tellingly passed on the advice to “*play it safe and keep your trolls inside their box*” (du skal spille de sikre kort og holde dine jokere nede i æsken).

This manager is referring to the way he sometimes experiences the need to silence some of his subordinates, for example at meetings with other internal and external partners, since most cops are perceived of by managers as very ‘*action oriented*’ (handlingsorienteret); this means that they often act according to their own perception and analysis of situations rather than what looks good further up the system, to collaborators or in the local media. In cross-sector meetings about crime-prone youth, for example, public authorities are forbidden from sharing sensitive personal information about the young people they work with such as their social security numbers. Some police officers may forget this restriction when giving their power-point presentations, and this upsets the other authority representatives. In chapter 8 we also get an idea about the sorts of *trolls* that need to be kept in their box as I discuss the ways that certain appeals of the job of policeman may invite *bullies* and *crusaders* to cross the line beyond what their audience considers to be proper behavior.

According to street cops, those middle managers who have never worked ‘*on the street*’ or who have been administrators for some time are operating ‘*from the wrong side of the desk*’, meaning that they are at a remove from the detailed dynamics involved with everyday operational and investigative police work. This

means that they often become anxious and insecure when confronted with difficult and ‘dirty’ police tasks, which sometimes involve confrontations with the ‘*dark side of society*’ (samfundets mørke side), as a police officer put it, such as when police fight drugs, prostitution and organized crime.

Together with knowledge, the ‘*anxiety level*’ of ‘*control freak*’ managers is said to rise according to the number of stars on their shoulders. A dog patrol officer described his easy-to-trigger manager as ‘*anxiety biting*’ (angstbider), a term that is also used about dogs that are unpredictable and dangerous because they might suddenly snap and bite you if they get scared. Other terms that subordinates use to warn each other about anxious middle managers are ‘*house mouse*’ (husmus), ‘*spoilsport*’ (lyseslukker) and someone who is ‘*wearing belt and braces*’ (gå med livrem og seler).

On the other hand, managers who have ‘*been in the trenches*’ (har været med i skyttegravene) know what police work is like and are generally viewed as supporting the sometimes spontaneous and creative means of policing (see also chapter 7). When these middle managers stand up for an initiative that has been suggested by their team members and push for an agenda of legitimization, they are sometimes viewed as ‘*street boys*’ (gadedrenge) by other managers, who do not share the same concerns or needs for action. However, those managers who are familiar with and respect ‘*the rules of the game*’ (spilletts regler) across different organizational domains are generally well thought of as being able to facilitate ideas and communicate suggestions up and down the chain of command.

While there are few such managers who have mastered different arenas, those who have are often surrounded by a herd of creative and informal followers who use the manager as a ‘*protector*’ (this English expression is in fact being used by

police officers) for their creative agendas. I will elaborate this dynamic further in part two of the empirical analysis.

The paranoia of the middle managers about being under managerial surveillance and exposed to subtle disciplinary methods mirrors how they perceive expectations regarding their own management style.

This was illustrated at a seminar for a group of managers in a police district where I was invited to give a talk about innovation. By the end of my talk a high-ranking middle manager raised his hand and said:

*“Maybe we should demonstrate a greater amount of trust in our employees. Maybe we could give away some control?”*

*“Okay, and isn’t it interesting how the title ‘inspector’ actually reflects the idea that managers in the police inspect and control their subordinates? If we were to rethink the name of this title in a way that would signal more trust down the ranks, what could that be?”* I ask.

The room is quiet for some time, until the same manager once again raises his hand and answers:

*“**Vice** police inspector!”*

The others crack up and one of the managers jokes: *“Oh, it’s really uphill for us, you see?”*

Of course, the title ‘**Vice** police inspector’ is already in use (in English the title would correspond to Deputy Chief). But what the vignette tells us is how the manager cannot think of a way to escape or move beyond the sphere of bureaucracy and control to which he is subjected himself. Apparently there are

some things that cannot be changed, at least not from the perspective of these managers. Or it might have been a way for them to remind me that I was touching upon a subject that is sensitive to them, since ranks come with well-established privileges that are being sustained and protected by the managers.

The notion to ‘play it safe and keep one’s trolls inside their box’ is thus hierarchically produced and sustained through different disciplinary mechanisms of power in the police.

### **‘Waiting for Godot’**

Many hopeful suggestions for developing, purchasing or organizing new things seem to get stuck when passed on by subordinates to middle managers.

In one department, I came across an ironic expression of the characteristic inertia involved with middle-layer processing of suggestions, namely that the middle managers are ‘*waiting for Godot*’ (venter på Godot). This refers to the title of the tragicomic play written by Samuel Beckett and premiered in 1953. The play stages two characters, Vladimir and Estragon, who throughout the play wait for a person named Godot who never appears. It is a story about apathetic hope and how to pass time in situations where there is actually no hope.

In an interview a middle manager explains how well he understands the resignation among subordinates when decisions or feedback regarding their suggestions drags on:

*“My men and colleagues keep sharing new stuff with me that they want to develop or buy; I send it back and forth, up and sideways. At some point you get the same*

*suspicion as your men: does anything happen at all? But as a manager you have to have faith in the system and you can't just let things be the way they are."*

While suggestions from their staff await a response from middle managers or others further up the line of command for approval, middle managers have to try to figure out where to address the suggestion inside the National police and how to coordinate it with ongoing initiatives, analysis or strategies elsewhere in the organization. Legal questions, union concerns, timing, unclear responsibilities, resource allocation, and power games are among the classical issues that eventually shelf ideas and drag out decisions.

Rather than being actively qualified or coordinated with existing solutions, new ideas are often simply frozen because of the limited maneuvering room of middle managers within an organization where a manager moving up the ranks has to constantly '*watch your back*' (dække din ryg).

Middle managers' requests to innovate on behalf of their staff might easily end up as '*political bait*' (politisk føde) for union representatives or competitive career-oriented managers known among the rank and file as '*star warriors*' (stjernekrigere), who won't pass up any chance to win more stars for their shoulders, i.e. to move up the ranks at their competitors' expense.

This is explained in the following quote from a police middle manager as she advises me about how to sneak an idea past middle management: "*some of them [the middle managers] just want to shoot down everything that moves and differs because it demonstrates their power, so you must never expose your throat to someone you don't trust.*"



The advice to '*never expose your throat*' refers to an ever looming paranoia among police that a potential competitor or somebody '*who has got something on you*' will strike at the slightest opportunity to taunt your moves.

One safe way for middle managers to engage with innovation that is rarely contested by those higher up in the ranks is by means of mere rhetoric, or what police officers and other employees describe as '*pseudo-projects*'. By only mimicking strategic intent and calling some of their initiatives 'innovation', regardless whether these initiatives are actually new or really make a difference, some middle managers get away with persuading others that they are using new politically correct methods, technology, and other innovations. They make their way up the career ladder without having to prove that their rhetoric is actually being implemented, since professionally conducted evaluations of the practical impact of such initiatives tend to be considered unnecessary.

Even promises to evaluate interventions and new means of policing often end up evaporating or stuck at the desk of national police employees who are constantly being told by *their* department management to be really careful about making critical remarks, since they also have to watch their backs and nurse relations throughout the organization.

To those further down the ranks, these processes often lack transparency and do not offer much hope or appeal for posting ideas through the line of command.

Middle managers who are known to advocate for their staff's needs and suggestions for innovative solutions, are regarded by subordinates as particularly '*brave*' or are assigned other positive identification markers. But it is important to note here that many middle managers put greater effort into fighting for

suggestions and concerns at meeting where their staff does not participate, so they do not always know about the struggles that have taken place.

However, given the intensity of competition among those who are eager to move up the ranks, *innovation* might also work as a positive career move, despite its potential adverse consequences if you fail. As we will now see, middle managers have the privilege of choice between those ideas that will potentially make them and their superiors look good and those that will not.

### **The power to select**

Due to the pyramidal hierarchy, middle managers become gatekeepers for knowledge and ideas running up and down the chain of command. They are granted the task - and privilege - of selecting and translating demands, expectations and wishes for new initiatives emerging from superiors and subordinates.

Not even a strategic intent to invite ideas from all levels of the organization can compensate for the fact that innovation has thus become a hierarchically embedded matter in the police. The middle strata work to ensure that everything proceeds according to the plans, expectations and responsibilities of top management.

Therefore, how middle managers select among their staff's creative inventions is a responsibility that comes with the duty to spare top managers from what they would consider to be bad ideas and no-go solutions. The powers arising from this privilege of choice are worth considering when it comes to understanding innovation and creativity in the police.

Those who post their suggestions to their managers know only that their suggestions are being processed by legal experts through ‘*paragraph riding*’ (i.e. purely legal processing in Danish known as *paragrafrytteri*) as police officers call it, by managers responsible for the budget or some centralized department either in the national police or a police district. Often the process is nontransparent and those who originally came up with the suggestion become anonymous. As a middle manager explains: “*It is as though, once you submit your suggestion, it is swallowed by a black hole, and you will never be able to find out whether it is stranded or is actually getting processed somewhere*”.

However, union representatives, are sometimes very active in their efforts to influence the approval or disapproval of new creative suggestions. This is an area of union politics - and a uniquely influential role for a union at least in comparison to other professional areas – by which it can demonstrate its power and legitimacy to its members. It should be noted, however, that younger police officers I talked to especially consider such demonstrations of union influence as barriers to development and modern task performance.

So sometimes the discussions arising around the proposal of new initiatives move beyond professional judgment and into the sphere of power demonstrations and personal motives. As a middle manager, you may owe a person some goodwill; or the opposite might be the case. As one middle manager once told me after telling me that he just got a formally proposed suggestion from a person he didn’t personally approve of: “*I pulled the old, well-known trick on him. I responded to him politely saying: “oh, this is a great idea! I will have someone in my department look at that!” [simulating enthusiasm] And then I leave it hanging there to dry*”.

Thus the arguments and processes governing middle managers' selection among ideas and new initiatives depend on the mood, approach, professional background, competencies etc. of the individual manager. Although top down innovation processes do sometimes include frontline police officers and others who are believed to know about the matter being developed, the bottom-up selection processes usually do not involve any formalized or qualifying assessment committee processes before being handed over to the decision processes by top managers.

The lack of resources (i.e. time, competences relevant for understanding, facilitating and translating suggestions from staff) is compensated for by the personal hunches and interests of middle managers.

Also, the non-transparency of the formal 'infra-structure' of innovation in the Danish police makes it hard for member of the rank and file and for middle managers to formally find the relevant people that can help qualify their suggestion and the decision making process. After years of major reform-minded changes in the police districts and the national police, this non-transparency and uncertainty about whom to contact, seems to be improving, and responsibilities are constantly in the process of being negotiated and clarified.

Another mechanism through which bottom-up suggestions are being chosen at the middle-layer of the hierarchy is the filtration that happens as middle managers try and adapt suggestions to the standard documentation procedures, language codes and guessing about what top management might have on its mind.

In an interview, a project middle manager who has worked close to top management in the national police for many years, reflects on how she managed to

mobilize a bottom-up innovation (to protect her anonymity I do not go into specifics about the invention she is speaking about):

*“First of all you have to somehow feed your idea into the portfolio of projects that the department managers are responsible to deliver. You also have to understand that some types of projects are more important than others for police in Denmark as a whole. I had to insistently persuade my superior and try to make him understand what the [device] was all about. I had to serve it up in the right ‘political wrapping’ too. There are many formalities when it has to be prepared for the Directors. And we had to do all that because otherwise you can’t operate in this system. But there was really substance to this kitchen table model and as soon as it became in my department manager’s personal benefit to run the project it was sold.*

*It goes like this: If you want to present something to the Directors, it has to be written on a bunch of papers. Then my superiors tell me to change my proposal and write their perspectives into it. And you do that three or four times, right? And once it gets to the Directors, that is **if** they ever read it, the original proposal and the final one do not have much in common. It ends up being as conformist as the last middle manager in the row wants it to be. It is a barrier of good but rigid intentions.*

*Everybody wants to contribute to development but on safe grounds. But basically, it is pure guessing about what the top managers might want. They think: “that thing went through the last time so we better copy that as much as possible”. This is when I think that middle managers in fact become disloyal because it means that our top management are never presented with any real options (she becomes silent for some time). But what I did in the case of my own invention was that*

*instead of presenting my superior with the idea in a written form, I presented him the physical prototype model I made myself. Now that they (the middle managers) can't change beyond recognition in the way they can with written words because it's a solid **thing**, right?*

*What happens is that middle manager's intention is to play it safe. And I'm sad to say this, but their judgments are usually rather arbitrarily based on their own restricted knowledge on matters that land on their desk. I am convinced that this dynamic is undermining top management's very intention that innovation should really take place in our organization", she says.*

What this project manager's experience tells us is that the conformation and adjustment of suggestions to what middle managers *think* that the next manager in the line of command might appreciate ends up changing the original suggestion throughout the process of re-writing the final proposal for top management. This manager has learned to present her suggestion to her superiors in the physical form of a prototype model to protect it from being 'changed beyond recognition' by her superiors.

What we also learn from this example is the actual power of the middle manager's privilege to select, filter, and change bottom-up suggestions. This power even goes so far as to trump top managers' privilege to *know* about the actual concerns and needs for development experienced further down the ranks.

In Part III we will see how the informal dynamics of the police organization seems to compensate for some of these shortcomings from the hierarchical barriers to sharing knowledge and innovation across formal domains of power.

However, it is only fair to say that we should not think that police middle managers do not contribute to innovation, an idea I will develop in the following section.

### **Winning hearts: Creative means of turning staff in favor of ‘the system’**

As the formal organization of the police is managed top-down and has been effectuated through a shower of reform-minded strategic initiatives over the past years, translating these changes into the context of everyday life in departments and units is a heavy burden to place on the shoulders of middle managers.

In this section I show how middle managers, as they attempt to adapt top-down initiatives to the local settings they are managing, describe being very innovative in the management technologies they invent for subjecting their staff to top-down initiatives.

For example, a recurrent issue in my talks and interviews with middle managers was about performance, which poses a great challenge to them in that they have to make their staff deliver the results. A local station manager expresses one his frustrations about this issue in a blunt manner: *“police officers don’t give a damn about those numbers, they only care about what **they** think is important to get done.”*

All the rank and file police officers I spoke to about this matter had their own opinion about what sorts of crime they find it relevant to respond to at the local level and what sorts are not. And in many cases, such analysis is based on

‘intuition’ rather than more systematic and cross-national crime analysis (Hestehave 2013).

At a manager meeting in a police district, I overheard a group of managers discussing the complex set of performance goals and outcomes related to fighting and preventing crime in a socially marginalized and high crime local area. Within a few minutes I completely lost track of the conversation. To me as an outsider as well as to a large proportion of the managers themselves, who were obviously frustrated and confused about the formulations and meaning of the objectives, the performance objectives, at that time set primarily by a department in the National Police, made no sense whatsoever, and the uncertainty and confusion that the managers had to deal with seemed overwhelming.

At one point during this meeting a high-ranking middle manager spoke to me saying: *“To put it frankly, the identified objectives are not worth the paper they are written on. They overrule our professional discussions at meetings like this one because there are too many of them, they are unrealistic and our monitoring fucks up because of muddy registrations. If we, who are in charge of the performance, find it hard to comprehend the objectives - then how on earth should the officers out on the street find them sensible?”*

A couple of weeks later I was doing field work at a local police station and the station manager offered to demonstrate her latest invention, and here is what happened:

The station manager takes me to the cantina. She points to a piece of paper on a whiteboard where several notifications are posted. It is a performance table listing a number of objectives, some of which are marked with heart-shaped stickers.



With a trace of self-irony, she explains:

*“This is my attempt to be innovative. We are behind in charges, so I invented this “heart model” because there were no more star stickers available at the store. I thought: they [her staff] would laugh me out of the room when I presented this. We are known as a ‘girly station’, so it is bad enough as it is. Especially the guys did respond with a little jibe. But during our weekly meetings we celebrate the colleagues who get a charge by putting a heart on the table and applause. We rarely openly appreciate each other’s’ efforts as police officers. But it seems as though they have taken it to their heart. They seem really proud when earning a heart.”*

To my question of why she invented this ‘tool’ she responds:

*“I’ve learned that in order to make your employees perform better, you need to motivate them. The staff can’t relate to the centrally defined objectives. It doesn’t always make sense to them. So I had to come up with something. It is not ingenious or original. It’s basically just a matter of creating motivation and incentives, you know. In another district they did something similar with little rubber ducks like the ones kids have in their bathtub... but this seems to work okay, we’ll see...”*

Shortly after this, an investigative officer under her command, John, invites me to join an investigation of fraud. We enter a quiet interrogation room and he explains the case to me. The story turns into a rich conversation about his career as a police officer.

He explains how his career changed dramatically as he got a serious back injury forcing him to stay away from ‘real policing’ and do paperwork instead. He is now recovering from a major surgical operation, which will show its results in three months’ time. In a defeated voice, he tells a story about a fifteen year-old ‘*young brat*’ who managed to escape out the window as Henrik interrogated him in the room we were now sitting in, and how his serious back pain prevented him from stopping the kid.

He wishes he could show me some ‘*real police work*’, he says. His phone rings while I think hard about something comforting to say, but before I say a word he jumps up, opens up the door and informs me that we are going to inspect a ‘*fresh*’ burglary scene.

As we are done with the job, John enthusiastically shows me some of the major crime scenes he has investigated, as we drive by. He receives a call on the radio. A burglar is breaking into an apartment in a ghetto-area nearby known for its gang activities and violent attacks on police. John listens with a tense look on his face and mumbles: “*Shit... Oh... Uhhh... bastard...*”

He looks restlessly in the rearview mirror, then at me. He explains how the police consider the ghetto-area to be a ‘*hostile area*’ (fjendtligt område), and since I am unarmed and defenseless, he might have to drop me off on our way, he says. I try to make myself invisible. I wouldn’t miss some *real policing*. “*You’ll soon see the guys [police colleagues] drive up from behind. We can follow them some of the way, if you like?*” he says. “*Sure*”, I respond. He smiles in

agreement: *“What the hell, this one earns us two hearts: offender caught in action and burglary... let’s hit it!”*

As we drive into the *hostile area*, another police car has already parked a few blocks from the scene and the colleagues have left it. A group of about ten to fifteen Arabic-speaking men of different ages has gathered on the pavement close to the parked police car. As we pass the police car in our civil car, a hooded teenager runs up to the parked car. *“Shit, he’s gonna smash the car!”* John yells. He hits the speeder and just as the teenager smashes the windshield of the parked police car with a piece of tile, John rolls down his car window and yells: *“What the fuck do you think you are doing?”*

John turns the car around at great speed, hits the brakes in front of the cheering group of men and jumps out the car while, hissing at me: *“They might throw stones at us or worse, just so you know”*. He manages his anger as he runs up to the growing crowd on the street. Five young men wearing hoodies walk up to the car I’m in while they stare threateningly at me.

Suddenly the door is flung wide open. It’s John: *“Did you see who threw the tile? Had it not been for my fucking back I would have run him down... shit... well, we don’t get this every day. This is **real** policing, I tell you!”*

As it turns out, John’s demonstration of ‘*real police work*’, chasing and capturing the burglar has a magnetic effect on him, even to the extent that he - eager to experience and show me some *real* police work - momentarily forgets his back

pains. However, his reference to the heart winning performance management system as he argues that “*this one earns us two hearts*” seems more like a way of legitimizing the pursuit rather than a wish to meet managerial targets.

This is a very central issue when considering the ‘motivation’ of police officers that the middle manager was speaking about regarding her invention of the competition for ‘winning hearts’. The symbolism of this invention has several layers to it; at a concrete level, the police officers win heart stickers for meeting performance objectives. Second, the actual managerial agenda here is to motivate staff performance; that is, to win *their* hearts in terms of increasing their competitive performance, in this case, collecting burglary charges.

But it may very well be that the reason for the potential success of the managerial tools that middle managers invent, at least as it plays out in this example, are mediated by the extent to which they connect to culturally embedded variations of ‘*real police work*’, which will be explored next.

## **Chapter 6. The view from the Bottom: Doing it ‘real’**

Patrol officer: “*I believe cops are born creative. That’s why most of us join the police, I suppose. We can’t sit still! We need action and we want to **do** something about stuff!*”

Me: “*Why do you think this is so? Why are cops creative?*”

Patrol officer: “*Why are we here? Not here in this room; I mean, why are we **really** here? Why do cops marry nurses? It’s because we share the same philosophy of life! We are here to help those in need. We*

*can't wait for the politicians to make up their minds; they don't know what it's **really** like out on the street. Creativity and the ability to think and act on your own are fundamentals for doing a good job. There is no manual for good police work because not two situations are really alike. Your gut feeling guides you; not yesterday's solution because today, right now, it's different!"*

In some of my in-depth interviews and conversations with police officers, they shared their philosophy and passion about their work. For a great many police officers, their job is much more than just a job; it is a membership in a culture that transforms their whole life and private world. It provides a calling and identity that are embedded in a set of values epitomized in the term '*the police heart*' (politihjertet).

Central to this chapter on the perception of innovation and creativity by the bottom of the hierarchy is the understanding by the rank and files of what constitutes '*real policing*'. That is, some tasks appeal more to the cultural construction of identity and organizational membership than others; and, as we will see in this chapter, these areas of preference guide much of the effort that rank and file police put into their everyday creative work.

Together with the privilege of action granted to frontline police officers, i.e. the power to *do*, as they see it, the creative solutions often called for in police work not a matter of deciding whether they should act on what seems to them like a good idea; rather, street officers consider such action as a condition of policing. To them, everyday creativity is closely connected to a 'street-rationale' of getting things done and making things work here and now. Therefore, they become easily impatient and are passionate about those solutions they devise themselves, which

cops refer to as '*duct tape solutions*' (gaffa løsninger) or '*drawer solutions*' (skuffeløsninger).

However, because the ethics and concerns are different on the street than in the bureaucratic office, a tense dichotomy develops between what street cops regard as the '*correct*' innovation of the office and '*real*' creativity of the street.

### **'Real police work'**

Frontline police work is guided by legal and experience-based knowledge of which the police training academy can only offer a brief introduction to the inexhaustible variation of situations and dilemmas that police officers will encounter in their career. Aspects of uncertainty and the specific rationales among frontline police officers that connect to their work on the street inform the common notion of *real* police officers and *real* police work in the police, which we will see is influential in how they relate to creativity and innovation.

There has been some debate about the extent to which policing is, in fact, a profession. For example, Diderichsen (2013) argues to speak about a professional area of expertise implies that 1) the professional knows something that the general population does not, 2) the professional has a certain degree of epistemic autonomy, meaning that the professionals themselves produce the specific type of knowledge that defines their profession and 3) a particular form of professional ethic, meaning that professionals serve ideals that go beyond personal profit, and this ethic unites the professionals as *peers*.

Diderichsen worked until recently as a section manager at the Danish Police academy, engaged in developing and implementing the new police education system as an undergraduate program. He does not see how the hierarchical

organization of the police in Denmark and other Western countries provides the conditions for meeting these criteria.

Police discretion, as Diderichsen points out, is based on legal knowledge and its interpretation ‘which is why police officers can only be assumed to have a form of knowledge which so to speak plays out in the cracks that inevitably emerge from the legal control with police work’ (Ibid., p. 80, my translation). Also, the autonomy of police is problematic, since the police must obey democratic principles in a society based on Law: ‘The relation between the police and the State power is simply too close for the possibility or desirability of such autonomy, just as it does not seem realistic to believe that political rulers would be willing to (partially) give up the control with such a central societal institution, even if possible’ (Ibid., p. 81, my translation).

Regardless of whether or not policing can be defined as a profession or not, police officials have clear notions about the sorts of practices that count as ‘*real police work*’ and those that do not. In his ethnographic investigation of police discretion in a Danish police district in 1996 to 1997, Holmberg observed how police officers’ notion of ‘*real police work*’ referred to the fact that “... *some work which is considered to be more right, substantial and fun than others*” (Holmberg 1999, p. 77, my translation). In comparing the international literature on this matter, Holmberg (Ibid.) highlights that tracing, chasing and catching offenders is particularly appealing to police officers. As we saw in the previous chapter, this was the case in the example of the police officer John, who was eager to catch a burglar in action.

But there seem to be additional layers in this question that play a crucial role in relation to innovation as a managerial discourse and also in police officers' perceptions of their everyday creativity.

For one thing, the types of police work that individual police officers associate with '*real*' are more fragmented. Whereas I did observe a general attraction to catching '*bad guys*', many police officers have individual preferences about what constitutes interesting, appropriate, and real police work, be it traffic, different types of investigation work, dog patrolling, street patrolling, community oriented policing, immigration matters, etc. And within each area of policing there are several different '*religions*', as both rank and file police and managers put it, interestingly enough, i.e. principles, concepts and methods of how to do a good job.

Throughout this chapter I argue how the culturally powerful notion of *real* policing on the street, as opposed to the *correct* administrative and managerial sphere of the office, is produced in large part by the tensions created between the concerns and practices of managers versus rank and file police officers.

Based on an ethnographic study in a large US urban police department, Hunt (1984) argues that the different social spheres of office and street are shaped by the gendered categories of the '*clean*' feminine superior morality of the home versus the male territory of the '*dirty*' corruption, violence and dishonesty of the street:

'In this case, the women of the home are viewed as untrustworthy in part because their superior feminine virtue is seen as dangerous in a public world in which most members are corrupt. In contrast, men who work on the street are perceived as



trustworthy mainly because they share an involvement in illicit activity' (Hunt 1984, p. 286).

Although Hunt's more recent study suggests the divide between office and street is no longer dominated by gendered metaphors (Hunt 2010) the inside-outside issue seems to replay itself across nations. For example, Punch (1983) describes a similar negative stereotyping of the other by street-level officers in Amsterdam's police force, in this case of managers. Generally, officers view their managers as "variously incompetent, careerist, mercenary, slippery, cowardly and lazy" (Ibid., p. 240). A part of this view is explained by the indulgent conditions that managers enjoy relative to police officers: where police officers work on the street in shifts throughout the week, managers largely work from their desks, following regular hours and rarely working weekends.

For Punch, this produces a paradox: while police officers relish not having managers around to control them, they also resent this absenteeism, particularly "when shit hits the fan" (Ibid., p. 241). In those situations, a manager is needed for support against the system and it becomes apparent who the good bosses are. '[A] good boss is one who backs you through thick and thin' (Ibid.), but a good boss, in Punch's account, is also hard to find and bosses are therefore generally resented by the officers in the street, even though some do attempt to be 'real' as opposed to 'token' bosses (Ibid., p. 243).

A related study is that of Reuss-Ianni & Ianni (1983) who also highlight the tension between "Street cops and management cops" in their essay's title. Based on a study (albeit from the 1970's) in two New York City police precincts, they argue that there are two distinct cultures of policing. The culture of street policing, which Reuss-Ianni & Ianni's informants then (and mine today) consider to be

under siege and deteriorating relative to the ‘good old days’, is characterized by mutual dependence and solidarity and a ‘cop’s code’ of acceptable behavior. It originates in street cops sharing not only occupation, but also racial, religious and economic backgrounds.

This ‘cop’s code’ involves a range of maxims, including ones like ‘watch out for your partner first and then the rest of the guys working that tour’, ‘show balls’ and ‘be aggressive when you have to, but don’t be too eager’. Such maxims are not necessarily respected or appreciated by management cops, and some such as ‘don’t give up another cop [to controlling managers]’, ‘don’t do a boss’s job for him’ and ‘know your bosses’ even serve to distance street cops from managers (Ibid.).

However, the violent and high-crime American setting studied by especially Hunt and Reuss-Ianni & Ianni differs from today’s Danish police setting where corruption and reported violent incidents are relatively low. And yet there still seems to be a considerable gap between the culture of the street and that of the office. Although gender does play a role in the world of the Danish police (I certainly dealt with my share of sexist, patronizing behavior and remarks about women in general, myself, female colleagues, etc. and these experiences were just as evident in the managerial sphere of the office), the tense dichotomy between office and street seems to be related much more strongly to the dynamics of the hierarchy.

What seems especially relevant in creating and sustaining the dichotomy between street and office in the Danish contemporary setting is, as Hunt (1984) also observes, the aversion on the part of the uniformed rank and files to what she terms ‘political patronage’ of individuals who are keen on gaining more rank:

*‘Political man gains power through the manipulation of friendship and the strategic distribution of favors. Formal qualifications and professional competence are viewed only as secondary requirements to gain status and upward mobility’ (Ibid., p. 288).*

But whereas in Hunt’s study, the cops nickname opportunist careerists as ‘whores’, ‘inside tit men’ and ‘asskissers’, the names used by the Danish police, at least in my presence, were less gendered, such as ‘court snakes’ (hof snoge), ‘sneaky farts’ (luske fise), ‘diplomats’ (which in some cops’ opinion means that they are ‘spineless’ and ‘howl with the wolves they are among’ (hyler med de ulve de er iblandt)).

Individuals who prioritize political concerns and career over the informal codes of what it takes to prove yourself trustworthy on the street strike a nerve in street officers who have few things to hold on to in reducing job-related fears and anxieties beyond the mythologized supportive function of the ‘partner’, their weapons, and training. A police officer is trained to be ready to risk his or her life on duty, so managers who view them as mere instruments for their own personal interests violate the officers’ dignity, calling, and confidence in the system they serve. As one rank and file officer expresses it: *“The political manager solves his task at any price, regardless of the suffering of the staff”*.

A recurrent theme for most police officers I talked with who were dedicated to their work on the street was a profound ‘*professional pride*’ (professionel stolthed). This pride was explained by emphasizing the respect you show by wholeheartedly engaging with every human being you serve to help and protect as a cop and by your loyalty to colleagues.

On the street, chaos, unpredictability and danger are always lurking around the corner. In effect, concern about one's own safety as a cop and the safety of others is constantly at play. As a police officer, you never know if the call you get on patrol is a scam or if you are about to meet a group of trouble-makers that outnumber you, a friend, a family member, a lost soul who does not know whom else to call because the police are the only social institution available around the clock, a victim who desperately needs your help or your potential killer.

*"You quickly realize that when you are on the street, there is no thinking twice and sometimes no time to wait for backup. There is you, your partner and the panicking herd of people gathering around a woman and child stuck in a crashed car. The end justifies the means, at least to a certain extent. That's just the way it is",* a patrol officer explains.

The informal world of the street radically differs from 'the formal reality of law and department rules' as Hunt (1984) also observed.

By contrast, in the office the variety of ambiguous tasks and direct exposure to emotional and physical threats and urgency that face the uniformed police officer is reduced, and replaced by written documentation, reports, prefixed performance objectives, and the legal processes of the prosecutory apparatus.

It is precisely this pre-determined '*correctness*' of the office bureaucracy that upsets some uniformed police officers as they face the '*realness*' of the everyday, indeterminate sphere of the street. A young operational police officer elaborates on this matter in an interview:

*"I think policing is more about politics than it is about actual police work these days; I mean, consider the kind of managers we have in our system. They are all the same! What happens is that they recruit the same kind of people as themselves.*

*You have to look very carefully to find those people who have the guts to do something because it is the **right** thing to do and not because it is politically correct. Those who are too good at their job to be kept down by the others are the kind of people they try to align with the rest. For them, the career opportunities become limited very quickly.”*

To him, *“the people who do real police work are those who are out in the streets catching the criminals. Then it more or less doesn’t matter **how** you do it!”*

He goes on to explain that those of his colleagues who want to do a really good job are usually on duty in the afternoon and evening when those who typically commit crime are on the street. *“If you patrol in the morning, you usually drive out to dead people, minor burglaries, traffic accidents, compulsory admissions and the sort.”*

According to him, the ‘*real criminals*’ are active during the afternoon and the night. They go to bed around three to four in the morning and sleep all day. In his view, the ‘*nice*’ police officers are on duty during the day so that they can ‘*mingle with the bosses*’ and be sure to be noticed and promoted. But only a few tactical leaders are really good when you work on the street: *“We have operational leaders here who, as soon as the balloon goes up, jump into their car and lock the door. That’s simply not okay. As a team leader you should be the one to lead – not the first to flee!”*

Following this logic, *real criminals* must be handled by *real cops*.

Police officers often hint that some of their colleagues who have chosen to become managers are traitors, while ‘*paper pushing*’ bureaucrats almost are cowards almost by definition. Once again, this again emerges from an action-oriented ‘*real*

*police*' culture where abandonment by a team manager who jumps into the car and locks the door is, of course, a contemptible act.

On the other hand, a leader who positions him- or herself in front of the team during these tasks and makes the team feel confident, calm and well-coordinated is worth '*going through fire and water*' for, as a police officer expressed it. Therefore, there is a strongly held belief among some rank and file members that in order to become a good manager, '*one must be able to look oneself and one's staff in the eye every day*' as a saying goes. Cops even talk about the importance of earning '*street credit*' (they use the English expression which in fact is gang slang for the status and influence you earn if you fight a cop, kill someone, or go to jail).

Another aspect of '*real*' versus '*correct*' relates to the tensions between police officers and lawyers. Occasionally, enthusiastic investigations, raids, searches, etc. end in cases being dismissed once they have been legally and bureaucratically processed due to some problematic aspect in the police officers' handling of the case. Due to a combination of the cops' frustrations of having '*put their own blood into the case*' with no result and their experience with the games and processes of judicial system, they circulate sarcastic jokes about lawyers.

A commanding officer confirms that the dichotomy between street and office is also echoed among higher-ranking officers, as he speaks about '*real policing*': "*Many of my colleagues make choices so that they avoid situations in which difficult decisions must be taken here and now; because it also means that you get your share of punches (får én på tuden). But it is way more fun than just being a paper pusher in the human resources department, which is of course a safer career move... but deadly dull, right?*"

On the street, rank and file police and their commanding officers engage directly with citizens. This provides them with the power to act as representatives of the police institution.

As cops see it, the power to *do*, and thereby make a direct difference on a daily basis, is generally considered more valuable than the power to make longer term strategic decisions, which I will now examine.

### **The power to do**

As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the demands and expectations of police officers to *act* in a variety of different and suddenly occurring new situations call for creativity. In other words, non-canonical incidents and problems may call for non-canonical solutions. No manual includes all the guidelines you need as a police officer in order to act by the book, which introduces an improvisational aspect of police work which I will further develop in chapter 7.

This points to another aspect of everyday creativity in the Danish police, namely the high degree of action-oriented autonomy, the power to *do*, which is a privilege granted to those who perform their duties outside the office in unsupervised spaces (see for example Lipsky 1969).

As already mentioned, some rank and file members I talked with do not want to become managers for the very reason that they do not want to get involved with administration and leave the sort of tasks which they are very passionate about.

To them, the power to *do* and make an immediate difference to other people and to live out a '*boy's fantasy*' (en drengedrøm), as several police officers described it, is a privilege. However, to ground our understanding of some police officers'

urgent and often impatient drive to engage with creative solutions, I believe that it is important to acknowledge the conditions and formal/ informal ‘making’ (or *disciplining* in Foucauldian terms) of police officers. Understanding this process makes it evident that the power to *do* is inseparable from the bare necessity to *act now*.

A senior investigator explains that, “*in the moment you agree to be just the tiniest bit of a manager in this system, you turn administrative. You might join in during the first part of investigating a homicide but the next day you are out.*” To him, his entire life is about solving serious crimes, to the extent that he spends much of his spare time putting together unsolved puzzles and invents creative means of tracing leads, perpetrators and witnesses.

The capacity to act and make quick decisions has been the main focus in the recruitment of police officers in Denmark up until a few years ago, when the focus shifted toward the recruitment of ‘*analytical*’ and ‘*reflective*’ police officers, as a manager from the police training academy put it.

But every officer who patrols the streets or is in direct contact with citizens in other ways must make quick decisions. To the public, police officers are notoriously regarded as rather square minded, something they occasionally joke about themselves. A rank and file policeman explains in an interview:

“*We have to be like that [parting the world into black or white]. You can’t arrive to a traffic accident with a herd of witnesses and be like: “Uhm... what’s going on here, I’m totally confused... Perhaps we should do this... no, wait a minute, it might be better to do that... what do you guys think?” It makes people insecure. I am expected to be the authority, the leader, and to react quickly... I just can’t be wrong. It’s a façade but we **have** to believe it ourselves in that situation; and*



*that's why we are allergic to criticism, as you probably know. Most of us are mistaken every once in a while but we hate to admit it. That would be like admitting we are only human beings* (he smiles ironically)."

To him, peoples' lives may depend on the clear and unambiguous guidance provided by police authorities during chaotic circumstances. Another police officer explains how the claim of authority is also crucial when working with hard-core gang members, who will not hold back from beating up a cop they don't respect. "*It is some kind of alpha-male game, although some female cops can do it too. It's not about arm muscles but brain. When you respect them, they respect you*", he says.

In this way, the ability to act without hesitation is a crucial aspect of street police work.

In line with this, the cynicism that is sometimes cultivated among police officers can be seen as a process of emotional hardening that prepares the police officers to face the worst situations imaginable.

In the following example, a young police officer who just came out of the police training academy to work as a patrol officer in a local police station is being socialized according to these norms.

One afternoon, two police officers and I head back to the station after a day's patrol to have a cup of coffee before their shift. Another patrol team comes in to join us, one of them in his fifties, the other in his early twenties. The two are unusually quiet and seem tense. One of

the other officers keeps poking them with sarcastic comments probably to make them talk.

The oldest of the two other patrol officers then makes a joke out of how his young buddy has just *'done a little dancing with a dead guy'*. The young cop's face turns dark red as he forces out a tense laughter and responds that they have just visited a house where a man had hanged himself in a rope. He was convinced that he heard a sound coming from the person's lips and so he had rushed over to cut him down, just to find himself *'dancing around'* with a stiff dead body.

We all laugh about the story, and as the young cop leaves the table, his partner pats his shoulder in a fatherly manner, saying *"I hope you're done dancing with the dead now?"*

In the transition police officers go through to become tough and reliable colleagues who will *'stand when it's windy'* (stå op når det blæser), they are met by older colleagues with a common phrase that *'as a cop you get thrown out from the third floor and then you'll just hope that your legs don't break and that you'll hit the ground running'*. What this basically means is that training cannot prepare you for everything, and when strange situations occur, as they certainly will, you have no choice but to deal with things *as they happen*.

Sometimes you panic or act in ways that might surprise you and your colleagues as in the case of the young cop rushing to the dead man hanging from the ceiling in the obsession to save a life. And, as demonstrated in this case, the colleagues deflate the awkwardness of the incident and indirectly discipline him by use of irony and sarcasm.

In other words, you become a ‘*real cop*’ by acting like one. And as you act as a real cop, you distance yourself from the ‘polished floors’ of the office in order to prove yourself trustworthy to your colleagues in that you have what it takes to deal with the at times highly intensive, self-sacrificing and potentially dangerous job on the street. In those situations, the privilege to *do* is not a choice; it might be a matter of life or death.

I would like to reflect for a moment on the implications of the ‘*real cop*’ discourse for innovation in the police, because I think it is critical to understanding some of the dynamics that cause some parts of the police organization to be reluctant to accept, or even to reject the term ‘innovation’.

First, the insistence on ‘*real*’ as opposed to ‘*correct*’ spheres of policing reserve a space for individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy that justifies their experience-based knowledge and autonomy. In the following excerpt from my interview with a uniformed rank and file officer he demonstrates how the ‘*real cop*’ discourse devalues the contribution of other internal and external domains when it comes to creative policing:

Police officer: “[Managers] *mostly think about what things cost, while cops think: “Just get this thing done!” ... Cops make things work and use their own tools for achieving that. For example, I use my own iPhone because it lets me to do stuff that my old-fashioned police phone doesn’t, such as searching the Internet for maps when I’m out in the street.*”

Me: “*What comes to your mind when you hear the word “innovation”, honestly?*”

Police officer: *“Honestly? I think that the word sounds “nice” but it is in no way down to earth. The consultancy reports that keep coming... well, among cops we know that stuff like that costs money, but we never hear about the results or feel any difference. When I heard about your research on innovation, I thought: “What have I got to do with that?” That’s what I thought. If you want to learn about cops’ ideas and creative solutions, why don’t you just say so? But I guess you had to sell your project to the lawyers who are in charge...”*

Similar to the vignette that opened the introduction of this thesis, this conversation provides insight about the way that the term ‘innovation’ is becomes associated with uselessness, in that it is all talk and no action. According to this police officer, innovation is a term that is alien to the sphere of action-oriented police work; it is a term used by consultants, managers and, of course, by me as a researcher belonging to a different sphere with no connection to the work performed by police officers at the bottom of the hierarchy.

Thus, the culturally embedded identity of being a ‘*real cop*’ doing ‘*real police work*’ is constructed by rank and file police officers at the bottom of the hierarchy as opposed to management, administration and – in some cases – the lawyers. A ‘*real cop*’ is different from a manager, different from an academic (including a lawyer) and different from an administrator. In fact, you become a real cop as you perform and defend the experience and action based aspects of (dirty) policing.

Seen through a Foucauldian lens, we might understand the construction of ‘*real policing*’ practices and a ‘*real cop*’ identity as a discourse produced by those at the

bottom of the hierarchy, in resistance to the subjection of power imposed on them from superior organizational domains.

This leads to my second reflection: to the extent that the action-oriented '*real police*' discourse can be perceived as an act of resistance, it also - in Foucault's framing of power - represents an act of freedom. This means that the '*real police*' discourse is a 'tactic,' in Foucault's sense of the term, in that it is a counter-move to whatever power that challenge the interests it protects. It produces and justifies a space for freedom or autonomy, and once again, this reinforces the privilege and power to *do*.

The act of power comprises the act of freedom, as Foucault has reminded us.

Therefore, since the term *innovation* is embedded in the sphere of management, police officers, who subscribe to the discourse of '*real policing*', automatically reject the term so as to protect their privileged sphere from managerial invasion. As the officer cited earlier says, "*cops make things work and use their own tools for achieving that*" which is also a way of claiming that they require no management.

Clearly this is an exaggerated statement staged to spell out a political message to me as a researcher, and thus, a potential messenger, loudspeaker, or garbage can for frustrations.

Nonetheless, his account demonstrates some of the power dynamics generated by the hierarchy, in that its disciplinary mechanisms also serves to fixate and intensify the tensions and differences between those who subject those who are being subjected.

As we will see in the next section, the action-oriented characteristics of the everyday creative practices that are being conducted by those at the bottom of the hierarchy are perceived with a varying degree of enthusiasm by other domains inside and outside the police organization.

### **‘Duct tape’ and ‘drawer’ solutions**

The deep passion of police officers make some individuals stand out as *‘fire spirits’* (ildsjæle), a Danish expression for people who engage passionately with a given subject or cause. These were the kind of people that I would be asked to address by their colleagues, since they are believed to be particularly creative in their work.

When talking to such highly enthusiastic people, I was often presented with a variety of *‘drawer solutions’* (skuffeløsninger), that is, inventions or implementation of solutions that are new to the sphere of policing and either literally kept in drawers as developing sketches or as *‘kitchen table solutions’* (køkkenbordsmodeller), meaning prototypes for new tactics, equipment, technologies, etc. that are being tested day to day according to the “*principle of whatever-means-are-available*” (forhåndenværende søms princip). When the technology, material, decision processes etc. do not offer police officers adequate solutions to solve a given task, police officers do not hesitate to figure out creative ways to solve problems on their own.

The homespun solutions to everyday problems that police officers come up with are also known as *‘duct tape solutions’* (gaffa løsninger), referring to the aesthetically deficient, patched together creations that some cops invent. The expression might also refer to homemade computer programming and solutions

created in Word and Excel documents, which individuals and sometimes entire departments of police officials, create and use to compensate for various troubles or needs they encounter when working with official technologies and IT-systems.

Both rank and file police officers and some of the managers I talked with believe that such creative solutions to solve the problems police officers encounter on a daily basis are necessary to make things work and run as smoothly as possible.

Consider, for example, the following case: in every police district, there is a special car reserved for the incident commanders, who are on call for command shifts in case of major incidents that need more complex coordination or other forms of support. This car is larger than the other patrol cars so there is more room in the back for extra equipment, people, etc. As the incident commanders often need some sort of a mobile office to handle things on the spot, they equipped the back of their car with a table and a number of electronic devices, such as a computer and a printer. They put a rubber mat between the table and the devices to keep them from sliding back and forth as they drive (see the photo below).



Although the police officers know that there are better solutions available on the market than their homemade solution, the car has already been bought by the purchasing staff, so it would be too expensive to buy the optimal solution.

In this way, police officers invent their own solutions for practical problems they encounter in their daily jobs. But in some cases, their urge to act exceeds their judgment of their own competencies or the appropriateness of their solution.

In one situation, a small group of police officers insisted on fixing the air circulation system at a local police station, and ended up sabotaging it, something which cost a fortune to get fixed professionally. “*Cops think they know how to fix everything when in fact they don’t*”, their manager complained.

In another example, police officers working at the airport figured out a solution for transporting violent passengers from one place to another by simply strapping them firmly to a stretcher, similar to those used by the medical staff for injured patients; in this way, troublemakers could be easily and swiftly transported from A to B. Of course, this suggestion was shot down immediately by managers who took into consideration the broader ethical concerns and public reactions that this solution might evoke.

When rank and file police officers complain about the difficulty of getting ideas through the line of command, they sometimes present counter-plot stories about scenarios drawn from outside the police, in which the men on the ground are heard and included in the decision-making processes. Often police officers idealize the efficiency of how things work ‘*on the other side of the wall,*’ especially in private sector companies as well as the more prestigious internal units such as organized crime units that deal with undercover activities and the like.



I came across one particular symbolic tale or legend remarkably often. It goes more or less like this:

A private from the military - a frogman (frømand), i.e. a Danish equivalent of a U.S. Navy SEAL, was presented with an upcoming international mission by his superior. The frogman had been on international missions before and had a significant objection to the plan and tactics of the operations, which had been put together by the office of the defense command. When he shared his concerns with his superior, the boss arranged for a meeting with important people from the defense command and sent the private in his stead, because he was the one who knew the specifics of the planned tactics.

The legend of the frogman expresses how important it is for police officers to know that issues involving their own and other's safety are taken care of by those who really know what the job entails down to the smallest practical details. That is, in some cases you have to have '*gotten your nose into the mud*' (ligget med næsen i mudderet), '*been in the trenches*' (været med i skyttegraven) or '*gotten dirty*' (blevet beskidt) in order to offer trustworthy new solutions to cops.

In this respect, the tale of the frogman has to do with the distance police officers experience between their concerns and those of management, and the ways that strategic and political decision-making compromises and silences their points of view as things are planned and developed.

Thus, it is a common belief among police officers that it is virtually impossible for a rank and file officer to get his or her suggestion for new police practices, equipment or technology through the chain of command. And unless it connects to other domains of concerns up the ranks, the idea most likely will get lost and

killed along the way. New recruits, who are eager to make a difference in the world at large and in the police force, are often told by their older colleagues to just forget about it. An investigator in his late fifties puts it like this:

*“Have you met Allan, yet? He really complains a lot. That’s because he is in the phase of his career where he is being struck by disappointments. You know, all the things he thought he should be and do... that’s not how it goes. I’ve passed that stage myself and come to peace with how this system works. When he gets frustrated about things, tell him to calm down because he is going to last many years from now.”*

What is playing out here is actually consistent with the theory presented by the top manager in chapter 4. Recall the vignette about the monkeys who try and climb a ladder to get bananas but are hindered by splashes of water and how this created a culture of resignation among them. The message that they pass on to each other is ‘don’t bother’, an attitude towards suggestions that would have implications for larger scale decision-making, coordination and development, something I was actually confronted with at different layers of the hierarchy.

In several cases rank and file police officers told me stories and gave me documentation of how they had submitted business cases where they had argued the benefits of developing or implementing new solutions to their superiors and - months or years later, never having gotten any response - would come across the same business case, perhaps slightly modified, but with their name now replaced by that of their superior.

I confronted middle managers about this tendency of stealing suggestions on several occasions, and they rarely denied that such things occurred, but it clearly represented some sort of taboo for some middle managers. One manager

responded with a sarcastic grin, saying “*we do not consider it stealing. We merely facilitate their ideas*”.

That is, in selecting among the ideas suggested by their staff, some middle managers claim the privilege of adopting the ideas as their own, if they decide it might make them look good to other managers or they think it would lend more legitimacy to the idea. Some middle managers explained that ‘*taking over*’ ideas from their staff was a noble gesture. It meant standing behind the suggestions and ‘*translating*’ or ‘*fighting through*’ the necessary argumentation.

Nonetheless, if middle managers don’t communicate their motivations for taking over ideas to their staff, it is considered stealing, and the next time, their staff might simply avoid letting them in on their new ideas.

For example, a rank and file traffic officer was outraged that his new boss turned out to be an ‘*asskisser*’: “*If his boss says “jump”, he jumps, and he says: ‘look boss, I will jump until you ask me to stop again’, and he actually will*”.

Recently, one of his colleagues had come up with a new way of guarding off the highway, which had a huge impact on how we structure operations and had really improved things. Then we read in the newspaper that the boss above ours had told them:

“*A new strong leader in our traffics department has restructured the way we run our operations*”. And the new boss walks up to my colleague, who invented the whole thing, saying: “*Well, Bo, I kind of took the honor for your work but I think I am fully entitled to do so*”.

In an interview, a middle manager offers an explanation for the middle managers’ claiming their staff’s ideas as their own: “*in a system where we have to present*

*ourselves literally as uniform, the only way in which you as a manger can make yourself noticed career-wise is by sticking out positively with good ideas which you know won't fall through. It might very well be that the idea didn't come from you yourself, but hey, that's the name of the game here. Good and viable suggestions for quick and effective solutions that will make your boss look good is good trade currency."*

Thus, the currency of ideas and innovative achievements that seem like sure successes is of high value among middle managers, and sometimes, in the process of passing the idea up the ranks, the credit for it has to be passed on along with the idea.

Again, we see how tensions between the hierarchical layers in the police are produced by distinct privileges and concerns and how, in fact, these forces are constantly challenging - and challenged by - each other.

At the bottom of the hierarchy, the counter-move to subjecting your good ideas to being taken over by the middle layers or waiting forever for the formal system to respond to your request is to simply exclude managers from their creative practices.

And since this means that they have no access to formal approval of their inventions, they are excluded from the resources needed for developing creative initiatives. This phenomenon adds another layer of understanding to why the typical examples of creativity among those at the bottom of the hierarchy are limited to low-cost, patched together 'duct tape', 'kitchen table' and 'drawer' solutions.

In this way, the hierarchy works exactly as it is supposed to: by limiting the scope of creativity and restricting access to knowing which initiative would best serve

the police to higher ranking managers, the hierarchy limits the individual autonomy of police officers while ensuring conformity and compliance with the law and regulations.

## **Summary part II: ‘Correct’ innovation versus ‘real’ creativity**

In Part II we have explored the first two questions proposed by this study, namely 1) how innovation plays out in the everyday setting of the police as an intention of government – a managerial discourse – and 2) how this intention measures up against those practices already performed by police officers that they associate with creativity.

Inspired by Foucault’s description of the relationship between discourse, hierarchy and the dynamics of power and knowledge, we have seen how the police hierarchy, through more or less subtle dynamics of power, disciplines innovation by segmenting different concerns, understandings and practices within the police organization.

In the case of police in Denmark, we have learned that ‘*innovation*’ primarily plays out with reference to managerial practices whereas ‘*creativity*’ appears to be more strongly connected to the sort of everyday creativity rank and file police officers draw upon to come up with solutions to the challenges they encounter in their work.

Thus, in the setting of the police, innovation and creativity are considered to be epistemically different and even antithetical in the setting of the police.

More specifically, we have seen how a dominant, trisected pattern of power relations plays out between the top, middle and bottom layers of the police hierarchy. These power dynamics create tensions and conflicts between the different concerns, responsibilities and privileges that individuals strive to produce, protect and sustain at each hierarchical layer.

While top managers play a crucial role in ensuring that the police is managed and controlled according to modern societal ideals, they are formally and symbolically endowed with the privilege to know and to know *best*.

Therefore, their approaches to innovation must (and, in fact, do) echo the innovation discourse of ‘new public management’ and ‘entrepreneurial governance’ governmentalities. Moreover, top managerial concerns and responsibilities include a number of tasks politically imposed on the police by extensive demands and expectations for reform. The modern institution of the Danish police seeks its justification through more focused, better, faster, and cheaper performance.

Therefore, to top managers, innovation is associated with broadly applicable solutions that are new to police in Denmark (but not necessarily new in themselves), which they believe will help their police managers and staff to achieve necessary changes and goals.

‘Innovation’ then takes on the nature of initiatives infused with politics, which must be implemented regardless of their popularity or meaningfulness further down the ranks.

From the stories and demonstrations of initiatives initiated or approved by top police managers, we learn that ideas suggested by subordinates tend to be ‘*wild*’ and need to be ‘*tamed*’. Their suggestions are funneled through what some top

managers consider as examples of innovation, namely more or less technologically advanced versions of suggestion boxes to which their staff can post their ideas. Through these forms of management technologies, top managers seek to protect their privilege to be the ones who know best and who are in control as they '*nest*' innovation. They do so by creating platforms for sharing, selecting and processing ideas that are in tune with what they see as sound innovation in that the ideas are readily applicable and will immediately pay off in terms of direct savings of resources or the fulfillment of performance goals.

As we have also seen, the frame of reference that is hierarchically produced in the viewpoint of middle managers is different than that of top management.

As the various dilemmas, challenges and solutions confronting top managers inevitably land on the shoulders of police middle managers, they in turn face the task of communicating, implementing and adapting these initiatives to solving the everyday problems that arise in their departments and units.

A successful career path for middle managers depends on how well they live up to the demands and expectations of superiors. But since the discussions among top managers are not always transparent in respect to which bottom-up suggestions will be well received, the main concern of middle managers is to 'play it safe' and stay within what they know and *think* is expected of them. And they end up filtering and blunting bottom-up initiatives in such a way that top managers may lose important knowledge regarding the needs, concerns and creativity that is taking place among frontline staff and others down the ranks.

In Foucauldian terms, middle managers are subjected to the panoptic disciplinary mechanisms of the hierarchy in the form of transparent and nontransparent (symbolic) career selection mechanisms. Not being sure of where, when or by

whom it is important to ‘*be seen*’ by superiors, middle managers often try to stay on the safe side of things and avoid taking any autonomous risks.

Thus, what shapes or disciplines the view and practices of innovation at the middle layer of the hierarchy are concerns of fulfilling the tasks of their superiors; and when describing what they associate with innovation, middle managers typically point to the same initiatives as top managers along with their own inventions of management technologies for translating top-down innovation into the everyday work of their staff.

Middle managers thus have the power to choose how top-down innovation is communicated and implemented and at the same time to choose if, when and how bottom-up suggestions make their way up the chain of command. The dichotomy between the ‘*correctness*’ of politically safe innovation and ‘*wilder*’ character of the day-to-day ideas of the staff is also evident among middle managers. At the middle layer of the hierarchy the concern is to ‘keep their trolls inside their box’, i.e. to discipline subordinates whose creative ideas and practices fall outside what the individual manager thinks is relevant, realistic or appropriate (or legal) for the police to be doing.

At the bottom of the hierarchy, the social world of reference of the rank and file police relates to ‘innovation’ in a remarkably different way than the two other layers. Moreover, it is important to note that this perspective is fully constructed by rank and file front-line police officers.

In fact, some rank and file police officers are dubious about the term ‘innovation’ which to them is a ‘*hurrah-word of management*’. To a considerable extent, their reservation about ‘innovation’ is, linked to the power relation between those who manage and those who are managed.



That is, in the course of the innovation and expansion of the disciplinary apparatus with which the modern institution of the police “polices itself,” so to speak, it has given rise to a culturally embedded segmentation between a managerial and legal-administrative sphere of the *office* on the one hand and the action-oriented sphere of the *street* on the other.

The dominant view among rank and file police officers and some middle managers, contrasts the ‘*correctness*’ of the office with the ‘*realness*’ of the street; this view generates and fuels a ‘*real police*’ discourse. The ‘*real police*’ discourse justifies rank and file police officers’ power to act on crime-related matters of concern to them in the here and now, using the means and knowledge available to them in the situation.

As such, various dynamics come into play in analyzing why individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy prefer *real* creativity (relating to the outer sphere of the street) over *correct* innovation (relating to the inner sphere of the office).

As the prerogative of the rank and file officer is reduced from one of knowing (deciding) which innovations work to one of *not-knowing*, or knowing only so much as is necessary to carry out the pragmatics of the job at hand, and as they are disempowered to select which initiatives makes sense to them in their everyday jobs, it makes sense that they take whatever advantage they can of the little power that remains to them.

According to Foucault’s conception of these dynamics, the flipside of the act of power is the act of freedom.

Since rank and file officers are ultimately the ones who have to police the streets, their privilege is granted by the mandate and autonomy this provides: front-line

police officers are endorsed with the power to *do* or *act* on the basis of the experience-based and often tacit knowledge they have accumulated.

In protecting their own privilege to act according to their experience-based knowledge, they often silence and oppose knowledge produced outside the sphere of the street, and counter it with local versions of the '*real police*' discourse.

When 'innovation' is introduced to the police in the form of a managerial strategy, it is stigmatized from the very outset, because it is not a term that was 'born and raised' on the street. Colleagues at the bottom of the hierarchy celebrate autonomous initiative because it can fix problems at hand using whatever means are available; this is why they call their everyday creative solutions '*duct tape solutions*' and '*kitchen table solutions*'.

Therefore, the different semantics associated with innovation versus creativity across the police hierarchy are most evident at the bottom of the hierarchy. It is here that the difference is distilled and constructed in terms of the, '*correct*' innovation practiced in the sphere of the office, which officers on the street rarely believe addresses the '*real*' aspects of policing.

This view is reinforced by the experience among individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy that 1) their suggestions for new initiatives are often rejected and overruled, and 2) their ideas and solutions are often shelved, stolen, or silently blocked by risk-averse middle managers, as well as being killed along the way by the inertia and non-transparency of the formal system.

This describes the hierarchically produced power dynamics that create and protect different concerns, privileges and practices – and thereby generate three different mutually exclusive 'worlds' of policing with respect to innovation. The layer of

the hierarchy occupied by the observer alters the view of what should be considered as urgent matters.

However, as previously noted, there is more to the story of innovation and creativity in the police than we can understand solely based on Foucault's theoretical model. Switching to the lens proposed by de Certeau, we will now explore the '*gray zones*' of creative police work as we move closer to the everyday tactics that operate at the margins of discourse.

Part III, *The 'gray zones' of creative policing*, is devoted to exploring the practices individuals engaged in the police employ to work with and around the disciplinary restrictions imposed on them by the formal workings of the police hierarchy.

### PART III: *Gray zone creativity*

As we saw in Part II, the practices of the police are subjected to a dense disciplinary body that transcends the institutional life and culture. Hierarchy, black and white 'by the book' practices of law, regulation and procedure together with close attention from politicians, citizens and media leave little space for trial and error experimentation in the police.

Therefore we might infer that the police is not innovative since it is simply not meant to be so by its institutional design.

Part III reverses this assumption. That is if we accept the premise that innovation can happen beyond how it is discursively constructed in the literature and government strategies about innovation in government.

Police officers often seemed to turn our conversations about creativity and innovation in a direction where they would explain me about the necessity and importance of working in the gray zones<sup>21</sup>. That is, as black and white as the disciplinary setting of policing may seem, the complexity and unpredictability of everyday life still prod police to master a way to nuance their reference for how to respond to such ambiguities.

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<sup>21</sup> I am aware that Michel Anteby also writes about Gray Zones, particularly in his book 'Gray Zones: Side production, identity and regulation in an aeronautic plant' from 2008. His work was brought to my attention in May 2014 at a workshop at Lund University. In his definition of gray zones, they are "areas in which workers and their superiors together engage in practices that are officially forbidden, yet tolerated by the organization" (p. 2). As such, his definition resembles the *emic* interpretation of gray zones employed by police officers in this study. However, Anteby's work focuses on side production well-known by managers, i.e. tolerated 'theft' of production materials, use of working time for private purposes and use of company-owned machines. It is therefore not to be confused with the gray zones of this thesis that are inherently part of police work and something that is actively created, negotiated and expanded by exploiting unclear and undefined laws and formal processes, although they share surface familiarity.

As de Certeau's critique of Foucault reminds us, individuals are not mere 'docile bodies' who subject themselves to whatever form of power is imposed on them. The subject is *active* in making use of the limits and restrictions imposed on his/her practices in a variety of creative ways.

Spurred by the responsive urge to act for *real* in ways that they see as complementary to how they prescribed by strategy or 'the book' (i.e. laws, regulations and authorized/conventional practices), police officers *use* the gray zones that are inherent in police work for creative work and seek to actively *expand* the realm of gray zones. I also suggest that gray zone creativity seems, to some extent, to be institutionalized and formalized in the police.

We analyze gray zone creativity through the lens of de Certeau's suggestion of 'tactical spaces' as forms of *variation* and *openings* that arise from within the margins of existing order to better understand how some creative practices tend to be regarded as less 'innovative' than others.

Chapter 7: *Using space for creativity: Police discretion as improvisational space* explores how the ambiguity and complexity of the sorts of situations and tasks that police officers encounter on a daily basis inevitably push the limits of what is and can possibly be prescribed 'by the book'. Creativity is a fundamental condition of policing as the process that police officers inevitably engage with as they continuously have to invent and use of creative tactics to operate within the margins of strategic place (in de Certeau's notion of it). We see how the improvisational space for creativity involved with police officers' discretion is negotiated as silent agreements between concerns of the 'street' and the 'office' which softens the powerful dichotomy between the two spheres.

Chapter 8: *Making space for gray zone creativity* focuses on the tactics by which police create and expand their possibilities for making adjustments and new contributions to authorized practices.

They do so in several ways. Of those that I encountered is for example the mobilizing of informal networks not only for the purpose of communication but also for innovating. The mobilizing and use of informal networks in the police complement the conventional ‘vertical’ hierarchy and bureaucracy in that it provides alternative ‘horizontal’ power relations. This provides the access and use of knowledge, creative variation and -solutions that are otherwise being silenced by managerial concerns and hierarchical privileges.

Another example of how police officers make space for gray zone creativity is when rank and file police officers, who are frustrated that their needs for new or better solutions in their work, attempt to ‘*wake up the system*’ by simply ‘broadcasting’ their complaints or own solutions to a broader audience rather than through the line of command. Of course, this is a daring act that has to be delicately balanced in the gray zones of what can possibly be gotten away with.

Among the more subtle and sneaky examples of gray zone tactics are those that ‘hack’ the system. That is, in order to smuggle their creative solutions through the ‘*Rockwool layer*’ of middle managers, rank and file police officers may simply imitate local bureaucratic codes and install their solutions as supplement or overwriting of existing solutions.

As a final example of how police officers make space for gray zone creativity we see how they apply creative tactics to compensate for strategic blindness, i.e. crime areas and initiatives that are not strategically mapped out and prioritized. By bridging and covering what local police officers consider to be strategic miss outs,

we see how police district middle managers and their staff develop silent ‘*projects*’ in the margins of policing strategies.

I end the chapter with an ethical observation. The notion *gray zone* may give the reader the impression that ‘anything goes’ in the world of policing and that the ‘gray’ somehow abolishes moral, ethical and legal concerns. As police move close to certain criminal environments or cultural communities within the police, some individuals may subject themselves to the identity constructions characteristic within these cultural spheres. In those cases, ‘gray’ risks to become too dark, in that counter-culture may emerge. However, there seems to be self-disciplinary mechanisms at play among most of the police officers I talked to that hinder gray zone practices in turning too dark. We will see how, in the Danish setting, police are guided by culturally ingrained ethics expressed as a social sanctioning of colleagues that go too far and that are thus marked as *bullies* (bøller) and *crusaders* (korsriddere).

Chapter 9: *Formalizing explorative spaces: Gray zones as authorized heterotopias*, suggests that there seems to be ways in which gray zone creativity is in fact acknowledged by top management of the police as an effective means of mobilizing responsive law enforcement. As an example of this, *task forces* are formally established as privileged, cross-disciplinary heterotopic spaces in order to focus intervention against specific crime areas. Another example of authorized heterotopias include local training units in the police districts, where gray zone creativity is staged and qualified as local trainers arrange for experimental training and education for dealing with situations that the local police officers find somehow troublesome or in need of improvement. Further, the police dog school provides an example of a heterotopic space that coordinates innovation across the country. As trainers are invited in from all over the country and the students - dog

patrol officers together with their dogs - continuously attend courses at the school, they are provided an explorative space where they can share their own local experiences and tricks. This has resulted in innovative dog training programs and techniques that position Danish police dogs among the best in the world.

## **Chapter 7. Using space for creativity: Police discretion as improvisational space**

*“Sometimes as a police officer, you have to cross the line to learn there even was one”*

- Patrol officer

This chapter explores the ways in which police officers consider creativity as a crucial part of their discretionary space and a crucial element in doing a good job. Law enforcement involves a discretionary space that is both improvisational and creative, which individual police officers must master to be able to handle the uncertainty and ambiguity involved in their work. Examining this discretionary space, we learn that police officers strongly associate creative gray zone practices with everyday police creativity.

This analysis of discretionary space in policing suggests that policing fundamentally takes place in a gray zone. That is, policing relies on improvisational practices that always have to be calculated with great sensitivity to various situational elements and where distinctions of right and wrong, good and bad are rarely completely clear.



Once again, this view views both crime and street police work as *tactical*, in de Certeau's sense of the term, in that in order to be successful, both types of activities have to constantly and skillfully operate at the margins of the laws and regulations that are imposed on the police by society.

Of course, operating at the legal and regulatory margins poses even greater legal and ethical challenges to the creativity of police officers, since they are bound to protect rights, law and ethics whereas criminals deliberately violate such concerns.

Nonetheless, the 'game' being played out between law enforcement and violators of the law continuously and inevitably occupies the gray zones between what is allowed/not allowed, right/wrong, good/bad, etc., leaving a complex of choices and creativity that eventually comes down to the individual police officer's active use of his/her improvisational discretionary space.

As we will also see in this chapter, mastering the gray zones of creative policing comes along with a 'vaccine' you get from your personal experience as a police officer. The 'vaccine' is the experience that slowly gets into your blood - the gut feeling - about what police can and cannot do, also making you resistant to the resistance from superiors when you have pushed the limits with your creative actions. Creative practices involve a calculus of pros and cons about what the police officer(s) believe they gain and risk.

In showing the ways that the police employ this tactical and improvisational space on an everyday basis on the street, we will see the tensions and silent gray zone agreements generated by these creative practices between the tactical space of the street and the strategic place of the office.

## **The gray zones of police discretion**

As Lipsky (1969) has pointed out, police officers and other ‘Street-level Bureaucrats’, are required to treat individuals according to discretionary lines of equality, impartiality and fairness while dealing with the unpredictability they face in their everyday work. As Lipsky observed, Street-level Bureaucrats, who constantly and directly interact with the citizens, use their discretionary space creatively by developing various mechanisms to deal with the ambiguousness and uncertainty they meet in their everyday work: ‘Although he [the Street-level Bureaucrat] works within a bureaucratic structure, his independence on the job is fairly extensive. One component of this independence is discretion in making decisions’ (Ibid., p. 2).

The complex set of laws and regulations developed over the years to discipline the practices of policing has the specific purpose of providing individual police officers with clearer guidelines and limits for what they can and cannot do. Yet, despite such guidelines and limits, the variety of possible interpretations and choices arising in any given situation faced by police officers is a major issue, even while recruits are in training at the police academy.

While taking a course on pedagogics at the Defense academy in 1982, an enthusiastic teacher who worked at the police academy and had himself served as a police officer, wrote a paper on the lack of criteria for selection and admission of new recruits. He worked his way up the ranks and had held an influential position at the police academy for many years, and has therefore had considerable impact on how today’s police officers in Denmark have been trained. He introduced his choice of topic for in his written paper from 1982 as follows:

*“In fact, it is so that when a police officer leaves the station to go on patrol or to do casework, he is completely “his own master” and is hardly controlled by his superiors. His effort depends upon his imagination and creativity and his choice of task depends on his knowledge and insight in the diverse tasks assigned to the police. His approach and treatment of the audience (publikum) place demands on his attitudes to his job, society and the individual as well as great demands to his psychological insight when he is dealing with human beings for better or for worse to such a large extent.”*

In his perspective, ‘*imagination*’ and ‘*creativity*’ are such fundamental aspects of police work that he recommends the use of a ‘*creativity test*’ for potential recruits (notice how this was proposed long before the discourse of innovation was being introduced as part of the overall police strategy).

In the same paper, he mentions how the law leaves multiple gaps for individual interpretation by lawyers and the police. As an example, he mentions § 742 section 2 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) on the practices of police investigation which is very broadly formulated and leaves much to individual interpretation and hence calls for ethical maneuvering: “*The police initiate investigation on the basis of report or on their own initiative when there is **a reasonable suspicion** that a crime, which is publically prosecuted, has been committed*”<sup>22</sup> (my translation and emphasis of the text).

Thus, imagination and creativity, together with legal knowledge and ethical concerns, are in play when police are acting as their “own master” while dealing with the uncertainties and ambiguities they encounter at their daily work. They

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<sup>22</sup> [www.retsinformation.dk](http://www.retsinformation.dk)

constantly work with the tension about when a suspicion is sufficiently well founded to be ‘reasonable’.

In an interview with a prosecutor, who has worked in the police for many years, he says (with reference to the Act of police):

*“Basically, as a police officer there are a range of different ways you can do things; but whatever you chose to do, don’t go any further than the minimum use of force required of you in that specific situation.”*

When talking to cops about the creativity inherent in their discretionary space, they explain that as a police officer, you develop hunches, ‘*intuition*’ or a ‘*police nose*’, as police call it, that marks you as a ‘*real cop*’, once again demonstrating the high degree of reliance on experience-based knowledge in police work as we saw in chapter 6; it should be noted, however tangentially, that the pragmatic characteristics of police work might also have limited the level of abstraction and diversity of knowledge on which the Danish police have founded their practices (Diderichsen 2013).

A street cop gives us an example of how using your ‘police nose’ is inherently a matter of using your imagination and creativity during an interview:

*“A lot of the young colleagues are too shy. But when you’ve been in the game for some time you learn how to trick those who trick you. I found 100 mg of marihuana down the panties of someone because I dare to search for stuff in such places. Some time ago a really big guy hid it [the drug] between the layers of his stomach fat. You have to think just as crazy as they do! That’s what we call using the ‘police nose’”.*

What we learn from this story is that every move by an offender calls for a counter-move by the police. In this case, drug sellers/-users try to get away with their crime by assuming a personal limit of common decency on the part the police officers who may search their bodies; this cop is perfectly aware of such tactics and he is prepared to match their ingenuity and disobey their expectations. In this way, a sort of ‘game’ plays out between criminals and police officers, which is an inherent part of what it means to do police work (Østli 2009).

A similar example from an interview with a patrol officer, addresses how police officers sometimes *make* the law work in their favor when dealing with troublesome suspects who know and hence try to use the legal restrictions against the police (in this case he is referring to the Act on the Processing of Personal Data (persondataloven)):

*“Some gangster-types play it really smart. The law says that you are obliged to inform police about your name, address and date of birth. But you don’t have to give up the last four digits of your social security number. These guys are perfectly aware of that, so many of them say to their pals: “Hey, just don’t give ’em the last four digits, fuck the police!” But when we stop one of them while it is raining, for example, and he won’t give us his last numbers, we say: “that’s fine... you just wait here while we find out who you are...” Then he stands there waiting while we get back into the car, and we **will** find him in our system. But we’ll take our time as he stands there waiting in the pouring rain. We need to get through to the radio and all (he smiles ironically). After a few minutes they usually come over to our car, knock and tell us the whole number. The next time they are not so cocky. We don’t want to be treated as fools and they don’t want that either”, he explains.*

The police officers thus take the law, which they find being used against them by the trouble-makers they encounter, and make it work *for* them forcing the suspect to lose his or her patience and become subjected to the authority of the cops while also turning this into an educational scenario: If you trick cops, they'll trick you right back.

In this way, the tactical use of law is a mutual performance by police and offenders alike on an everyday basis, where the smarter one fools the less smart one (or the one with the most constraints). This is an example of how interactions between law-breakers and law-enforcers push and pull each other beyond the black and white of the law into a different space, a gray zone, which provides space for different choices for action depending on the specific situation.

However, what police officers refer to as working in the gray zone or in the “*interface of what ‘the book’ prescribes and how it is performed,*” as a police prosecutor put it, may also arise from the unpredictability of their daily work, which keeps surprising police officers with new and peculiar tasks.

In response to rare or somewhat strange situations, police develop their own street-manuals on how to handle unusual tasks in an appropriate and efficient way. In most police stations one will find a version of a ‘Best Bets Folder’ (guldkornsmappe), where police officers share tips and tricks of how to deal with many strange occurrences in their work together. Other more off-the-record advice is passed on verbally to colleagues and new recruits during long hours of patrol, breaks, etc. (see also Hunt 1985).

Off-the-record advice also includes passing on informal techniques that police develop to manage and communicate the diversity of people and crime confronting them. They do this by categorizing, or *stereotyping* individuals into

groups of good citizens and criminal citizens. However, this practice is bounded by ethical considerations with respect to discrimination (see e.g. Holmberg 1999). Nonetheless, the ‘*police nose*’ serves a pragmatic and irreplaceable function in everyday police practices, such as knowing the sorts of cars and people to stop and search for drugs, what crime is typically associated with certain geographic and demographic areas, etc. A patrol officer explains:

*“If I spot a steering wheel lock in your car, I would think that this is just a good citizen who looks after her car. But if I saw it in the back seat of a bully’s car, I would think that it was used to collect money [i.e. as a violent weapon for illegal depth collection]. There is a difference although the situation is the same. But the context differs which in fact changes the situation.”*

Such solutions were not considered as ‘innovative’ by the police officers I talked with but merely as ways to make things work in their everyday operation. But in de Certeau’s view, these are precisely the kind of everyday creative ‘*tactics*’ of the ‘*common hero*’ that he was eager to promote and understand.

However, as we will now see, the degree to which police managers in the police are willing to acknowledge gray zone improvisations, or at least certain forms of gray zone creativity, depends how much ‘street’ experience you have in your blood; i.e. how experienced and willing you are as a manager and legal expert to support gray zone improvisation.

### **“First you’ve got to get the vaccine”**

As discussed earlier, ‘*real police work*’ is more than something you *do*; a ‘*real cop*’ is something you *become* (Van Maanen 1973) Frontline police work is

described by the police officers themselves as something that ‘*gets under your skin*’, something which dyes your blood blue over time, metaphorically speaking.

A commanding officer who had ‘*been raised on the street*’ (i.e. had been a frontline street cop for many years) explains in an interview that in order to really understand and navigate in the gray zones of creative policing, you need to know about the details and passion of the work. “*First you’ve got to get the vaccine*”, he says.

‘*The vaccine*’ refers to the increasing wealth of experience you gain over the years when working on the street and/or in investigation. This experience becomes embodied, and has a subliminal impact in your estimation whether your creative act will do more good than harm. Over time, ‘*the vaccine*’ you get from experience makes you resistant to the kind of ‘*earfuls*’ (øretæver) frontline police officers get from bosses, the media and various actors within the police system when they operate at the margins of what they are allowed and expected to do. The same commanding officer explains:

*“You HAVE to take your share of chances, and well... yes, of course this implies balancing on the edge of the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven). You develop a kind of curiosity capacity (undringskompetence). This is what fuels the entrepreneurial spirit of the creative colleagues that we can’t do without. As a manager you need to understand and trust that the closer you work with a problem, the better solutions you come up with”,* he says.

According to him, the ‘*vaccine*’ makes him resistant to aligning himself with the safe career path in the police, given that as a young officer, he was closely involved with targeting drug-related crime:



*“Even after all those years I am very pleased with other people’s results because I remember how it feels to get that; it is really a hassle and takes such a long time. But when you succeed it feels great!”* he says.

As I interview a police officer who used to work in a team which dealt with ‘*professional criminals*’, as he calls them, he explains that creativity and autonomy are ‘*core competences*’ to look for when recruiting for their team. The intimate interaction with the highly violent criminal environment calls for even-tempered officers:

*“You probably can’t even imagine how much patience it takes to deal with some of these people [gang members and drug dealers]. We have to work in a very professional way which takes a lot of discipline and coordination, like “Okay guys, we go along these lines today in this particular situation”. This might change the next day, but we need to be completely synchronized in order not to fuck things up for each other. It’s very easy to cross the line with this kind of job. If you sense that Thomas has a bad day or has had enough, you have to tell him to go and cool off in the car. Or else he might snap”,* he explains.

The self-regulative culture among police officers is crucial as they sometimes deal with tasks that demand a lot from them physically and emotionally. However, the constant requirement for them to make strategic, tactical (in the police sense of it) and emotional adjustments to situations and are often negated by the prevailing focus on the negative aspects of sub- and counter-cultures in the police, both in the literature and among certain police managers.

Thus, support from first line managers means a lot to frontline police officers. Interestingly enough, in the beginning of my conversations with many rank and files, they found it important to assure me that they don’t need any recognition for

their work. It is important to them that it is enough for them simply to do a good or hard job. However, from numerous in-depth interviews, I learned how important recognition from superiors and colleagues and the sense of cohesion and support actually is to them.

For example, when talking to a rank and file officer who had just started a course offered to aspiring police managers, a large part of the interview ended up as a reflection on how he wanted to be a ‘*cops’ manager*’. He had quit his job in a private company and come back to work in the police force to make a difference. He wanted to become the kind of police manager he thought was largely lacking in the modern police force:

*“I dream of being a part of the new police. That’s why I returned after the reform. I quit my much more profitable job and joined the police again. I heard that now there’s an intent to developing the employees. I wanted to be part of that. My former job in the company was a money-machine. Police work is about doing good; about making Denmark a safe place. It’s also politics; but as a police officer you can directly **touch** society. It’s not like the politicians or our top managers who have a distorted picture about how things really are. As a cop you simply **know**... I also know how essential it is to receive the recognition we hardly get. You solve a hard case, and boing! A new one just lands on your desk. That’s terrible management. You have to look your people in the eyes and say: “How are you today, Jens?” Instead of just sitting there as a big, dumb manager programmed to every ten minutes or so saying: “That’s just the way things are! Now get back to work!” I’m receiving training in coaching and that’s a unique tool for managers! How can you view your staff as underdogs when they are highly skilled investigators? I’ve had my share of managers who just don’t care. But as a cop you need to believe that you are part of a team and that your efforts*

*matter. You should not be so afraid of stepping your superior on the toes. I'm sick of that, I hope I never become like that....* (he becomes quiet for some time and stares out the window). *I know that when I become a manager I will have to nod my head sometimes because of the decisions that they make up through the ranks. But I can't do that in front of my staff. I have to be on the same bus they are in, if you know what I mean. Those who work on the ground are the ones who get the best ideas. But often they don't share their ideas. I, of all people, know how that works around here. So much development is wasted because of that".*

This police officers' dream of what he wants to be like when he becomes a manager provides us with important insights into what later in the interview, he describes as a '*cultural revolution of police management*'.

The sort of manager I was encouraged to talk to because their staff thought they somehow provided the '*angel dust*' that made creativity thrive, as one prosecutor put it, talked about similar concerns.

For example, an experienced manager for a district police dog unit says that: *"Now, I'm a dog-freak, all right? I used to have my own dog, but he died... I relate everything to dog training; raising my kids and all. There are many similarities, also to how you treat your staff: you can't make a dog do anything if you don't reward and praise it. And provide clear boundaries for it and punish it if necessary. You can't use the same tone of voice for your staff that you use for your dog, though. But the principles are the same. I write a lot of e-mails, and always make sure to emphasize when the guys do a great job out there. Then they can say: "Hey, my dog did that!" It is important to make them feel proud when they do a good job"*

By contrast, managers who are not '*on the same bus*' as their staff and do not actively provide boundaries for good and bad work as in the cases above, might abandon their employees and leave them in a difficult predicament.

The following story illustrates how a former special patrol police officer and his team felt abandoned by their managers during the latest police reform. As he explains, while the managers, were busy positioning themselves and competing for management positions made open because of a massive reshuffling of heads, the police district faced a growing problem in the local nightlife. Troubled youths from a ghetto area would go to a near-by town where they got into fights with local gang members. Trouble also arose in the ghetto area as youths would burn containers and engage in other sorts of misconduct, much to the consternation of their neighbors. The top management of the police district decided to allocate resources for a special team of police officers to deal with the problems.

Once the small team was selected, they soon learned that incidents were happening simultaneously in the nightlife of the town and in the ghetto. But because they depended on each other for backup they could not patrol both places at the same time.

They presented the problem to their manager with no luck. They realized that they had to come up with a solution themselves. Together with nightclub owners and doormen, they came up with tactical and educational programs that made it possible for the patrol officers to '*outsource eyes in the night life*'. The doormen knew precisely how to look for potential troublemakers and deal with problems discretely without causing discomfort to peaceful citizens. If a nightclub participated in the project, the police would give them a

sign to post on their front door indicating that the bar was cooperating with police to keep it free from violence. In this way, the police only had to drive to the night clubs when their help was needed to identify or arrest trouble-makers and they could concentrate on working more intensively with the complex set of issues in the ghetto area.

As the special patrol officers became involved with developing a range of solutions of this kind, their success started to be evident in the growing number of visitors to bars and nightclubs that had previously been abandoned by peaceful citizens because of the bad company that had occupied them, and also in a decrease in violent episodes in police reports.

However, the police officers soon learned that they had to ‘*go under the radar*’ with these initiatives, for police management and legal experts opposed them, arguing that the police authorities were not allowed to dispense notices that could be seen as constituting advertisements.

According to the police officer, the team experienced this as managerial ‘*deniability*’. Even though management knew they had a problem, the cops were on their own when it came to solving it, because this was only possible by means of available best practices or resources. “*In this way, it is each officer’s responsibility if we cross any borders that offend important people, and the managers can deny knowing anything about it. In situations like this, you know that it’s **your** ass that will be on fire if something goes wrong; there’s only you*

*to blame for it. So you have to be very careful not to cross the line*", he says.

According to him, middle managers now take the credit for ideas developed under their authority when other town and city representatives want the same solutions.

From this police officer's perspective, the team was constantly aware of the personal responsibilities on their shoulders when they were left on their own to deal with a complex set of dilemmas and problems they felt compelled to solve.

In such cases, no solutions or possibilities are provided by the 'strategic place' of the police; the only thing that is passed on is the dilemma. What we also learn from this example is the potential consequences when police officers believe that their managers are doing nothing to support their work: they perform their job creatively '*under the radar*'.

Whether or not the special team was, in fact, being let down by their managers in this case, what this example confirms is that police officers often feel an urgent need to solve all kinds of problems that confront them in their daily work.

In this section we have also learned that getting the 'real life on the street' vaccine is essential in the form of an accumulation of experience and tacit knowledge about how to ethically, morally and legally deal with the ambiguous gray zones of policing. As cops see it, you have to *live* that complexity in order to know, appreciate and master it.

Further, given the front-line police officers' power to *do* and the improvisational or 'tactical' character of their discretionary space, their 'real life' vaccination as police officers may also be of importance when they become managers and need

some degree of tolerance against those areas of policing most prone to gray zone dilemmas.

Although some police officers draw a sharp line between the view from the street and the view from the office, the following section will demonstrate that the gray zone complexity that police officers face in their job and the creative tactics it evokes on a daily basis are, in fact, recognized in the ‘strategic place’ of the police. Such recognition takes the form of more or less tacit agreements between representatives of the domains of the street and the office.

### **Gray zone agreements between the office and the street**

According to most rank and files and managers I spoke with, some geographical and demographical areas demand ‘grayer’ agreements between operational police and representatives of legal-bureaucratic offices than others.

For example in the capitol, Copenhagen, the intensity of crime is greater than in the rural districts. When it comes to drug-related crime, the ‘free town’ (Fristad) *Christiania* is an example of a crime-intensive area which occasionally becomes the object of more aggressive experimentation.

Christiania was founded in the early 70’s when idealists and homeless young people squatted in military barracks. It developed into a community founded on an ideology of freedom, and was officially tolerated as a ‘social experiment’ in 1972 with the agenda of “*building an autonomous society where each individual can unfold him- or herself with respect to the community*”<sup>23</sup>. The inhabitants of Christiania are not necessarily in opposition to the surrounding society, but are only claiming the right to create their own; as such, Christiania in itself is an

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<sup>23</sup> <http://www.christiania.org/>

example of Foucault's notion of *heterotopia*, a space in the middle of the city created from the embodiment of dreams and utopias. Today, close to 800 people inhabit the 34 acre territory marked by old defense hillocks.

However, Christiania has also attracted other more dodgy characters living at the edge of the law and beyond, and has been corrupted over time by the cannabis trade and organized crime.

From time to time, the police raid *Pusherstreet*, an area with stalls primarily selling cannabis, from which huge quantities of drugs are sold on a daily basis. In 2013, the newly established *task force pusherstreet* confiscated about 1.5 tons of cannabis and 7 million kroner (app. 1.3 mill. US dollars) in cash (Hvilsom 2014).

The following example, which I call *Operation Trojan Horse* for later reference, illustrates the situations in which the need for improvised police practices relies on implicit, gray zone agreements between the office and the street.

Throughout my field studies, police officers would tell me the story of one raid in Christiania, they feel represents '*the essence of a creative police heart*' (kernen af et kreativt politihjerte), as one rank and file officer puts it in an interview. To the participants in the raid and to those who enthusiastically passed along the story, the operation was a symbolic example of the kind of creative autonomy they would associate with '*real policing*'.

The name of the officer in charge of the drug raid operation came up in several conversations and interviews and the interviewees strongly suggested that I speak to this person. He was described as a charismatic leader, a '*cops' cop*' (en rigtig politi'er) and "*the kind of leader for whom you will throw yourself in front of a bus*", as one of his former subordinates expressed his unconditional trust and loyalty to the manager.



I eventually was able to interview this individual and what follows is a description of the drug raid just cited based on his account

Each year, the police engage in a range of different strategies and tactics in order to fight the drug-related crime in and around the area. However, both Pusher Street and Christiania in general are heavily guarded by ‘scouts’ who are constantly on the lookout for police officers, secret agents and possible raids.

Police have to develop clever ways of surprising the scouts and drug-dealing activities in Christiania in a continuous, mutual game of hide and seek. The main challenge lies in succeeding with a way to enter the area and ‘catching the bad guys with their pants down’

One successful operation was pulled off when the response unit staff got the idea to rent a big pickup truck with the back covered by a big canvas. It was the kind of truck that often delivers groceries to Christiania. Only in this case, the truck would not carry groceries but as many cops as could possibly be stuffed under the canvas.

The next day, a disguised police officer drove the truck all the way into the middle of Pusherstreet; it went unnoticed, like the Trojan horse invented by Ulysses in the Trojan War in the Homeric epic. To the great surprise and fury of the drug dealers, the truck exploded with cops who managed to catch a much greater number of pushers than they had done at previous raids.

From the perspective of the cops, the operation was a tremendous success. From the perspective of ‘the paper pushers’, however, it was considered reckless. Safety representatives and legal experts were indignant that the police officers had been

stuffed together in the back of the truck, and by the fact that it is illegal to transport people in the back of a vehicle without a ‘student driver permission’ (according to Danish tradition, when students graduate from high school, they drive from house to house in the back of an open truck to celebrate and for this, the driver needs a special permit).

The commanding officer got a mandatory warning from his superior followed by a request for a promise never to do it again.

This example provides an entry point to exploring the sort of ‘*gray zone agreements*’ (gråzoneaftaler), as the commanding officer calls it, that is negotiated between representatives of the office and the street.

Many police officers (and others who work in the police) suggest that in some cases, ‘*forgiveness is better than permission*’ (tilgivelse er bedre end tilladelse). In the case of Operation Trojan Horse, the commanding officer justified it as an ‘*under the radar*’ action, i.e. an initiative which was attuned to other institutional concerns, and thus had to be carried out without the initial involvement of other organizational domains.

He argues that the process of consensus agreement would have risked ‘*compromising the element of surprise*’ and involved long drawn-out decision processes that would have killed the initiative. With respect to the issue of the drawn-out decision process, this is familiar to police officials, because their suggestions ‘*get caught by the committee*’ (går i udvalg), meaning that it can take forever for the representatives of the union, safety committee, legal experts etc. to decide about the various issues that come into play once the operation is subjected to detailed examination.

As presented in chapter 6, the discourse of doing things *real* (often dominated by impact ethics) empowers those police who work on the street (or in front-line investigations). This discourse sets itself against managerial discourses of *correctness*, which dominate the office sphere. But in contending with the pragmatics of everyday life, there is a need to balance these discourses, and ultimately, one has to outweigh the other.

In the case of the Trojan horse, the commanding officer's superiors knew about the overall planning of the operation but they did not know about the specific tactics used. So the *gray zone agreement* refers to the fact that the superiors knew about the general plan and was prepared to ignore certain details of how it was executed as long as the commanding officer did not severely violate his trust. In other words, it is an agreement that allows the commanding officer and his team to execute the plan in a way they believe in, even if it involves a degree of risk: "*some of the methods we used tested the 'framework' (i.e. formal agreement) and perhaps exceeded it in a few situations which then was sanctioned by the management*", the commanding officer explains.

This may involve gray zone agreements between commanding officers and their more administratively oriented superiors, where the commanding officers have to be sensitive to the fine balance between '*getting an earful*' (at få en skideballe) and '*seriously getting an earful*' - which to many people both inside and outside the police amounts to the same thing.

But according to this commanding officer, there is a noteworthy difference. That is, there is the kind of warning you get from your boss because he is obligated to warn you, like the '*mandatory warning*' his boss gave him in the aftermath of operation Trojan horse. This actually serves merely as an encouragement to keep

trying to solve the same problem, but in *new* ways, so that the managerial office won't have to defend the same practice twice.

Ultimately, the commanding officer and his superior share an interest to combat drugs in Christiania and they both know that *how* to do this is the difficult part of the equation, with no clear answers. It is a complex task, inevitably involving a process of trial and error: some initiatives might work, others might not.

The commanding officer continues: "*We constantly have to come up with new solutions here. The trick is never to be stupid enough to do the same thing twice*", he grins.

This principle applies to the criminals who try out new creative ways of getting away with crime and to police officials who try out new preventive crime-fighting responses to crime. There is also a further dimension of accountability when police officials experiment with new practices. When superiors face the same criticism time and again, they become more vulnerable to renewed criticism from within the police force or outside, because it is harder to explain yourself the second time.

He further illustrates his point, again with reference to the policing of Christiania:

During a big political event in Copenhagen, a large part of the police force had been deployed. However, things were pretty quiet, so in the command station it was decided to make use of all available resources. "*Among other things, we had a helicopter available from the military*", he explains.

One problem with conducting drug raids in Christiania is that the drug dealers often escape and hide the drugs. A police officer in the command station got the idea that they could use the helicopter.

From the helicopter, the police could easily direct their staff on the ground and tell them exactly where to find the cannabis. To the police officials, the helicopter operation was a great success.

But afterwards, the military complained to the police director about this specific use of the helicopter in that it was not part of the agreed assistance.

The commanding police officer was put ‘on the carpet’ and had to confess that it had been idea and promise he would never do it again. *“But I did do it again; only the next time we used a Swedish police helicopter and this time the use of the helicopter was clearly within our agreement and therefore “legal””, he says.*

Knowing exactly where the invisible line is that one should not cross before the gray zone becomes the dark zone, the commanding officer masters the sensitive balance between how much managers and politicians really need to get the job done and the extent to which unconventional means will be tolerated and forgiven.

Along with the example of Operation Trojan horse, this story demonstrates how space for improvisation is created through subtle agreements and negotiations between different domains of concern.

Officially, non-canonical practices must be approved *before* the act according to principles of democratic consensus, legal concerns, ethics, and - in the case of the

police using the military helicopter - cross-sector negotiation of resource allocation.

However, as confirmed by the commanding officer and many other police officers I spoke with problems that call for an impact ethical approach are resolved via non-canonical, unofficial channels. This process is legitimized in terms of faster decision-making, necessary arrangements, removing ignorant and/or arrogant stakeholders, and in some cases, for reasons of operational security.

However, this acquiescence should not be understood as if top police managers were issuing a *carte blanche* under the table to anybody to engage in *any* type of experiment. Gray zone agreements are built on the trust that develops between a police officer in charge and the top-manager, who is typically a lawyer.

In such cases, the manager has to earn '*street credit*,' as was explained by the commanding officer cited earlier. This means that the person who is granted goodwill by his superiors is typically someone who has served the system for a long time, and solved their share of difficult problems without too many or too big mistakes. In other words, some police managers are more trustworthy men/women of the system than others in the eyes of their superiors.

Freedom comes with certain responsibilities, and is granted to those who master the tactical spaces *within* the 'strategic place' that de Certeau proposed as the irreducible element and ethic of creativity in everyday life.

But since an act – by the police or others – is always judged *after* the event, asking for forgiveness rather than permission is often the condition of law enforcement. If most police officers and many prosecutors are willing to take such chances in their job, it is because of the potential crimes they want to *prevent*.

According to one prosecutor who has worked for the police for many years in different departments, close collaboration between police officers working on the street and prosecutors in the office is a critical condition for good policing:

*“The bureaucrat is always “one up” relative to the person who is out on the street and has to make a decision here and now. But it is the understanding between these two that is essential. I’m always waiting for the cop’s bid (jeg sidder altid i baghånd). From where I sit it would be easy to criticize what the police should or should not have done in the situation. It’s all about the mutual understanding between me and the officer on the street: the attitude, the spirit and knowing that there are many ways to deliver your feedback. We work towards the same goal which is to solve crime in the best way possible”, he explains.*

He tells a story about a case in which he worked at the margins of legal autonomy together with a team of organized crime investigators:

In 1995 the police in Denmark ran an investigation of a group they suspected was in possession of illegal weapons. As part of the investigation process, the investigation team filed a court order to set up secret room surveillance at the garage of one of the suspects. Their request for a warrant was rejected because the court found that their cause for suspicion was insufficient.

About one week later the case took a serious turn. A big wheel loader broke through the wall of the state prison named Vridsløselille, and thirteen prisoners managed to escape through the hole in the wall. Among the escaping prisoners were several of the individuals that the investigation group suspected for illegal possession of weapons. *“So, what do you do? Now the situation is really bad...”* the prosecutor

says, inferring the potential harm if the escaping prisoners got hold of such weapons. “... *We decided to act before the last brick of that prison wall hit the ground. Go, drive, NOW... Confiscate the weapons!*” he narrates.

Afterwards, the investigation team went to court and told the judges that they had entered the garage without a warrant: “*The charged persons and their lawyers made a fuss about it and protested that it was an illegal investigation but our case was upheld both in the District Court and the High Court,*” the prosecutor explains.

To the members of that investigation team, it felt unbearable *not* to try to prevent the escaping prisoners from getting the weapons the police suspected they were hiding. Nonetheless, it is a gray zone act, in the sense that it is an ambiguous matter of either violating the legal rights of the escaping prisoners or risking the harm they may cause to police or others were they to get hold of lethal weapons. “*Sometimes we prosecutors have to be very creative with the law. The more experience you have from other areas of crime, the more you can apply law creatively*”, he says.

Thus, although police officers often claim that legal experts don’t support their gray zone creativity, this is not generally true in my experience. But it may take experienced prosecutors to be willing and capable of doing so.

Police officers who do exactly what the law prescribes might be seen as harassing citizens. According to the law, for example, the small metal or plastic dabs that cover the screws on the license plates of cars must be the same color as the license plate itself. Of course, few people know that, and two traffic police officers had the notion to stop large numbers of cars to collect fines to meet the performance



objectives for their district. This was stopped, however, because it was considered harassment by their colleagues. On the other hand, it is also unacceptable for a police officer to ignore more major offenses or to violate the law.

Once again, we can see that police practices and creativity are performed in a highly creative moral, ethical, and legal gray zone, a space created and used in tacit agreement among those who police, those who judge, and civil society.

Now we will move on to consider the ways that the police create space for gray zone creativity within the police organization; that is: how do police expand the culturally embedded grids of disciplinary hierarchy and bureaucracy demonstrated in Part II that tend to freeze and hinder creativity?

## **Chapter 8. Creating space for gray zone creativity**

As we saw in Part II, the disciplinary mechanisms of police hierarchy creates three ‘worlds’ of policing, i.e. top, middle and bottom, expressed as different cultural segmentations within the organization. This dynamic also applies to how innovation becomes to be received and understood very differently across the police leaving very little space for support of frontline creativity at the bottom.

This chapter shows some of the tactics that police may use to pave the way for *gray zone* creativity in the police organization, which they claim are necessary and effective ways to circumvent the inertia of chain of command processes.

I will argue that these everyday tactics are effective in creating ‘tactical spaces’, as de Certeau would call them, thereby creating and expanding space for marginalized knowledge and practices in the police. In the context of these heterotopic spaces, the police becomes capable of experimentation, and is able to

use and develop new organizational ‘side-streets’ (to recall de Certeau’s street metaphor) and police practices.

Based upon de Certeau’s theory of practice, we can see the ways that rank and file police and their managers carefully create a space for creativity in their daily work. They do so by selecting and maintaining valuable ‘*informal*’ and ‘*strategic*’ networks that they use to develop and diffuse unauthorized practices, which were typically described to me as ‘*gray zone*’ activities.

Another kind of tactics, although risky, is when police officers lose their patience with the formal chain of command and simply ‘broadcast’ their suggestions or solutions through formal communication channels, such as official e-mail lists, to ‘*wake up the system*’ by forcing managers to pay attention to their needs.

A more stealth way to push one’s ideas through the ‘*middle manager wall*’ can also be by ‘*hacking*’ the system in the sense that police officers dress up their inventions in a way that is similar to official solutions and hereby overwrite them with their own.

Further, we will see an example of how a middle manager has created what he calls *project mole* to manage his staff’s calling to respond to an area of crime that falls outside of what is strategically demanded of them. That is, they tactically create their own space in compensating for what they experience as strategic blind spots in their everyday work.

What these examples show is how gray zone creativity tends to be informed by the action-rationality and is typically informed by the work in the streets. They also show us that police have creative ways of working around management’s self-referential and narrowly selecting procedures for innovation. By operating in the marginal gray zones of the police system and either back-channel or confront the

formal system up-front police officers create other spaces for creativity than what the formal managerially oriented system provides. As such, gray zone practices create space for variation and creativity in both police practices and organizational maneuvering that bureaucracy does not favor or support. The question is of course if and how the creation of such operations in the margins of the police system contributes to innovation in the police. One further aspect of relevance to this question is that police officers apparently self-regulate gray zone practices through culturally embedded ethics that sanction those among them who cross the line, i.e. *crusaders* and *bullies*. The challenges and potentials of gray zones and gray zone creativity in policing will be further discussed in chapter 10.

## **Going off-road: Informal networks as the fast lane for pushing things through**

*“Front door means talk. Back door means action”*

- Police manager

As described in chapter 2, perhaps *the* most important advice that police veterans pass on to newcomers is to quickly establish a *strategic network* around them. Knowing where and whom to address in order to get the information, help and resources you need to implement your ideas is an important function provided by cultivating informal and strategic networks in the police.

For anyone who wants to get something approved further up in the system, the formal processes of hierarchy, bureaucracy and the conflicted interests that they might imply are an unmanageable process. Anyone who needs a quick solution to

the challenges he/she faces in their work, prefers action over talk, to put it in a nutshell.

As illustrated by the police manager's statement above, you might want to use the '*back door*' (i.e. informal channels) rather than proposing something at the formal '*front door*' of the chain-of-command system. I will now describe examples of how 'back door' activities take shape in the police as '*informal*' and '*strategic*' networks that makes it possible for police across ranks and departments to circumvent hierarchical power relations and bureaucracy.

It may be argued that simply engaging in informal activity, since it is not official, prescribed, customary or in accordance with bureaucratic ideals, is a *gray zone* practice, in principle, because it implies deviation – or *nuancing* – of black and white organizational formalities. In other words, when you engage with '*informal networks*', as police put it, you enter a sphere defined by norms, expectations and processes that are different than the formal sphere. In fact, I learned how police make space for creativity by creating and expanding organizational gray zones even before I learned how they used gray zone practices as part of their discretionary space for improvisation as shown in the previous chapter.

This experience explains why managers and rank and file police often described the sorts of informal practices we will see in this chapter in terms of working in the *gray zones*, which in this context can be understood more in terms of working in the shadows of the formal organization.

In using the shadow metaphor I would like to point out that I am not directly linking the analysis of *gray zone* practices of informal networking in the police to Stacey's (1996) and Shaw's (1997) concept of 'shadow systems' in organizations. From the perspective of complexity theory, they explain shadow systems as self-

governing informal networks of actors that emerge spontaneously as they work at the ‘edge of chaos’ (Shaw 1997), ‘without any central or governing control or intention’ (Ibid., p. 235), thus complementing legitimate formal organization to bring about cultural change.

Lundholm et al. (2012) offer a similar analytical framework that is more in keeping with the theoretical approach of this thesis, which recognizes the multiple subtleties of governing. Their ideas can be helpful for focusing our analysis of *informal networks* in the police. The authors base their argument on ethnographic studies and favor acknowledging ‘the horizontal dimension’ of organizations: ‘In these situations [of horizontal practices], employees still influence each other, but not on the basis of formal authority. Instead, influence is based on ideas and arguments, which reflect a knowledge or creativity that is not tightly associated with the person’s formal position in the organizational scheme’ (Ibid., p. 118). The authors emphasize the importance of the coexistence of this horizontal dimension of organizational practices with the vertical, formally hierarchical dimension.

‘Verticalization’ of the chain of command provides legitimacy, clarifies formal decision-making power (Ibid.) and, one must add, in the case of the police, creates effective and equivocal lines of communication for the urgent and sometimes even chaotic tasks police must handle. By contrast, ‘horizontalization’ allows for practices that involve creative and complex solutions. Horizontalization takes advantage of the fact that subordinates often have the necessary knowledge, and hence authority, although the traditional hierarchy is unwilling of supporting their initiatives (Ibid.).

This resonates with de Certeau’s argument that power relations play out in ‘strategic places’ of social order (although he does not provide many details about

this subject) and silences *other* knowledge and practices; yet, the weak makes use of the strong, as de Certeau reminded us, and everyday tactics operate from inside the very system they serve, complementing and expanding it silently from within.

Thus, vertical organization – despite its value - needs to be supplemented by *other* ‘horizontalizing’ spaces, especially when it comes to facilitating creative processes that call for diversity and expert knowledge.

In Part II we saw that the formal hierarchy of the police privileges knowledge associated with rank and formal status rather than horizontal, expert knowledge. We also learned that innovation and creativity is understood quite differently when seen from the perspective of the top, middle and bottom, depending on the privileges of power and that this affects what individuals would regard as innovative or creative practices.

It is remarkable, however, that police find ways to compensate for the fragmenting and rigid discipline of the hierarchy as they move off-road (to use the city metaphor) and engage with informal networking.

Consider the following interview citations:

*“You keep a circle of people closely around yourself and you tell them what you think or what your troubles are, and because they like doing the same stuff as yourself, we come up with ideas together. It’s as simple as that.”* (Patrol officer)

*“Then I got stuck in solving the case and thought: “What the hell do I do now?” So I got in my car, drove to the Embassy and talked to a guy I knew from a foreign police agency. Then he called a friend he had been at the academy with once and who now worked in a high-tech department...”* (Senior investigator)

*“A valuable thing about meeting [informally] is that you achieve greater insight and understanding about what’s going on. In formal meetings people don’t always speak their mind freely because they think: “No, I’m not saying anything because this or that person is present” and so on, right?”* (Middle manager)

*“We have very strong informal networks in the police; therefore, some call it a ‘police of cousins’ (fætter/kusine politi). You always know someone who is working in the same area, and then you get help from that person instead of using the more formal channels which people think are too slow, less concerned with getting things done or outright inadequate”.* (Top manager)

These are but a kaleidoscopic sample of accounts of what *informal networks* mean to individuals working at different layers of the police hierarchy.

In the course of exploring and comparing international differences in policing and law, and the collaboration required when police combat child abuse over the Internet, Vendius (Forthcoming) observes that international police collaboration is characterized by similar informal arrangements and activities. Even though several international forums for police collaboration have been formally established, the bureaucratic processes and complications arising from differences and lack of legal clarity, best practices etc. force police officers to find other means and channels to get things done. In fact, these informal activities coexist alongside the formal institutions of collaboration (Ibid.).

Degnegaard (2010) similarly observed that ‘when one follows how everyday problems are being solved in the police, they are solved through informal networks rather than through formalized work procedures. Whether in a patrol car or in an office, problems which cannot be solved with the resources at hand are approached through the informal networks’ (Ibid., p. 241). In Degnegaard’s

analysis, these informal networks constitute ‘an essential resource in the police’ (Ibid.) in that help is always just a phone call away and they provide the police officers with ‘social capital’.

There is no doubt that every police officer treasures his or her personal informal network both within and outside the organization, as do individuals in other formalized work settings.

But when moving in closer to these ‘informal networks’ we learn that they fulfill other purposes than to provide alternative channels of communication; in fact, they are highly *productive*; an issue that is highly relevant to the present focus on everyday creativity within the formal ‘strategic place’ of the police.

An example that illustrates the heterotopic characteristics of informal networks is when a cop working in a police district police enthusiastically demonstrated a ‘*drawer project*’ he had persistently worked on developing. It was a software solution that would make it possible for police officers to better share detailed information about a particular criminal environment. Sometimes he unofficially invited colleagues into his office to help him, depending on what needed to be done. He kept a logbook (his personal version of the chain letter questionnaire I had sent out to a few individuals, see chapter 2) for the purpose of my research, in which he noted the development process of his project development in varying degree of details over a period of ten months.

His manager knew about the project, but signaled that he was not inclined to become involved, as shown by his initial reaction to officer’s suggestion: “*If you can make this thing work, you are welcome to do it. But I strongly doubt that you can get it through our IT department.*”



The logbook continues with descriptions of various obstacles and small successes along the way. For example, he had no programming skills so he arranged for a police officer in another department, a former programmer, to help him over a period of two weeks. He was able to persuade his boss to negotiate this with the other cop's boss, and they ended up agreeing to a week's transfer of the programming officer to their department. But since this was insufficient time to get the software program up and running, they would meet after work. Some days they worked on the project until 2 in the morning.

Today, a couple of years later, the software program has been completed, but it is only being used in one police district, because district management, according to the officer, is unsure about how it will be received by the National police and the other districts. But, since the police officers who use the system communicate with colleagues in the other districts, unofficial meetings have taken place, and there may be similar developments on their way.

This 'night work' aspect of operating tactically in the margins of strategic place, as de Certeau also wrote, takes place when creative initiatives are discouraged by managerial worries and priorities. Yet, through everyday tactics, the police officers use whatever is made informally available to them as they persist in trying to make way for their innovations from within the police system. In this way, informal networks provide competencies and other resources – sometimes from outside the organization as well, which police cannot access through formal channels.

However, it is worth noting that high-ranking managers also engage in informal network creativity, which they justify as '*strategic autonomy*' in keeping with their superior status within the hierarchy. As we just saw, they may accomplish

such activity by borrowing competent staff from other departments to help them perform tasks that cannot be executed by their own department. Alternatively, district managers may negotiate with managers in the National police for approval for them to experiment with new projects, materials, etc. These practices bear some resemblance to the sorts of ‘*gray zone*’ agreements between street and office we saw in the previous chapter.

Similarly, managers at different ranks work as ‘*sponsors*’ for suggestions from their staff, but this system is often ineffective, because the employees lack confidence that this particular manager will understand their idea and promote it for them through the system. This is what is referred to as a ‘*strategic network*’.

*Strategic networks* differ from *informal networks* with respect to creativity in that they tend to be characterized by fewer close personal relationships. Strategic partners provide police officers (and others) with strategic knowledge about how their suggestions might be received in other organizational domains. In addition, if police officers who are not always eager to write up ‘business cases’ or who do not know how to translate their ideas into administrative or managerial language need help for these things, they might make use of somebody in their strategic network as a ‘*floskulator*’. A *floskulator* is a unique expression used by the police that I came across several times, as police officers sometimes considered me as one. The word is a combination between ‘cliché’ (*floskel*) and some mechanical device, such as ‘*radiator*’, and refers to the utility of certain people in the system as translating ‘devices’ to pass cops’ messages on to others who would probably not understand the need, the suggestion, or find it valuable enough to pursue.

Also, the process of selecting and recruiting personal, trusted informal networks changes or subverts power relations; on formal occasions, managers ‘*send our best*

*man for the meetings, and if it is interesting enough, that man will be myself*, as one manager put it. But in the horizontal or multidimensional sphere of informal network activities, individuals can recruit anyone *they* believe will have the knowledge and skills to do a good job. As an individual, you hereby become influential regarding matters that are very dear to you.

Even so, suggestions sometimes get stranded along the way, and police officers become impatient. In the next section we will see that another, more risky tactic is to simply ‘make noise’ and ‘*wake up the system*’.

### **Making waves by ‘waking up the system’**

In some instances, what challenges police officers is not so much having to invent a new solution as being asked to use existing ones without being provided with any reasonable explanations.

For example, in an interview, a rank and file officer talks about his passion for improving the equipment in the patrol cars:

*“Just like the dog people who take action when it comes to dog stuff because that’s what they are all into, I have a thing for the cars. They really should work, right?”* he says.

In the police district he works for, the management had decided to buy new patrol cars. However, in the new type of cars, an alarm would go off if the patrol officers forgot to put on their seat belt.

The thing is that when you transport a potentially dangerous person in the back seat of the car, police are not supposed to use the seat belt

because it limits their movements if they have to immediately respond to any unpredictable behavior.

With the new cars, they would have to put up with the constant loud beeping of the alarm when at the same time concentrating during a highly stressful job.

Anticipating that he would ‘*run into the bureaucracy wall*’, the patrol officer made a move to ‘*wake up the system*’ (vække systemet).

First, he called the local police district garage to ask if they could switch off the alarm, which they refused, with the argument that they were not allowed to do so. He did not know who else to call, and “*you never achieve anything by writing somebody at the top of the chain*”, he reasons. So he called the offices of the car manufacturer office and got the information he needed to switch of the alarm, “*Voila!*”

Then he wrote an e-mail to the other police stations in the district telling his colleagues how to switch the alarm off. “*I know very well that the e-mail is read by everyone and at one point somebody will respond that I can’t just do that. And it didn’t take very long before I got a response saying that I should immediately recall the e-mail.*”

The case of the seat belt alarm became an issue for the safety representatives, and the latest thing that he had heard was that the alarm is now uninstalled on delivery.

As this police officer demonstrated, the idea to switch off the alarm is not new in itself; the point here is the creative persistency with which the police officer pursued his goal, even to the point of risking a great deal of trouble for ‘waking

up' the system, simply by broadcasting an unauthorized solution and thereby making it directly available to be applied, an option that most likely trump existing options were it not stopped by management. The police union membership magazine is sometimes put to use for similar purposes.

In an interview, a prosecutor tells me another story with a similar message:

As the police magistrate's service (dommervagt) was being altered and renovated in one of the police districts, top management had decided to build three waiting rooms for the prisoners. Three rooms was far too few. One day, a police officer was fed up with the lack of space because there was no room for the prisoner he was bringing to court. The arrestee was a huge guy, "*a real hulk*", the prosecutor explains.

Since it was time for lunch, the police officer brought the prisoner with him to the management corridor, must outside the police director's office. He attached the prisoner to a radiator with his handcuffs, went into the secretary's office and said: "*Would you look after this guy for me? I'm off for lunch!*"

As is easy to imagine, the police officer got into a lot of trouble for this manoeuvre. But his bold act resulted in two or three additional waiting rooms.

Thus, when things simply become unbearable, there are several ways in which rank and file members may feel compelled to 'make noise' in order to make their managers truly aware of the need for a better solution.

Although creative, these practices of waking up the system may not be so much examples of de Certeau's notion of tactics as instances of outright revolt and direct confrontation between the top and bottom worlds in the police system. We might say that when police officers feel that their managers will not come to the street, they bring the street, along with all of its problems, to their managers, whom they see as representing the obstructiveness of the world of the office.

These examples highlight the kind of tension that exists between hierarchical layers and the ways that police officers at the bottom of the hierarchy lose their confidence in the effectiveness of passing their suggestions along through formal channels.

We will now look at some examples of how the weak sometimes outplay the strong when police occasionally hack their own system in subtle ways to create space for creativity.

### **‘Hacking the system’**

In order to stealthily transport new ideas through the labyrinth of imagined or real obstacles, police sometimes smuggle their suggestions and alternative ways of doing things past the chain of command and other official channels, something we already saw in the discussion of informal networks. However, some of these practices are especially stealthy and in some cases, even concealed. Instead of negotiating permission through formal or informal channels, some individuals simply *do by* ‘*hacking the system*’ as an investigator put it. Here is an example of such subterfuge.

A police officer with a passion for preventing criminal tendencies among troubled youth has developed different crime preventive

methods and concepts ‘*under the radar*’ together with internal and external collaborators. She developed ways to smuggle these ideas through what she refers to as ‘*the MMW*’, i.e. the middle-management wall (MLM: mellemleder muren).

*“I know they [the superiors] are never gonna listen to me anyway. They think I have the brain of a gorilla because I recently worked on the street [i.e. as a patrol officer]. So what I figured out is this: I invent names for our ideas in the kind of wording they love, look here is an example.”* She pulls out her drawer and takes out a yellow post-it note with an official-sounding acronym on it followed by a short explanation.

She tells me that she personally invents these titles for the ‘*under the radar*’ initiatives she has created together with her informal network of collaborators from other public agencies.

*“I have to write down these titles to remind myself what they stand for. The trick then, is that whenever I write a report to prepare my boss for his meetings, I sneak in one or two of these words”,* she explains.

What happens then is that her superiors slowly get used to the headline abbreviations and every once in a while, they even have to remind each other what they actually mean.

*“Then they all look confused and the one with the lowest rank is assigned with the task of finding out what it means. This is when they come and see me, because I wrote the report”,* she says.

According to her, this tactic has been helpful to her in making several of her initiatives “official”.

By imitating bureaucratic conventions and processes, such as using official-sounding vocabulary and imitating the form and procedures of official practices, this police officer has found a way to ‘hack’ the police system by simply incorporating her own conceptual innovations.

Of course, as de Certeau emphasized, the use of *drawer solutions* and *duct tape solutions* of this kind is only of value to the police and society at large if they happen within the ‘strategic place’.

Without further elaborating on the details of the hacking solution developed by the police officer in the example above, it is only fair to point out that it undermines the whole idea of transparency and democracy, the values that the bureaucracy is intended to protect.

Other ‘everyday hacks’ of conventional and official procedures, technology and materials include police officers buying their own hats, pistol caps, raincoats, etc. and wearing them on unsupervised occasions to make up for what they see as shortcomings in the officially sanctioned products. These acts compromise another aspect of the ideals of the police bureaucracy, namely that of a uniformed and uniform police force.

Moreover, valuable knowledge may be lost when relevant contributors from within and without the organization are not involved in the creative process, and the result may end up being crippled, deficient, or uncoordinated separate solutions.



Still, a number of the *gray zone* creative tactics I came across were being carefully qualified through informal networking to the extent possible with the limited resources available to their inventors.

In line with police officers ‘hacking’ existing practices, including the processes of the hierarchy and bureaucracy, I learned that some creative projects are deliberately protected and kept ‘*way down here in the alley of our system*’, as a middle manager explained while adding a small doodle to my illustration of the street metaphor in an interview. Some solutions might demand some amount of trial-and-error testing, adjustments, and proper timing before the innovators share them with colleagues and managers. “*Some managers really have a nose for finding the holes in the cheese*”, one police officer said, justifying why he wanted to develop his project further before informing his superiors about it, so that he could personally discover and fix as many gaps as possible.

In the following example, we will see how an unauthorized practice can be used ‘under the radar’, i.e. without formal permission or supervision.

My phone rings. It’s Morten, a police officer I interviewed the week before while briefly visiting a police district. “*I’ve got something for you! It’s about that side-road stuff you are interested in*”, he says. He tells me how he and some other instructors have developed a new concept for the annual marksmanship training for their district colleagues that would improve the way the police handle stressful situations. “*Friday at 7? That is, if you can get your ass out of bed at that hour... I’ll pick you up at the station. Oh, and don’t wear high heels all right?*” I reply that if he promises to leave his high heels and silk panties at home as well, we have a deal.

When Friday comes Morten picks me up at a train station in the suburbs and we drive to a remote area. At the training location, a group of around twenty police officers and a handful of instructors meet for training police officers about different scenarios where they might have to use force and weapons. According to the leading instructor, the police academy does not provide real training, because *“everything has to be so correct that they forget that the recruits might actually have to shoot at somebody someday”*.

When police officers do, in fact, have to fire their guns, they usually do so moving about, while throwing themselves on the ground for cover etc., sometimes in a crowd of civilians and at short range. So the instructors have developed a variety of empathic role-plays and methods for strengthening their colleagues' abilities through training.

To make the shooting experience more realistic, one of the instructors had driven around to local clothing stores collecting mannequin dolls to resemble human targets. *“If you really have to shoot someone in real life, they don't look like a paper shooting target; they will actually be humans. And shooting at a human is very different than shooting at a piece of paper”*, he explains.

But according to him, police trainees are not allowed to shoot at anything that resembles humans. So they simply don't tell anyone except the colleagues who train with them. *“And there's no chance that the bosses come out here to see what we are doing, 'cause that would mean that they get their polished shoes dirty!”* he smiles.

After training, I am offered a demonstration of how they ‘hack’ their gear to make it safer and more efficient. They believe these are very important innovations, they tell me. They also explain that it is much easier to get colleagues to show up for their annual marksmanship training now because the instructors’ experimentation has led to far more realistic, relevant and fun training scenarios. They teach the police officers a great deal about their own reactions when under pressure.

As this example demonstrates, informal communities in the police gather around creative practices that are encouraged by having the space to experiment with solutions that are important to their work and personal safety.

Of course, the story doesn’t end here; fueled by their passion and convincing arguments, I decided to inquire further into some of the issues that the local police instructors were so frustrated about.

First, I spent some time trying to figure out who actually knew about the shooting regulations. After having been sent back and forth between departments, I finally reached a person on the phone who stood in for the person with whom I was actually supposed to talk. He told me that he didn’t know about the shooting regulations himself but that it was *probably* not allowed to use the mannequins. To the best of his knowledge, the shooting instruction manual from the military states that targets resembling humans may not be used for training due to the risk of hitting a real person (even if the ultimate point is to hit real people, if a police officer or soldier actually has to fire his weapon outside of a training situation).

But if I would send him an application for an exception, he was pretty sure that it would go through without difficulty.

When I let the local instructor, Morten, know about my research and told him they only needed to file an application, he responded that he thought that was way too much trouble, and as long as nobody complained, it didn't really matter. But I was welcome to do it for them and be their '*floskulator*', he said.

I did not take his suggestions, but I did note that for all the frustration they had expressed about not being allowed to use human-like targets, the effort he was willing to invest to have it formally approved was remarkably small.

When I had the chance to ask a shooting instructor from the military (where shooting is regulated by an explicit set of safety guidelines), who also informally educates police shooting instructors, I learned that there are no rules or regulations against using human-like targets in the military. The practices depend on the terms and regulations set for the specific shooting range, and if one uses a shooting terrain, rather than a restricted range, there are no limitations provided the mannequin does not contain metal parts.

So in the end, somewhat to my surprise, it turned out that the 'regulation' against shooting at mannequins was merely a myth and the choice of making this an official practice came down to the instructors in charge of the shooting range, a change that they found inconvenient.

In the end, I am not sufficiently familiar with shooting regulations to know if I was missing something important here, and I chose not to pursue the matter any further to find out if the individual at the national police had made up a non-existent regulation or if some regulations do exist somewhere against the use of human-like shooting targets. I do not hold it against the shooting instructors that

they had such weary looks on their faces when I suggested that they could just apply for permission to use the mannequin dolls for training and I honestly did not think any of their managers really cared about it. In any case, I was left wondering if this was an example of someone choosing the strategy of being ‘better safe than sorry’ or simply a matter of keeping the initiative ‘under the radar’ for the in-group thrill of it.

In this way, everyday ‘hacks’ of existing practices and solutions that are available to the police officers - as long as they are kept in the margins of strategic place, away from managerial supervision, and don’t harm anybody - give rise to variations and practices that live a silent life.

In the following section we will take a closer look at a very fraught topic for the Danish police officers and their management – how to deal with the gaps between politically negotiated performance objectives and policing strategies on the one hand and the range of criminal activity witnessed by police officers every day that they cannot always follow up. As we will see, the tension aroused by these gaps gives rise to creative tactical responses from middle managers and their staff as they seek ways to bridge these gaps.

## **Compensating for strategic blind spots**

Strategic priorities draw lines regarding the crime areas for which it is reasonable to use police resources and how to best plan and coordinate this process. Inevitably, some areas of potential police intervention are a lower priority than others. This section will show the day-to-day creative efforts on the part of the police to compensate for what they consider to be the blind spots of strategic policing.

As discussed previously, the Danish police have implemented several managerial techniques to focus their '*performance*', especially over the past decade. Prioritized efforts - for example, combating prostitution and organized crime - are operationalized into local performance requirements. These are more-or-less specific specifications for those activities national and local managers and staff should accomplish to achieve a strategically defined performance measure. Such measures aim to make police organizations manageable and accountable for their activities and to compel them to prioritize in more transparent and coordinated ways.

However, these standard measures sometimes fail to translate into meaningful practices (as we have seen in Part II), at least from the perspectives of first line managers and front line police officers. And as we have seen in chapter 4, top district managers acknowledge that whenever it becomes clear which tasks police prioritize and which they do not, both the public and police officers become indignant.

In the case of the police in Sweden, for example, Andersson & Tengblad (2009) have shown that the complexity of initiatives associated with 'new public management' have created cultural resistance among police officers, further reinforcing traditional work roles rather than stimulating new practices.

Similarly, in the case of British police, Butterfield *et al.* (2005) found that greater distance is created between top managers, middle managers and their staff as the control by frontline staff decreased: "The new performance management systems did little to enhance the sergeants' control of the constables, as sergeants remained even more dependent on them for information and to deliver policing. While constables were held accountable by the performance indicators, the way in which

these were achieved went largely unsupervised, and sustained the canteen culture by encouraging the style of policing associated with a ‘force’ rather than a service’ (Ibid., p. 339). Moreover, Østli (2009) empathically described the ways that Norwegian police have struggled to keep up with the crimes they have witnessed in their daily work, an effort they sometimes feel is discouraged by policy priorities and lack of resources

Most police officers I talked with experience some sort of gap between what is strategically mapped out and what police managers and their staff actually confront in their local setting. Although I rarely asked for such stories, the theme was often raised by the police officers.

One police officer compared this predicament with that faced by a doctor encountering a person suffering from a potentially fatal injury on the street who must ignore the individual because otherwise, the doctor could not complete the required number of anti-wrinkle Botox injections that day.

To me, this seems like an exaggerated comparison. Yet, police officers and some middle managers do report that the cut-backs in ‘free patrol’ (fri patrulje) along with preset performance objectives and detailed monitoring of their working hours imposed considerable restrictions upon their space for autonomy and creative initiatives.

At those times that police officers and middle managers decide to pursue such strategic blind spot areas of crime despite the restrictions they were presented as a further example of working in the ‘gray zones’. Here, ‘gray zone’ practices refer to everyday tactics that are complementary to the priorities of the strategic place.

One particularly illuminating example I came across is that of the *project mole*.

The *Project mole* is an ‘under the radar’ initiative run by a local police station manager, presented to me by the station manager and some of his staff members as ‘*a side-street activity*’ (en sidegade aktivitet) with reference to the street metaphor. The manager aimed, in his own words, ‘*to legitimize*’ his staff to more systematically deal with drug related crime in the local community.

As the station manager describes the project, he emphasizes that it should be understood as a way to make space to “*develop new stuff*”, in the midst of an everyday scenario where routine administration takes up “*95 % of our time and resources*”. According to him, “*getting things done*” calls upon creative ‘*tools*’ of local management:

*“I do things differently out here [he is referring to the geographical remoteness of the station from the central station of the police district]. I initiate some projects because I think it is frustrating that they [his staff] cannot do what they want to do. If we have the space to do it, and we have accomplished our strategically defined objectives, I think we should be allowed to do it. So, we call upon ‘operation mole’ as one example (he lowers his voice).*

This project represents a response to a decision to strategically manage local drug dealing at the street level; this decision greatly upsets the station manager and some members of his staff. According to the local station manager, this decision was, in part, a response to incidents where cops had ‘*crossed the line*’ in trying to infiltrate local drug dealing through undercover activities.

The station manager tells that policing of drug related crime has become increasingly centralized, a tendency that reflects the centralization of surveillance and the professionalization of certain areas of policing as described earlier in chapter 1 as part of the historical outline of the development of the modern police



force in Denmark. For one thing, the decision has been made that only *special patrols* should deal with drug-related crime on the street, as the station manager explains. Special patrols are small teams of police officers organized in many police districts to deal with the local incidence of serious gang-related crime. The existence of special patrols means that other patrol units do not respond to jobs that are covered by the special patrol.

It is important to note that emergency calls to the police are managed from the main station; so whenever an incident is reported to the district police, the patrol unit response is centrally coordinated. According to the local station manager, this means that the patrol cops who are summoned for the job do not necessarily know the prior history or deeper implications of the event or the persons who might be involved.

This leaves the local station manager and his staff with an obscured general sense of local crime patterns and little familiarity with the details of drug and gang related crime in the community. As the cops see it, this makes no sense. They are eager to map out drug-related crime in their local area, to gather information, and to respond. The station manager elaborates:

*“But if they come back to the station and present the information they have been given, and ask if they can act on it, we have to tell them “No!” But then they sometimes do it anyway. Cops can be very task-focused, right? (He laughs while shaking his head) You can’t take that away from them”.*

According to him, his request for a special patrol has been refused by his superiors due to fears of creating a subculture, something he believes for his part can be avoided through ‘*proper leadership*’. Yet, he feels that he is left with too little

managerial space (*ledelsesrum*) to legitimize his subordinates' responses to local drug-related crime.

By organizing *project mole*, the local station manager and his staff could “*reach into the streets to the young people in order to know who's doing what and to learn about their criminal and non-criminal behaviors*”, as he explains it. That is, because of its close contact with the local community, including reliable sources, detailed information, and awareness of behavioral patterns, his patrol unit has developed a good sense of drug-related crime in its area with respect to who sells and buys drugs on the street, and the sorts of trouble and violations of the law caused by these criminal network activities.

The ‘*mole*’ is an old metaphor referring to espionage and undercover activity. Like moles that dig their tunnels and spend their lives underground, human ‘moles’ are political or state agents who infiltrate a political or criminal environment over time to develop close relationships and gather information.

Operation mole is managed along with two similar projects by two individual in the local investigation department in addition to their other work. They submit details of their intelligence gathering to a local *information bank* to which everybody in the station continuously reports. From time to time, they generate a task for operation mole based on the patterns they detect, and they print it out on paper to be put in a tray that is picked up by one of the *moles* on duty that day as an *extra resource*:

*“The members of operation mole are those who are passionate about policing drugs on the street. They know that when they get a tip, they keep it to themselves until they are on mole duty. Then they follow up the information they got earlier by searching for drugs, talk to the young criminals or prevent things. In other*

words: we can actually work to prevent charges [performance objectives]”, the local station manager tells me, assuring me that he is “*not being unfaithful to the strategy or undermining anything*”. Rather, he is only “*responding to the frustration of the men*”. He continues:

*“We are probably a bit autonomous out here. We are placed far away from the central district management, which kind of provides us with room for freedom. But you can see the result of this from our high detection rates. In this way they [his staff] can deal with these things. We just don’t call it a ‘special patrol’. This is the kind of motivation I can give them out here. The innovation is really just in going back to the local knowledge we had before the police reform. We are getting close to the unit I want (a special patrol).”*

Again he stresses that annual performance objectives must be met before he will create projects like operation mole:

*“This provides us with the freedom and confidence that we can handle this; and this sure is what produces positive results at the end. It is just that our method is different. We legalize working with drug dealing in the streets. The strategy is a way of prioritizing the assignments we think are out there. This leaves behind some gaps for everything that actually happens in real life but is not included in the strategy”.*

He legitimizes project mole as a *space for freedom*, a form of *trust* that is earned by first providing strategic managers with their performance numbers.

Given the level of middle-manager paranoia I have witnessed in the police force, one might wonder why the local station manager chose to share project mole with me. I believe that I was *supposed* to learn about project mole because I had, in fact, been referred to this station manager *because* he was doing things creatively,

something that district managers in central positions wanted me to witness, both as a researcher and perhaps even more because of my affiliation with the national police.

The message of the local station manager's story is about the need for more local autonomy and managerial maneuvering space; this space is not simply given but must be *earned* or *taken over* by a manager. We once again are witnessing the creation of a space for variation, for non-canonical 'projects', procedures and practices. The development of this space is actively created and managed at the local level by means of a dynamic of 'gray zone' negotiation similar to what we saw taking place between the street and the office in chapter 7.

So *operation mole* can be viewed as a way of compensating for strategic blindness; it is an attempt to deal with the non-prioritized aspects of crime that confront local rank and file officers and managers to which they feel compelled to respond.

When interviewing one of the 'moles', a rank and file policeman in his mid-thirties, he highlights *operation mole* as an example of '*real policing*' (rigtigt polititarbejde):

*"Drugs are low priority and they [politicians] don't think we have a problem with it in this district in spite of the fact that this place is flooded with the shit, it really is! But surely, if we are not allowed to work with it then we don't produce any case numbers and here we go: statistics confirm that we don't have a problem!"*

He explains that whether or not he and his colleagues can engage in 'mole' operations when on duty depends on who is working as his partner and control center manager during that shift. According to him, "*some colleagues just want to go to work, do no more than what they are told to do; and the same goes for some*

*managers who just want to close all cases before ending their shift, instead of supporting those cases that might need to be developed in order to be well solved. But I'm also thinking about my own kids here; if I can prevent them from witnessing drug addicts and dealers at the corner of their school yard, there's no stopping me in doing that".*

He tells a story that goes back 'a couple of years' when other managers ran the station. One summer, the managers were given extra resources to run a gang unit in response to local night time problems between gang members and criminal minority youths. However, whenever he and his colleagues from the centralized OC (organized crime) unit offered creative suggestions to the managers for how to deal with the problems, the managers rejected them, and the extra resources were allocated to investigations in order to cover lack of staff during the summer holiday.

After the summer holiday the gang unit was dissolved because there had been too few night time incidents. However, according to the 'mole' cop, many of the criminal youths are typically gone for weeks during the summer visiting their homeland. *"That's when it occurred to me and the guys that it was all just a hidden agenda to cover summer watches. We were never really meant to fight any crime. Of course, things exploded a few weeks later but then the unit was closed down and we had to come up with other solutions."* he says. He continues, expressing his frustration that the special training offered to police officers who work directly with intelligence sources is often assigned instead to middle managers who do not work directly to collect information from sources, merely sign up for the course *"to decorate their CV"*.

To the ‘mole’ officer, *project mole* contrasts with such cosmetic management tactics in that it legitimizes a real solution to a real local problem, one that he and his colleagues witness in their day-to-day work and that they do think is being inadequately addressed.

In ‘*responding to the frustrations*’ of his staff, that provoke some street cops to act autonomously to address some strategically non-prioritized types of crime, the local station manager has created local projects as ‘*free spaces*’ to deal with these extra-strategic initiatives. Although this policy may circumvent strategic decisions, it is a way for him to establish a transparent platform for work that his staff is undertaking and which they would most likely be doing regardless. In ‘*motivating*’ his staff by letting them deal with drug-related street crime in the form of a local ‘*under the radar*’ activity, he is creating a subtle managerial tool to monitor and supervise actions they would otherwise keep to themselves.

When I asked a local station manager from a different police district what he thought about the anonymized example of *project mole*, his response was: “*Well to me this sounds like one of those middle managers who just want to decide things for themselves!*” To this other manager, *project mole* is an autonomous and uncoordinated act, a sign of disloyalty to strategic actors such as task forces and other national units, who are responsible for dealing with the task and for collecting information about organized crime. However, it should be noted that this other station manager was speaking from the position of managing a local station affiliated with a special patrol.

I asked an organized crime analyst from a national analysis unit about this issue, and he told me that district managers should be careful about trying to deal autonomously with gang and drug related crime because it generates a self-

fulfilling prophecy: when the police treat criminals as an organized entity, this enforces their group identity, which in turn empowers their affiliation and influence as an organized enterprise.

I obtained a third response from a patrol officer working in another police district, who looked at me with a mixture of indulgence and irritation when I asked him about his thoughts on the matter: *“Okay... (sighs)... just so you know it, it’s not like you have stumbled across something unique here. These sorts of ‘under the radar’ projects have always been run in the police. How else should we be able to get things done that none of the gentlemen at the top of the food chain care about?”*

According to this officer, *project mole* is merely one pragmatic solution among many to deal with real crime as opposed to the politically painted picture based on retrospect analysis.

As indicated by these different responses to the ‘mole phenomenon’, it is not a new invention; rather, it is an institutionalized way for police officers and their managers to respond to those types of crime that occur locally but lie beyond the strategic focus.

Whether innovative or not with respect to their uniqueness and novelty and regardless of their problematic aspects, projects like *project mole* are examples of everyday creative tactics that police officers use to fill the gaps that always emerge between strategic objectives and the actual incidents that confront them on the street.

By this point, I have repeatedly suggested that ‘*gray zone*’ creativity is an inevitable and, as regards innovation, deeply necessary aspect of policing because of the improvisational, non-categorical nature of daily police work along with the

managerial/strategic blind spots they try to bridge. However, it would constitute a serious blind spot if this thesis did not address some of the more problematic and culturally discrepant aspects of police autonomy.

### **When gray turns too dark: ‘bullies’ and ‘crusaders’**

It is late afternoon and I join a couple of patrol officers for a coffee break in the small cantina of a local police station. Another officer joins us. You can tell from the look on her face that she is about to burst from withheld laughter.

Apparently, a citizen had just called the emergency control center to alert the police that two men in a car had forced another driver to pull over right in front of her on the road. Luckily she had gotten their license plate number. The two ‘*bullies*’, one of them with a Mohawk-like hairstyle, and the other with his arms covered with tattoos, had violently pulled the driver out of his car. The woman had passed them but was afraid something very bad was happening to this poor guy and the police better have a look into it.

As it turned out, the two bullies were police officers dressed in civilian clothes and driving a civilian car who had executed a stop-and-frisk on a suspect. The officers at the table complain about the way certain cops dress.

As this incident demonstrates, the citizen would never have suspected that the two suspicious ‘*bullies*’ were police officers. In other words, when police officers are



not in uniform or otherwise recognizable to what police call '*audience*' (publikum), i.e. the public, one cannot distinguish an illegal violent act from a law enforcement intervention. The right of police officers to physically restrain citizens is contingent on their acting *as police officers*. Many of the things that they do in their work would be blatantly illegal for others.

In the example above, there may be a fair reason that the two police officers, who the citizen thought were bullies, looked and acted the way they did. When police officers work in criminal environments they sometimes have to 'blend in' and in this case they may have suspected that the person they stopped was armed. Once they are pursuing this suspect on the highway, the context for what is happening and why changes.

The reason for beginning this section with this particular story is to illustrate another aspect of the *gray zones* of policing, which relates to the risk faced by some police officers because of their intimate work inside criminal environments of being sucked into the seductive, 'magical meaningness' (Katz 1988) that exists in such social worlds.

Some cops talk like their 'clients', walk, dress, and begin to think like them as part of becoming more intimately involved with their motivations, group dynamics, collecting valuable intelligence etc. This is an identity constructing process that begins with the necessary alteration of your appearance to match the social setting you are entering, not entirely dissimilar to the experience of researchers as they begin to adapt to the cultural environments they are studying (see for example Hunt 1984).

We have already seen in chapter 4 that police managers are well aware of the downside of staff autonomy. But when it comes to the ambiguous discretion

involved in some police tasks, such as those that are practiced by investigators, uniformed officers and agents working with organized crime and the associated drug and gang environments, these police cultures are more likely to ‘spin out of line’ than others.

Closely related to this observation, Hunt (1985) proposes the term ‘normal force’: ‘Normal force involves coercive acts that specific “cops” on specific occasions formulate as necessary, appropriate, reasonable, or understandable. Although not always legitimated or admired, normal force is depicted as a necessary or natural response of normal police to particular situational exigencies’ (Ibid.: 317).

While ‘normal force’ may be considered necessary by street cops, their managers and the society at large may not necessarily approve of their methods.

Rather, as Hunt argues, ‘the full socialization of a police officer takes place outside the academy as the officer moves from its idealizations to the practicalities of the street’ (Ibid.: 354). On the street, the police officer is exposed to peer-to-peer control based on social norms grounded in experience as a supplement to formal rules. As such, Hunt demonstrates how police officers assess the use of force within a continuum of legal, normal and excessive practices, of which the latter is sanctioned by peers: ‘Normal force is thus the product of the police officers’ accounting practices for describing what happened in ways that prefigure or anticipate the conclusion that it was in some sense justified or excusable and hence “normal”’ (Ibid.: 345).

In an interview a Danish police officer who states that he has ‘*tried it all*’, i.e. he has worked with all sorts of areas of policing, explains that: “*the problem with being a cop is that when you engage with certain units or tasks you often have to really keep your balance not to fall on the wrong side of the law*”. He tells me a

story about how he himself chose to leave an infamous patrol team once that, in his words, had ‘*gone autonomous*’.

“*In our world, these cops are known as ‘crusaders’ (korsfarere)*”, he continues. In his experience, a *crusader* is a colleague who is a ‘*real buddy*’ and ‘*takes your shit too*’ if you get in some kind of trouble together. But the crusader has a quasi-religious belief that what he/she does and how it is done is the only right way. The crusader ‘*rules the game*’ (er spil-styrende) and never stops being a cop, not even at home, and so the crusader becomes blinded by the belief that what he/she is doing cannot be wrong. “*The badge justifies all deeds*”, he explains.

The reason that these individuals are generally disliked by their colleagues despite their fitting into the category of ‘*real cops*’ has to do with the quality police associate with criminals from which police officers want to distance themselves and their profession: criminals care only about themselves and their own interests. A police officer cares about others. “*The big difference between a police officer and a criminal is the **gain** from your act. You do not choose to become a cop for the sake of your own profit; you do so from goodness in your heart because you wish to help others*”, as one rank and file police officer expresses it.

Many police officers I talked with joked that cops and criminals are alike in several ways: “*The gang members say we are the biggest gang in the country: ‘You also wear a back tag, you are no better than us’, they say; that might very well be so, but there are many of us and therefore we will always win*”, one police officer smiles while telling me about how he teaches young cops to behave respectfully no matter who they interact with.

Another police officer says that: “*Some of the colleagues who have tattoos up and down their arms are those who are ‘most’ cops. But sometimes there is not far*

*from that and the others and their tattoos (i.e. gang members); they also work best in a system in which the hierarchical boundaries are clear and you know exactly what you are supposed to do and what you are not supposed to do”.*

Thus, in some instances experienced police officers discipline their colleagues' bad behavior. In parallel to Hunt's studies of normal force in the US, Danish police officers impose norms of acceptable creativity on each other and sanction deviance from these norms by labeling deviants among them as for example 'bullies' or 'crusaders'. Particularly the latter term also applies to colleagues who are entrepreneurial in ways that do not necessarily involve the direct use of force but become too narrow minded or crusading in the way they carry out their ideas. And those police officers who, according to their colleagues and themselves, used to be 'bullies' in their younger days, point to managerial neglect as a key element in the dynamics of what happens when police autonomy goes bad.

In an interview, a special patrol officer explains what happened when his team felt abandoned by their first line manager:

*“The worst kind of managers are the anxious ones, you know, the kind of manager who gets a nervous breakdown if someone farts. We had a manager like that some time ago. It was as though he was scared of us. Each time we came to him with a suggestion of how to handle a job, he turned it down. But did he come up with a suggestion himself? Of course not... He was always gone to meetings. So we had to protect him with cotton wool, you know... Like protecting him from the sort of decisions and tasks that would make him shit his pants. He basically didn't get what our job was all about and rather than asking us, he became a control freak. So the team had to work on its own”.*

If police managers fail to supervise the needs, dilemmas, or 'crusading' tendencies involved with police work performed in the *gray zones* some individuals within the group may take over the leadership, or the group may detach itself from management control, as described by the police officer above.

A dog patrol manager, known among colleagues to be good at getting negative sub-cultural police activities back on track, says: *"if I don't know what they are facing out there, the rise of the counter-culture immediately begins. Then the strongest in the department survives and becomes headstrong (egenrådig). If just one is allowed to do that you seriously have a problem. It's like a rotten apple. Once it has happened, rottenness spreads. This is one of the things that have shocked me the most; how one or two negative people out of a bunch of thirty-five can take over the agenda. In the case of the department I took over, it was not a matter of corruption but bullying; mental terror."*

It should also be noted, though, that some first line managers may micro-manage their staff by interpreting laws *'much more narrowly than how the law is written'*, as a patrol officer says. That is, they expand the disciplinary grid of the law to use it to justify why police officers cannot do this or that when, in fact, this is a matter of individual interpretation, not unlike the converse case when police officers make the law work for them in creative ways. Those micro-managing superiors whose personal interpretations of the law are evident to their staff also risk losing the respect and trust of those who report to them, and may be excluded from some *gray zone* practices.

When we consider the stubborn excesses of bullies and crusaders, we are reminded of the importance of de Certeau's emphasis that creative tactics *must* be

performed within some sort of disciplinary framework or ‘strategic place’ as he called it.

Therefore, the reason for including the darker side of creative and unauthorized police practices is to stress the importance of avoiding exaggerated romantic fantasies about autonomous creativity, especially in the case of the police and other state institutions that carry a mandate of trust mandate that must not be abused.

What we also learn from police officers when they distinguish between ‘bad’ versus ‘good’ autonomy is that they are quite aware of potential bullies and crusaders among them and that their concern is guided by a certain ethic. The autonomous practices accepted and tolerated by police officers as ‘good’ are those that 1) do not violate the formal and informal codes of proper policing, and 2) link to other, more general, legitimate concerns and conceptual frameworks within the police and in society at large.

Thus, the ethical code for acceptable autonomy in the police setting is similar to the one proposed by de Certeau (and Nietzsche); recall that de Certeau’s entire point was that creative tactics do not require counter-strategies but operate within the limits constituting the ‘strategic place’ in a social sphere (in this case, the system that legitimizes the institution of the police and the practices of its representatives).

For the individual working in such a realm of autonomy the requirement is ‘to respond to the demands of modernity by interiorizing a complex set of socially imposed standards and to regulate forms of otherness in itself and in society which deviate from established social norms’ as Ansell-Pearson points out with reference to Nietzsche’s ethic of autonomy (see chapter 1).

Police skepticism about *crusading* and *bullying* implies an inherent ethic and sensitivity, recognizing that police creativity must not be a matter of unrestrained entrepreneurial and individualized innovation. Rather, the creativity and innovation that arise in different aspects of the *gray zones* inherent in police practice need to be systematically disciplined by the cultural, legal and ethical mechanisms that characterize the police culture of control.

In summary, this chapter has shown the ways that police make space for creativity within a highly conformist, hierarchical, and bureaucratic organization by inventing and deploying a variety of everyday creative tactics. This allows them to work around the formal hierarchy and rely on other means of coordination and collaboration. Whereas the vertical and hierarchical organization is fixed, the informal and horizontal alternative is capable of being task-dependent and variable over time, affording the officers greater flexibility to advance their creative ideas.

I have only selected and categorized the most exemplary of these creative tactics. They serve to supplement the vertical and formally hierarchical police organization by creating more horizontal and informal spaces for experimentation, to develop new practices and to intervene in areas of crime neglected by strategic priorities.

My key point is that there is a double movement involved in police officers working creatively. The first movement is to ‘simply’ create a new solution, and to develop and qualify it through use and practice. The second movement is to find a creative way to get to be creative, i.e. tactically making space for that particular solution to be developed. In order to be able to develop creative solutions, police officers have to be creative with respect to the solutions and also with respect to maneuvering the solution through the organization and its disciplinary grids.

While some of this creativity in police work deliberately reduces transparency and creates a variation that is not bureaucratically endorsed, this does not mean that gray zone creativity is unregulated. It is not regulated in the ways that we would traditionally expect the police bureaucracy to be regulated. However, through their continuously being subject to the disciplinary apparatus of the police, police officers internalize a complex and tacit set of knowledge and values that mostly keep their gray zone activities from turning too dark. Police officers continuously evaluate their colleagues' activities, and in many cases their own as well, and ensure that these activities – despite being autonomous – stay in general line with what the police ought to be doing and what is acceptable given the special responsibilities entrusted to the police.

## **Chapter 9. Formalizing explorative spaces: Gray zones as authorized heterotopias**

*“If institutions are power made durable, then the question is not whether hierarchy can be opposed with flatness, but whether and how institutions can keep de-institutionalizing themselves”*

Parker 2012, p. 244

Up to this point, Part III has dealt with gray zone creativity as informal, ‘horizontal’ practices that are themselves inventive in how they circumvent formal power dynamics and official procedures in the police.

This may give the impression that the variation and creativity emerging from everyday experience only happen through informal and unauthorized practices in



the police. But, as this chapter aims to demonstrate, we have reason to believe that this is not the case.

Let us return to Foucault's and de Certeau's space metaphor for a closer look at how 'tactical spaces' may also be formally embraced in the strategic place of the police.

Depicting the ways that heterotopic spaces, understood here as the creation of creativity, innovation and 'serious play' (Hjorth & Steyaert 2003; Hjorth 2005), are formally arranged in the police, we suggest that the police have ways to 'trick' or partially reformulate their customary hierarchical processing and disciplining of everyday creativity.

To illustrate this, I draw on examples of how *task forces* and local training units work as explorative spaces to actively integrate and qualify the ideas and inventions that spin off from police officers' everyday creative efforts.

What we learn from this is that organizational spaces *other* than the dominant forms of organizing are deliberately created in the police with the potential of:

- 1) Focusing and empowering task performance and the impact of policing
- 2) Creating informal work environments where managers actively encourage tolerance for otherness in the form of cross-disciplinary, cross-sector or cross-department collaboration and the sharing of emerging experience and ideas.
- 3) Providing 'street stages', or physical manifestations of heterotopic spaces, where police officers can bring their 'side-street' suggestions and legitimately share and refine them with colleagues and supportive managers.

- 4) Developing new practices that (in some cases) are coordinated with and promote development, procedures, and help break down cultural barriers in other organizational domains.

This further implies that the Danish police compensates for the shortcomings of the formal, disciplinary police hierarchy in providing space and support for experimentation and creativity beyond political and managerial rationales.

As alternative forms of organizing are accepted, experimented with and applied by police managers, the power dynamics of the ‘classical’ vertical organization that we saw in Part II are replaced, or *de-institutionalized*, as Parker suggests in the opening of this chapter.

Although the police make allowances for *other* spaces within the ‘strategic place’ of the organization when they are useful to mobilize the performance of specialized tasks, the specific elements of this potentiality are often suppressed due to internal political conflicts related to the privileges accorded to these units. The aim of the chapter is to speak in greater depth about the other potentials and challenges involved with formally embracing and creating space for play and creativity in the police.

### **Task forces as ‘legitimate side-streets’ for experimentation**

This section explores the use of *task forces* in the Danish police as a formalized way to organize specialized and creative police activities, which are substantially different from more conventional ways of managing police work.

I was repeatedly encouraged by district police officers to have a look at what takes place in a task force if I wanted to know more about creative police work. This resulted in a two-week visit to two task forces; although the stays were relatively brief, I had the chance to experience the unique atmosphere and intensity of the task force environments.

Task forces are areas of specialization that go far beyond my knowledge, so it is only fair to say that what I present here are mere suggestive reflections on their potential organizational role as heterotopic spaces and by no means an evaluation of their performative capacity to create results in the means-end sense of the term. Nonetheless, I believe it is relevant to illustrate and analyze some of the dynamics as they were presented to me in more or less mythological form by police officers in the districts as well as by those actually working there.

I argue that task forces, as de Certeau's would see them, can be viewed as a *managerial tactic* in that they are used within a political and strategic frame of reference to create particular environments to support of specialized, creative and highly effective task performance. They are arranged and managed as *bricolage*, a collective of continuous selection of relevant and at times unconventional elements. They play out as what Foucault described as heterotopias, other spaces with a specific societal purpose.

The specific focus on task, performance and the diverse re-combination and arrangement of resources (such as people, competencies, technology, methods, managerial techniques, etc.) create increased appreciation of *otherness*, i.e. the need for diverse competencies and trial-and-error experimentation, as well as greater reliance on democratization, or 'flat' (see Parker 2012) management.

In this way, the use of task forces in the police suggests that the arrangements of ‘strategic place’, i.e. the power dynamics of hierarchy, that (in a Foucauldian sense) fixate and subject creativity to conformity as it emerges in the everyday work of the police, can be displaced or re-arranged by the strategic managers themselves.

### **The use of task forces as managerial ‘tactics’**

In some situations, police tasks call for unique arrangements to speed up creative responses to precarious situations, such as exploding crime-rates or problems within the arena of policing which attract political and public attention. Under such circumstances specific problem solving might be relocated and relieved from routine and time-consuming practices, such as certain administrative tasks, as well as focused on one particular type of crime.

It is not uncommon for politicians and public agencies to respond to outside criticism or extraordinary demands by establishing temporary special units to relieve the general system and ‘take bureaucracies “off the hook” by making it appear that something is being done about problems’ (Lipsky 1969, p. 19). The establishment of task forces in the Danish police is an example of Lipsky’s more general observation

In September 2012, for example, the police in Copenhagen established *Task Force Pusherstreet* ‘to fight overt organized cannabis trade in Pusherstreet and to strengthen Law-abiding as well as collaborative forces in the area’<sup>24</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup> Announcement of objectives from the official homepage of Task Force Pusherstreet (my translation): <http://www.taskforcepusherstreet.dk/>

Other task forces in the Danish police deal with diverse areas including burglary, serious economic and international crime, gang-related crime, prostitution and human trafficking.

With reference to de Certeau's street metaphor, the head of a task force tells me how, in his view, the task force is established as a '*legitimate side-street*'. According to him, it is paved by a political task that calls for rapid response and intervention and therefore comes with a more or less explicit mandate to use alternative means of management and police practices, although closely coordinated with other relevant internal and external collaborative actors.

Given this managerial 'license to innovate' the task force managers are granted the privilege to "*barricade and protect creativity against all the typical bureaucratic and hierarchical hassle. We can focus on getting the job done*", the head of another task force puts it.

The same chief assures me with an ironic grin that although the task force is managed as a cross-disciplinary matrix, it still appears *very* hierarchical in the documents presented to the political management.

This is yet another example of how individuals, in this case a high-ranking manager, must compose a new arrangement in ways that 'play on and within a terrain imposed on it', as de Certeau suggested (see chapter 1).

The managerial arena of the task force is *other*, but should appear *same*; just to keep on the safe side of things and avoid stirring things up too much while cutting across the insulating layers of the large, hierarchical and bureaucratic police institution.

As alternative forms of organizing police functions in response to political demands and expectations, task forces might therefore be thought of as ‘managerial heterotopias’: although they are organized in fairly unconventional ways, they operate directly from the center of ‘strategic place’- not from the margin. But as we will see, they make space and provide shelter for ‘a possible *creative swarm*, the ebb and flow of multiplying activities’ as Hjorth & Steyaert (2003, p. 288, italics in original) describe the marginal dynamics of creativity with reference to de Certeau.

Although task forces vary in their focus, their size, the way they are managed and their success, I will share some observations of what seemed to characterize the heterotopic aspects of the two task forces I visited.

### **Task forces as privileged space**

That task forces are formally established also means that they are privileged spaces in various ways. While this increases the chances of innovative success or, as de Certeau put it: the ‘lucky hits in the framework of a system’, the issue of privilege is a highly sensitive one for the police.

For a police officer, being appointed head of a task force is prestigious and typically represents a profitable career opportunity. Task force managers have considerably greater resource autonomy in that they often administer a budget allocated to their particular unit and purpose, which often leaves more financial and creative space for trying out different solutions. This means that task force operations are funded more ‘generously’ than regular operations, allowing them to independently acquire newer technology and equipment, for example.

Also, decision-making power, direct access to top management and a defined task with generally formulated objectives are aspects that allow task forces to '*play more freely*' and they are even expected to do so, as the head of a task force explains it.

In some cases, task force managers are free to hire employees who they think are especially motivated and suitable for the job and negotiate the possibility of flexible working hours, which makes it possible to better respond to work-intense periods such as urgent or lengthy investigations. The task force police officers I talked to find this an attractive deal since their work is usually tightly managed and scheduled by superiors when serving in a district police station.

Staff is temporarily recruited from the districts, typically for two years for investigative staff and one year for operational staff (an arrangement that varies from task force to task force). The reason that operational staff has a shorter term is because of management's fear of developing a subculture or *crusaders*, since task force operational police officers work very closely with the criminal environment. Although this gives rise to frustrations among police officers who do not want to leave their job in the task forces, the short term employments create an intense and highly motivated atmosphere which weeds out the '*empty gazes*' (tome blikke) that comes with the exhaustion of energy reserves following a period of intense work, as explained by a task force manager

According to managers in both task forces, what they take from the district and National police in the form of staff, the task forces give back in the form of high specialization and competencies. As task force employees work in-depth and team-based with a specific crime problem, they develop a higher level of skills and competences in that area. This runs contrary to the strategy practiced in the

police districts for years that ‘one cop responds to all tasks’ as a way to optimize flexibility and efficiency. This strategy has proven counter-productive to the cultivation of specialized areas of policing and for this reason, has recently been supplanted by national strategies focusing on greater specialization and competency boosts.

In the police districts, a common dream among patrol officers and investigators is that their home-developed apps for iPhones and iPads might revolutionize investigation, documentation processes, etc. Some police districts do experiment with the use of portable technology devices, but they face the challenges of scaling investment and dealing with the sometimes vaguely defined legal framework, such as in the case of the Act on the Processing of Personal Data (persondataloven).

A myth shared by police officers not participating in the task forces is that their colleagues who work there are privileged with all the latest technologies. Given the specialized work they are doing and their small size, task forces have the potential to be pioneers; their situation provides a well-defined and delimited ‘laboratory’ for testing new types of technologies, methods, etc. But in reality, according to the task force staff that I spoke with, this was not the case. A task force manager explains what kind of challenges they too are facing in respect of technological innovation:

*“There are so many issues surrounding technology and documentation where we have to be careful not to break the law. So when the staff comes to my office, and they do so on a daily basis, and say ‘we just found this and that on the Internet which would be of great help in our investigations’ I often have to kill their ideas. This is perhaps the most difficult area of innovation for us and for the police in general. In this respect, the intelligence service (PET) is ahead of development so*



*I lean up against them. But in some cases it is a matter of claiming your rights as a manager. We started out by getting the most modern equipment for our telephone tapping service. We needed 14 inches laptops for the cars which were outdated after a year and a half. Then smart phones were launched and then iPads. Of course, these things are mere investments but imagine the costs of keeping the entire police force up to date with the newest technologies. And you should see the kind of technological solutions my staff sniffs out on the Internet! Criminals can operate using the newest technologies, but police face a very different set of restrictions”.*

A task force investigator also invalidated the myth that task force staff has privileged access to new technology: “okay, maybe the colleagues out in the police districts think of the iPads we got some time ago. But seriously, children down to the age of 7 have that. That has nothing to do with innovation”, he explains.

This indicates that the task forces do seem to be perceived by others as a kind of spoiled utopia, a heaven of hopes and wild fantasies, simply because they are *other*.

On the other hand their potentiality as creative spaces for specialized policing tends to be overshadowed by the nerves they strike in the police organization because of their privileged status.

As we saw from the brief history of the Danish police in chapter 1, leading figures in the police union set great political priority on ensuring that police officers are equally privileged. We need only recall the ways that the elitist position of criminal investigators in the years following World War I created tensions and skewed privileges between them and uniformed police officers. Police union representatives referred to this difference as ‘*A and B police*’, focusing on the

problem created by the less favorable terms of employment for their union members.

The union employs the same rhetoric today to challenge the autonomy and resources granted to the task forces. Interestingly, it was union members who advised me to learn from the task forces if I wanted to experience innovative policing, which made me curious about the nature of this field of specialization.

When I spoke with police managers working outside the task forces about the positive ‘aura’ that seemed to surround the task force working environment, I would often be met by the argument that, with an increased use of task forces, the top management were creating an ‘*A and B police*’. One patrol officer I talked to expresses the concern as follows: “*Why should I just do the boring work in the police district, while my colleague gets the chance to work in a task force and have a twice as exciting job as I do?*” Similar comments specifically address the unfairness that police managers feel in relation to the task forces.

In response to these familiar critiques, a task force investigator said: “*You know what? We [police] are perhaps the largest communist society Denmark ever had. We all have to be equal and nobody should think they deserve better than others!*”

And there are unfortunate consequences to district police as an increasing use of task forces recruit their staff and risk leaving a skeleton crew. Also, the specialized competencies that task force police officers develop while working in the task forces might not come into use when they return to the police districts because the district managers cannot provide the officers with positions that are relevant to them.

So, even though in principle, the loop of exchange of staff could work, it does not run smoothly.

Of course, there is much more complexity in play than I could outline here. But irrespective of the challenges and conflicts arising from the privileged sphere of the task forces, I still believe that they offer important insights for ways to formally organize creativity that are different from the dominant ways of organizing police work. The remaining part of this section is devoted to the dynamics of potential in task forces as marginal(ized) spaces created directly from - and not just within - the strategic place of the police. We will focus on the ways managers subvert power mechanisms as they engage in ‘flatter’ and more democratic managerial techniques to make space for variation in competencies and for sharing of ideas.

### **Subverting power relations to intensify variation**

In an interview, a task force investigator reflected on my question about the main difference between working in a police district and on the task force: *“What I take with me from having worked in the task force is what it is like to have had the opportunity to experience freedom of thought.”*

He and others I spoke with explained that this ‘*freedom of thought*’ results from a combination of the small size of the unit, which enables a ‘flatter’ management approach, and an intimate and interdisciplinary work environment that breaks down the traditional barriers between roles and task responsibilities in the police. With reference to de Certeau, task forces create space for heterogeneity, which subverts the ‘law of power’ imposed by the monotonic singularity of normative discourse and the power relations produced by the traditional hierarchical order (see also Hjorth & Steyaert 2003).

The staff of the task forces I visited generally regarded them as characterized by an informal tone and a ‘*flat management structure*’ that produced a “*highly creative atmosphere*”, as a task force investigator put it. All of the task force police officers I talked with explained that the formal tone that characterizes so many other police departments is counterproductive to sharing ‘*wild ideas*’.

We know from Part II that managers put considerable effort into taming such wild ideas. So why is this handled differently by the task force management?

One head of a task force explains that he intentionally tried to replace the conventional hierarchical and bureaucratic ‘*staccato*’ characterizing the way that police tasks are managed, by setting up managerial techniques that support the building of a ‘*task community*’ (opgavefællesskab) and the recognition of a ‘*common destiny*’ (fælles skæbne) in the task force setting.

The task forces are typically governed by a board of directors with representatives from relevant police districts and the national police. This is an unconventional principle of governance in that task forces reshuffle and shift traditional power relations even at the top managerial level. A task force manager explains in an interview that “*the game of power is not defined beforehand. It is not given who dominates the decision process. This is something that is constantly being negotiated. The board members have to argue for their case when we negotiate the focus of our tasks. It is a challenge but it also opens up new possibilities and better results because it qualifies the decision processes. Power is always in play because it is equally distributed to begin with. Thus, we all become much better coordinated through dialogue.*

From the ways that management is composed and democratized beginning at the very top of the hierarchy, power is not a *given* in the form of a privileged formal

status for top managers in relation to each other. Power is *earned* through substantive argumentation and, each voice is in principle equally weighted on the board of directors.

I asked a top manager in one of the task forces what she thought is so special about the way task forces are managed, and she replied:

*“I think of this task force as an air bubble. This may sound wrong, but what I mean is that, politically, we have been given the opportunity of not having all the daily operations flowing through our front door. Or perhaps a better way to describe it is as a grassroots movement. I don’t know if we work in particularly innovative ways. But what I think is different here compared to other departments I have served in is the openness or expansiveness of how we think about ourselves and what we do. The task force started out as a bubble of air in the sense that everyone contributed to defining the community, its history, and traditions. We have all been part of the grassroots together and had to invent things on the go. Managers and employees were all pioneers together on the same journey”.*

The ‘air bubble’ space this manager refers to means that the task forces are essentially open spaces. They begin as a ‘space without a place’ (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986), where staff and managers momentarily escape the dominating order of the police organization and by virtue of ‘*the freedom of thought*,’ can manifest their version of a utopian atmosphere. ‘The heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time,’ Foucault wrote (Ibid., p. 25). Task forces resemble Foucault’s suggestion of heterotopias, established as temporary alternative spaces to serve ‘a precise and determined function within a society (Ibid., p. 24).

Task forces do not operate in isolation from other police units; rather, they are ‘in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror or reflect’ (Ibid., p. 24). Task forces define themselves in opposition to traditional ways of managing and policing while at the same time being a reflection of - and reflecting back upon - the hierarchical, bureaucratic ‘staccato’ order from which they try to distinguish themselves as being ‘other’.

And being in the position of a privileged other, ‘effectively enacted utopia’ (Ibid), the norm calls for a humble attitude: “*we are farmers without a land of our own. So each time we go out to plow, harvest or plant we are doing it on other people’s territory. This is sensitive business, in the police as well*”, a task force manager says as he explains the intimate coordination and collaboration between the task forces, the police districts, and the national police. Task force managers supposedly recognize the importance of sharing their results and successes with the involved police districts in their communication with internal and external sources.

Also informed by de Certeau’s notion of tactical space, we have an analytical lens to better grasp what heterotopias may *do* by virtue of their capacity to open new space, or as the police manager expressed it, ‘bubbles of air’: ‘When a space for play can be introduced, through which new variants are created, multiplicity always emerges. A plural culture is then possible through a dissemination of ‘innovations that swarm at grassroots levels’” (Hjorth & Steyaert 2003, p. 290).

Let us take a look at how task forces generate space for variation in culture and concentrate grassroots level innovation.

First, the task force managers actively arrange for and encourage close cross-disciplinary collaboration, something that is otherwise rare in the monodisciplinary field of policing. Local and national police units work alongside prosecutors, external agencies and competences. This creates a unique potential for sharing ‘*tacit knowledge*’ and ‘*breaking down cultural barriers and invisible fences between departments*’, as it is described by a task force investigator.

From the perspective of both staff and managers, the innovative aspects in the functioning of task forces have to do more with the ‘flat’ and interdisciplinary sphere they provide than with their investigation methods or other means of policing.

As I interview a group of employees from one of the task forces consisting of operational (uniformed) police, a lawyer, and investigators, I introduce them to de Certeau’s street metaphor. An investigator cuts me off enthusiastically, remarking “*that’s it! That’s exactly what it’s like. The ideas that bubble down in the side-streets of our system never reach the head quarter, or how you called it. You simply give up along the way. But here [in the task force] we have moved beyond that. In general, there is not much innovation in the police. It’s a lifetime position with no inputs from the outside. It’s an old, conservative system. But not here!*”

One of the operational police officers elaborates: “*Here in the task force, I can walk directly into the office of a key manager and present my idea. If he or she is having a bad or busy day the chain of command is flexible and I am free to take the idea to another manager who’s got a bigger smile on the face.*”

When I ask whether they think the innovation they experience in the task force environment has to do with their use of technology, methods development or other

solutions that might support their work, an operational police officer cuts me off again saying:

*“No, we are not really that much ahead with those things. What **really** matters is the kind of team work and management we have. You just walk down the corridor and you’ll find most of the different competencies we need: lawyers and all. So if you get an idea we sit right next to each other and there’s not such a long way to testing it out. And you talk together for a longer time than you would if you call someone on the phone to clear off a formal question.”* He looks at the lawyer and continues and grins: *“we [the police officers] have even lowered our barriers against the lawyers, who would have thought that could happen?”*

The lawyer, who works as a task force prosecutor, responds: *“the close collaboration between lawyers, police and others has the effect that lawyers often experience a will to try extra hard with a case and be extra imaginative when it comes to bending the square legal realms of possibility”*. This was confirmed by other task force lawyers who have worked hard and persistently to push past some of the dusty conventions of the legal system.

This analysis indicates that at least some of the task forces function by virtue of their heterotopic characteristics. They are established by top political management as a kind of privileged managerial tactic, an unconventional democratic arrangement as contrasted to the command structure of the traditional hierarchy. They are implemented by the heads of task forces and their staff as ‘effectively enacted utopias’ to create a specialized work environment for focused and high performance policing. The heterotopian space, as the concept has been elaborated by Hjorth & Steyaert (2003) and Hjorth (2005), is created as a space for cultural and interdisciplinary variation to support creative and efficient problem solving.



Innovation is not a focus of the task forces in itself, so task force managers and staff do not approach innovation directly by inventing new innovative technology, investigative methods, operational tactics, analytical approaches etc. In general, police have a hard time replacing their more traditionally ingrained and reactive approaches to policing (Hestehave 2013).

But the relational aspects of the task forces and their synergetic effect on task performance seem to contribute to the '*freedom of thought*' and the creative aura that surrounds the task forces and which, according to the task force managers, results in more proactive approaches to policing.

Seen in this light, it is clear that task forces shift and push the comfort zone of conventional hierarchy, power relations, cultural barriers, police practices, legal practices, and so on. Task forces can become problematic as privileged institutional spaces when they expand at the expense of the performative capacity of other institutional domains and this results in other crucially important areas of police responsibility being neglected. However, I hope this perspective can supplement the devaluing criticism task forces sometimes face within the organization by illuminating the potential task forces represent as somewhat culturally marginal, tactical - and yet formalized and privileged - spaces within the police.

It is very likely that there are yet other kinds of creative organizational arrangements in the police that make space for creativity as 'bubbles of air' for 'otherness' to breathe, as it is surrounded by the conforming police hierarchy.

'Heterotopias are built everywhere', Hjorth (2005, p. 396) reminds us. In the remaining part of this chapter we will see that such other formalized units do, indeed, exist in the police for which heterotopian principles are crucial for success.

Such ‘formal embeddedness’ of spaces for play/invention is exemplified by the tactical use of local and central training units.

### **Training units as anchoring points for tactical invention**

In this section I will briefly present how tactical users, i.e. managers, trainers and trainees, are mobilizing local training units as spaces that are open to everyday creativity/invention (Hjorth 2005).

Both of the training units have been strategically created, and strategic managers expect them to contribute through new training programs. But as we will see, they differ particularly in one aspect: their capacity for organizational accessibility in order to share their inventions.

The small, local police district training unit consists of a regular team of instructors, and is formally isolated from other local and central units. Its creative responses to local needs for new police practices and courses for learning them are less likely to spread and inform police training and practice in other areas of the police.

This dynamic is especially evident when we compare the local training units to the centralized police dog school, where trainers and trainees from across the country attend courses on a regular basis. The courses at the police dog school are arranged in such a way that the trainers and trainees (people as well as dogs) are given the time, place and collaborative synergy to play with the experiences they bring from their everyday work. They can creatively expand their practices beyond the planned activities at the dog school in tactical ways that, according to the head

of the school, are the reason that the police dog service has survived. Also, the geographical, cross-district span of participants ensures the dissemination of the new training and police practices.

This observation is important to better understand the dynamics of an asymmetry that emerges from within the police and, from a central-strategic perspective, creates dysfunctional and uncoordinated local autonomy. It also offers an explanation of why some innovations seem to spread more easily than others with respect to how extensively their relations with other geographic areas and organizational domains are formally supported.

### **The potential role of local training units as hotbeds for experience-based creativity**

I was invited to participate in several district training events arranged by several police instructors responsible for local tactical (in the police sense of the term) training programs, where the instructors always found some participative role for me. The small unit of four instructors was established in 2007 as part of a large-scale restructuring of the districts. The district management expressed their desire for a local training unit, primarily to ensure that uniformed police officers were up to speed in the context of extensive restructuring of their tasks and as part of new national training concepts, among other things.

But since management in each district was responsible to prioritize local training of frontline staff, some top managers saw no need for this kind of training. As a result, only some police districts have local training units to keep their operational

staff updated on ‘best practices’ and prepare their staff for present and future scenarios.

*“We will never perform any better than the last time we trained”*, one of the instructors said as he told me how much he appreciated that the top managers of his police district recognized the need to keep their operational staff ‘sharp’ on duty.

The local instructors are responsible for different areas of training depending on their prior experience. Every year they gather suggestions from their colleagues and assess what courses they should develop to offer the following year, and they present their choices to their managers in the form of an education catalogue. *“You need to be passionate about your specific area of expertise or else you cannot sell the idea to the managers. It’s all about argumentation. We don’t get all of our ideas through with the managers but we would be in trouble if we did! We would not have the time to run all the courses we invent”* one of the instructors explains.

The local training unit arranges a range of courses with different groups of participants depending on their pedagogical aim. The instructors emphasize that a crucial aspect of the courses is to expose the participants to training scenarios that are as realistic as possible. *“Only through the embodiment of experience will they understand the aspects that the approach to their job actually implies”*, an instructor says. He has more than 35 year of experience as a patrol officer himself and has previously served as a shooting instructor. He gives an example of how he and his colleagues came up with a course for the lawyers in the district.

A long time ago, lawyers in the Danish police used to wear guns on duty. But it was eventually decided that they had to hand in their weapons since they hardly ever practiced their shooting skills or knew

how to handle their gun in case they would be forced to draw it. Since many of today's prosecutors do not have personal experience with guns, the police officers noticed that some of the lawyers lost their cases at court. They simply didn't know the details of how the weapons work, knowledge that is crucial for convincing the judge and jury in court.

As an example, the instructor tells a story about a case some years ago where a youngster had threatened someone with a dummy gun (a toy gun that looked very much like a real gun). A police officer who had been involved in the case went to the ordnance department and borrowed a real gun that looked just like it. At court, he asked for permission to perform a brief experiment, which the judge allowed. He placed toy bullets in the real gun and real bullets in the dummy gun, pointed the gun at the judge and asked which pistol the judge would prefer him to shoot. The judge ordered him to put away the guns and the prosecutor had no further questions. *"At court, it's all a play. So it is our job to provide substantial information for those who are processing our case"*, he says.

Since several cases in the district were lost because the prosecutors did not know the different guns and how they actually work, the local instructor and his colleagues found motivation in this story. They arranged a gun course for the lawyers that included shooting practice to provide them with a stronger sense and respect for the powerful weapons. The course also includes simulation games to give the lawyers a deeper understanding of the kind of psychological and

physiological pressure police officers are exposed to in their job. The instructor explains:

*“In the simulation exercise two female lawyers acted as police officers. The plot of the game was that that a violent crime had happened and they had to search a house for the perpetrator. They were also told that there were no real people inside the house, only paper targets. As they walked into the house and down the main corridor, doors would lead into rooms at both sides. The lawyers froze just before they got to the first door, panicked, and didn’t finish the exercise. They walked out of the game thinking: ‘Gosh, there’s more to this situation than what we can look up in our law books. That means that they will better understand the kind of dangers and reactions police officers are exposed to on the street.’”*

The course is offered to all newly employed lawyers in the district, including managers.

The example cited above is only one of many creative training scenarios that the local instructors have created and set up to support the ‘embodiment of experience’, or the vaccine of lived, physical experience that takes black and white and turns them into a nuanced gray zone that goes beyond what any set guidelines can predict.

In chapter 6 we saw that frontline police officers draw primarily on experience-based knowledge as they are subjected to the activity rationality involved in the function and purpose of their job.

The creative practices invented in the local training units in the police districts, such as the course just noted, affirm Hjorth’s observation that ‘strategic


prescriptions are used tactically, creating temporary trophies that cannot be kept but that push the creators to be continuously on the move, to be spacing, to create heterotopias as care-of addresses in work' (Hjorth 2005, p. 396). In this case, the 'care-of' tactics consists in the instructors' commitment to bridge the gap between 'experience required' and 'experience acquired' that is so crucial to performing a well-informed job, for police officers and prosecutors alike.

A local instructor explains: *"As police officers we don't just buy the new stuff that is sent to our e-mails from the national police or our Human Resources department. We are thinking: 'what do they know about police work?' Your body and mind is exposed out there on the street in ways you just can't describe and know until you really feel it. That's why we are so physically oriented in the way we train our colleagues"*.

By providing their colleagues with time and carefully selected and invented training, the local training units offer different 'street stages' - physical, embodied manifestations of heterotopia - within their strategically prescribed mandate. They stage, or simulate, the scenarios of lived life on the street to prepare colleagues for dangerous situations and improve their skills for handling them that cannot be acquired through verbal instruction alone. The local district managers affirm the need for such a playing space as a crucial aspect of high-quality policing.

To give another example, the local instructors also arrange cross-sectoral exercises, such as simulation of a plane crash at the local airport, simulation of a major fire at the local fire station etc. together with representatives from the different services (i.e. doctors, paramedics, firemen, commanding police officers etc.).

The cross-sectoral simulation scenarios provide an experimental environment where the different actors can teach coordination and learn crucial lessons about gaps and needs for better solutions in case of large scale emergencies and catastrophes. The photo on the right shows the miniature landscape used for the simulation exercises, including model cars, people, houses, fire, etc.



The participants are presented with an ‘emergency scenario’ and receive continuous updates on the situation from the coordinating police officers. Despite of how it might appear to outsiders to witness grown men and women in uniforms passionately engaged in role playing with toys, the simulation is deadly serious. Everybody in the room knows what it means in real life when the physician thinks that the police are responsible for calling in an emergency helicopter and the police think it is the physician’s responsibility, and the helicopter never shows up because nobody made the phone call. It means that lives would be lost had the same accident really happened. So the game quickly turns into a space of indeterminacy. It is serious because it is not a quite a game, but it is not quite real either. It is a space for ‘serious play’ (Hjorth 2005) characterized as being a gray zone between simulation and reality.

Because a heterotopia is offered, new collaborative practices and approaches to urgent and catastrophic scenarios emerge *in situ*, based on the premise that in these people’s jobs, every moment is a gift to use, not to lose. The ‘street stage’ heterotopia set up by the local instructors provides an opportunity to preserve



creative solutions emerging from improvisational tactics *before the fact* while the ‘reality’ is still a game without any *real* consequences.

The cross-sector imitation scenario is a powerful way to coordinate practices and responsibilities for comprehensive emergency situations and catastrophes that call for complex collaboration among many different actors.

However, when locally invented courses, strategies and tactics are applied only locally and do not connect to other parts of the country and the organization, police practices become geographically asymmetric. There is no formalized collaboration between the local training units, the central police academy, and the central department for continuing education, for example. This means that only some of the new police practices can spread through informal networks. Conversely, new concepts for police practices promulgated by the central units may be implemented very differently in the police districts (if they are implemented at all).

To illustrate the effects of such asymmetry, a patrol officer told me a story that he found very funny while we were driving. A youth demonstration in central Copenhagen turned into a riot, with people burning parked cars and making trouble in the streets, so the capitol police needed backup from other police districts. As police officers arrived from Jutland, they were told by their colleagues to wear a yellow vest with reflective tape on it because that would make it easier for the police officers to distinguish cops from troublemakers when it was dark, but this was actually a lie. The police officers from Jutland arrived wearing their yellow vests only to discover that they were luminescent targets for the troublemakers who could easily spot them and throw stones at them. This is a typical example of the kind of prank cops play, and the capitol police apparently

thoroughly enjoyed watching their colleagues bouncing around trying to avoid the stuff that was thrown at them.

But what also becomes clear in this story - whether apocryphal or not - is the actual importance for police to coordinate their strategies and tactics nationally and to know in detail (and in advance) how to approach a situation in case they need to cooperate.

This is one of the reasons that the national police are now centralizing strategic coordination and development of police practices. However, one consequence of centralization may be that managers may take away the kind of space for locally invented training and police practices that is offered by the local training units. Then, the central units may lose their sensitivity to local needs and the everyday tactical creativity of the frontline police officers in the police districts. Recognizing the phenomenon of gray zone creativity informs us that quiet, unauthorized police practices are present throughout the police organization. Life has already been happening out on the streets even while managers are busy trying to model it and invent ways of controlling it at a distance. Gray zone creativity helps to fill this gap between what managers see and what frontline police officers see. And local heterotopias shelter the tactical gray zone creativity, keeping these otherwise spontaneous and ephemeral improvisational practices from being blown away and forgotten in the rush of everyday life.

We will pay a short 'visit' to the police dog school to see how the Danish police have institutionalized a tactical, heterotopian space that seems to successfully contribute to innovation. But unlike the problems that face local training units in disseminating their inventions through formal channels, the dog school works as a

centralized space for improvisational performance that coordinates and qualifies innovative dog training across the country.

### **Sniffing out innovation: Police dogs' heterotopia**

An exploration of what happens at the dog school shows us that this centralized unit is managed so as to serve as a focal point for the inexhaustible potential for training and utilizing the police dogs' sense of smell.

The police dog school, an old farm house with adjacent outbuildings, is situated in scenic surroundings in the northern part of Zealand. The school is part of the national police and is thus a central and strategic educational unit. Police dogs and their 'moms and dads' (the dog patrol officers) are trained here. As I visit the dog school the head of the school gives me a guided tour. I comment on how tidy everything is kept. He explains that the dog trainers take great care of the facility because it means so much to them. This is the only place where these enthusiasts can get together to develop their own and the dogs' training skills.

The living room and kitchen inside the old house remind me of a bachelor home; the Chief tells me that the cops have restored and decorated the place themselves with whatever spare items they could find at home. On the carpet, they have attached an artifact: a large paw cut out of metal (see photo on the right) to mark that we are in dog territory.



The dog service was almost closed down some years back because protestors were badly bitten in a demonstration, an event that attracted very negative media

attention and a political demand to immediately change how the dogs were used as a ‘use of force’ tool.

Since then, police dog enthusiasts have put great effort into re-inventing the dog service in a variety of ways. “*The only thing that limits innovation here is human’s limited abilities to see new possibilities and invent new ways of teaching the dogs what to do*”, the chief says.

Today, police dogs are no longer used for the sole purpose of catching and biting perpetrators. They have been trained to corner the suspect, and then sit down and bark until the police officer catches up with them and arrests the individual.

Of crucial importance to the dog enthusiasts is the ways they have experimented with potential uses for the dogs’ exceptional sense of smell. Advances in crime technologies have created a ‘*burning platform*’ for the police dog service, as the chief explains it. For example, technology outperformed the dogs with respect to identifying suspects because DNA analysis proved to be a more precise way to identify a perpetrator than the former practice, in which suspects would line up and a trained police dog would first be exposed to a piece of evidence with the suspect’s odor on it and then sniff its way to the right person.

The best police dogs in Denmark, *group one dogs*, have been trained to locate a range of biological traces, including blood, semen, hair, saliva, and buried objects such as weapons and dead bodies. This means that the use of Danish police dogs has been re-invented as “*complex*” police dogs, meaning that an individual patrol dog has been taught several skills depending on the tasks that might develop during a patrol shift.

According to the chief and local dog patrol officers that I interviewed, this rapid development of police training methods and new areas for using dogs in police

work has only been possible because the school has provided a focal point for accumulated experiences and the development of training concepts.

The dog school provides a collective meeting-place ‘owned’ by the dogs, the dog patrol officers, the instructors, and their managers, who have all served as dog patrol officers themselves. The school has separate rooms for dogs and cops, and televisions have been removed from the cops’ quarters to encourage their participation in informal and creative social activities beyond the formally scheduled program.

According to the head of the school, the instructors, and the dog patrol officers I talked with, *‘play and experimenting’* are essential aspects of the innovative training programs and use of dogs that the dog school delivers. Instructors are called in from different parts of the country to run the courses. This means that different experiences and competencies may be tried out and used in training: *“In this way we depart from the original schedule, but the colleague has a clear goal in mind – he has an experience and a result he wants to share”*, the chief explains.

The dog service must continuously reinvent itself to keep up with developments in technology and investigation. The chief recognizes this and is careful not to *‘take over the staff’s ideas’* but support their experiments until they have been proven right or wrong. He continues:

*“Now, don’t get me wrong when I say that we are playing. Another word for what we are doing would be ‘development’. We don’t try out new stuff to be nice to the dogs or their owners. We have to be accountable for the amount of time and money we spend here. The reason we are privileged with this space for creativity is because my superior trusts what we are doing and that we have a goal in mind. We [the dog service] survive because of innovation. The dog service is driven by*

*enthusiasts that are very proud about what they accomplish. Imagine if a witness or another colleague from the police tells you: he ran that way! And then your dog can't trace the guy. Then they think 'what on earth is wrong with this dog or cop?' And sometimes the person ran a completely different way than the witness says. You are judged pretty hard. So you have to be proud and honest about your work".*

The dynamic synergies emphasized by the dog enthusiasts with whom I spoke, which make the dog school a powerful space for innovation share at least some of the characteristics that characterize other creative spheres and other forms of 'exploratoria' in the Danish police.

First, the dog school is a formally managed informal sphere, in the sense that the head of the school intentionally arranges for social get-togethers and experimental play during courses. The dog patrol officers develop tips and tricks - *tactics* in de Certeau's framing - in their daily experience of learning and using different police dog concepts, which they go on to bring into play together with their colleagues at the dog school.

In this way the dogs, the dog patrol officers, the instructors, the managers etc. all contribute their share to create a space for creativity and innovation - a tactical space and heterotopia (Hjorth 2005) within a formal, central and strategic framework. It is this dynamic that sometimes generates new training methods that are then added to the school's 'best practice' training portfolio.

Second, the dog school is managed as a sort of collective with a 'license' to experiment within a focused area and develop in-depth specialization.

Third, managers take a cautious and trusting approach to the innovative processes, perhaps because the head of the school 'got the vaccine' (see chapter 7) himself, since he worked as a dog patrol officer and thus

understands the details of the work and the limits and conditions for gray zone creativity. This means that the creative process of trial-and-error experimentation is acknowledged and supported rather than suppressed. It is a managerial 'nesting' approach (to use the police manager's metaphor cited earlier) to tactical innovation that gives the eggs the time and care to be hatched or rejected by those who bring their eggs to the nest, so to speak, rather than simply being chosen by managers who might appropriate them even before anyone can tell if they will prove to be fertile.

Further, since the instructors and dog patrol officers from across the country participate in the courses on a regular basis, the school provides both a physical and a virtual center for accumulating and sharing specialized knowledge and best practices. Dog patrol officers know where and whom to address in order to add to - or gain from - the newest trends in dog training. Training practices and other aspects of specialized knowledge are being disseminated from the dog school as a professional focal point for innovation. In this way new and continuously revised 'best practices' are coordinated across the country.

This should not be misunderstood as suggesting that the dog service in general is the 'perfect image' of the Danish police. As the head of the dog school indicates, the dog school, along with the task forces, is a privileged space in that it creates space for specialized knowledge within a certain area of policing. Once again, the union policy that none of its members should have better working conditions than the others plays a powerful role. For example, one criticism that the dog patrol officers face from other colleagues in the police is that they are spoiled because of the amount of time they train with their dogs to improve their skills.

Another common criticism is from patrol officers in the districts who complain that when the dog service is called in to assist on a job, they do not always ‘check the temperature’ of the situation with their other colleagues before they take action with their dogs.

Regardless of the criticisms or envy regarding the privileges accorded to the police dog patrol officers, their lack of coordination with other areas of policing, and sometimes firm approach, etc., the lesson we learn from the ways that police dog school is managed as a space for play, creativity, and innovation has to do with its heterotopian qualities.

In exploring heterotopias within a large organization, it may be fruitful to look at them not only as ephemeral relational spaces but also to consider their potential association with specific organizational *places*. This allows for the possibility of anchoring, sheltering and coordinating the local silent *gray zone* creativity as an intermediary space between the ‘side streets’ (tactical space) and ‘main streets’ (strategic place) of the police organization.

What this chapter generally proposes is that, in order to support innovation as it emerges from police officers’ everyday experience and experimentation, it may be constructive to consider the potential value of centralized process governance in the police that goes beyond command-and-control rationales. ‘Strategic places’ can also be managed in ways that create openings, shelter and resourceful qualification for locally emerging ‘tactical’ inventions. In this way, the proper use of central governance could give voice to the silent gray zone creativity emerging from the margin of discourse and existing ‘best practices,’ and thereby support innovation as it arises and takes form from the daily work within the police.



### Summary Part III:

In Part III we have seen in chapter 7 how ‘*working in the gray zones*’ is a culturally embedded expression used by police to describe indeterminate and improvisational aspects of their discretionary space. It refers to how frontline police officers often experience a need to depart from doing their work ‘by the book’ in order to respond to situations where black or white answers of how to respond do not seem to apply. Because of this ambiguity - the collapse of meaningful and available solutions at hand – police officers engage with what we can understand as creative tactics *within* the strategic order of the police system (de Certeau 1984). To police officers, gray zones are related to work on the street, i.e. how life *really* happens out there, while whatever is prescribed, documented and planned in the sphere of the bureaucratic office operates with clear distinctions between right and wrong, true or false, good and bad, etc.

As such, the gray zones in police work implies an inherent aspect of creativity, which police officers associate with *real* police officers doing *real* police work while responding to *real* problems out in the *real* world.

The phenomenon of gray zones shows us how creativity is an inherent aspect of police work. It is a space for maneuvering within a legal and ethical framework which you learn, partly at the police academy but to a larger extent from ‘getting the vaccine’, i.e. the experience you accumulate from working on the street, and getting your share of ‘*earfuls*’ from superiors and ‘the system’ over time. Gray zone creativity is something that police officers consider to be a great part of their work and identities, and it is not something they tend to associate with ‘innovation’ since this, according to them, belongs to the more rigid and *correct* managerial sphere of the office.

‘Masters’ of gray zones do, however, succeed in making gray zone agreements between the street and office in the sense that they know precisely how to operate across different cultural domains and where the invisible line is that one should not cross. The skillful art of moving into the gray zones without going too far is what constitutes the ‘don’t ask for permission but forgiveness’ sorts of gray zone agreements that enables police to respond quickly and creatively to certain precarious situations.

This indicates that gray zones and gray zone creativity in police work are tolerated (i.e. inevitable and functional to the system) to a certain extent but exist only with a reserved right of deniability on behalf of the political part of the organization. Gray zones are proper and crucial to police officers who work in the street but improper to custodians of *correct* formalities working in the office. In Part II we already saw enough of the power mechanisms of the police hierarchy to recognize the narrow ‘window of opportunity’ for frontline ideas to survive the selection mechanisms of the chain of command. Gray zone creativity adds to this picture of the silent (and silenced) frontline innovation by confirming the different rationalities between street and office.

In chapter 8 it was demonstrated how gray zone creativity also takes place within office as silent mobilization of new practices from within the police in the form of ‘temporary spaces created by the tactical user’ (Hjorth 2005, p. 392). Through informal and strategic networks, frustrated attempts to ‘wake up the system’ and force managers to relate to their suggestions, ‘hackings’ of existing solutions and compensating for potential areas of crime intervention that strategic performance objectives do not prioritize, police work around and invert formal power relations. This allows them to momentarily evade disciplinary selection mechanisms that, according to them, would otherwise kill their creative inventions.

Thus, in making space for creativity and invention within the highly self-disciplinary police system that tends to be overshadowed by managerial innovation as in new practices that meet political demands and expectations, police across ranks and function engage with gray zone tactics in the margins of their system. Experience, professional norms and ethics of autonomy contribute to self-regulatory gray zones indicating that they too are subjected to the disciplinary culture of control within police.

Chapter 9 shows how political/strategic managers in the police also establish certain units with the purpose of either supporting responsiveness to specific high-crime areas, as in the case of task forces, or to specialize or maintain competencies such as at the police dog school or the few local training units in the police districts. While the task forces differ from traditional ways of organizing police in that they are privileged in respect to budget, flexible working hours (at least when I visited), specialization etc., the training units are characterized more by serving others as they create privileged spaces or atmospheres that their colleagues can use.

In order to increase responsiveness the managers of these units recognize first, as their units are ‘excused’ from traditional hierarchical power relations they purposefully subvert these by ‘flattening’ their organization. They do so by democratizing the right to know and innovation no longer becomes a possession of managerial interests but oriented towards a shared goal. This is possible because it is a specific area or core task that is in focus for *both* managers and staff. In speeding up responsiveness, managers are more dependent on mobilizing an environment that accumulates specialized knowledge and staff’s action-oriented ideas.

What seems to be the most innovative aspect of the task forces is a matrix structure of management that emphasizes cross-disciplinary, synergetic collaboration creating more creative, in-depth task performance. In providing an informal, cross-disciplinary atmosphere, task forces break down physical and cultural barriers to efficient task performance by providing intimate and direct link between different competencies.

In respect of the local training units, however, another aspect of the street-rationality of everyday creativity/innovation is highlighted as a crucial aspect of *embodiment* of new practices. In order to really understand the physical world of policing, as in the example with lawyers who attend a course about guns, one must really *sense* it. And in order to coordinate, maintain and update competencies locally - also the kind of new concepts that are prescribed top-down - local training units provide spaces for 'serious play' that prepare colleagues for different potential challenges in their job. While the new aspects of courses, police tactics etc. that are invented in the local training units tend to stay local because there is no substantial formalized horizontal knowledge sharing network between other local (given that a police district even has a local training unit) or central training units, the police dog school has a different transversal reach. The dog school composes a 'street stage' where colleagues can bring their 'side-street' ideas and legitimately share and refine them with their colleagues *and* managers as a heterotopic, intermediating space between the 'side streets' (street-rationality) and 'main streets' (office/managerial-rationality) of the organization. As trainers are invited in from all over the country and the students - dog patrol officers together with their dogs - continuously attend courses at the school, they are provided an explorative space where they can share their own local experiences and tricks. This has resulted in innovative dog training programs and techniques that position

Danish police dogs among the best in the world. As such, Chapter 9 informs us that in order to shelter street-oriented everyday innovation and utilize its potential in a systematic and formalized way, the police organization advantageously create shelters, '*bubbles of air*' - or other spaces - within an organization that otherwise does not generally support that.

## **Part IV: Final reflections**

### **Chapter 10: Discussion**

To summarize briefly, this thesis has proposed that as a government goal manifested as managerial discourse and as a general strategic focus of the Danish police, innovation has to a considerable degree been stifled by disciplinary mechanisms within the police. Specifically, the police hierarchy relates to three worlds of innovation in that it segments the interests, privileges and ways of associating innovation with daily work into the top, middle and bottom levels of the hierarchy.

At the top of the hierarchy, concerns about legitimacy and correctness in the face of the need for politically justifying the role of police in society lead managers to create ‘nests’ for only some categories of innovation while suppressing others.

At the middle, managers deal with strategic goals but they ‘play it safe’ when implementing new top-down initiatives and choose selectively from the ideas proposed by their staff.

At the bottom of the hierarchy, innovation seems to have little meaning. Instead, police officers associate ‘real’ creativity with the work and significance of doing ‘real policing’. In order to make space for ‘real’ creativity, which otherwise tends to be suppressed by the disciplinary dynamics of hierarchy, they make use of and seek to expand *gray zones*.

In the *gray zones* of everyday police work, police officers make use of the autonomy that is inherently part of their discretionary, improvisational space and part of their daily work on the street.

They also employ creative tactics to expand their space for creativity. These include *informal networks*, *waking up the system*, *hacking* existing best practices, actively concealing solutions they have developed themselves from their superiors and quietly compensating for strategic blind spots.

There may be other kinds of organizational spaces that are formally prescribed as ways to ‘take bureaucracy “off the hook”’, as Lipksy (1969) expressed it, and create privileged conditions for focused, specialized performance. Within these spaces, traditional hierarchical command and control power is modified by ‘flatter’, democratizing management techniques. This happens when the managers responsible for the performance of the units and their support for the core tasks of policing in their area, recognize that by providing ‘shelter’ for and supporting frontline knowledge and experimentation with ‘*wild ideas*’ (i.e. gray zone creativity), they can encourage the creation of *other* innovation. “Other” innovation is associated with *real* frontline creativity that ‘undershirts’ discursively *correct* innovation as recognized within the ethos of the office. Police task forces, local training units and the dog school are examples of how formally prescribed units are tactically used as *heterotopias*, i.e. spaces for creativity/invention (Hjorth 2005).

Therefore, we support Hjorth’s observation that ‘creativity, play, and art are already there, at and in work’ but that ‘some aspects of innovative work are marginal’ (Hjorth 2005, p. 396) in his study of a managerial project to integrate creativity and artistic practices in a company through company-artist collaboration.

The marginal aspects of innovative police work arise from the ambiguity of the gray zones as a fundamental response to the conditions of policing. To the

frontline police officers, gray zones are associated with the everyday creativity they tactically use to maneuver within a grid of power relations, legal and ethical restrictions that discipline their practices. To managers working in the offices of the police, gray zones represent a dangerous opportunity for bad or useless autonomy and invention that must be ‘kept in the box’, i.e. suppressed.

In a critical discussion of how innovative practices play out in the Danish police, we begin by proposing the concept of the gray zone and gray zone creativity as informed by an interpretation of the police that is consistent with our analytical framework.

We continue with reflection on the semantic space between innovation as a managerial discourse and the everyday creativity of frontline policing. I argue that the phenomenon of police ‘*working in the gray zones*’ is an important reminder of an inherent but unarticulated dilemma of police having to act both as an instrument of government and as a creative/autonomous actor. I would propose to call this dilemma the *autonomy complex* of government institutions.

This dilemma brings up the question of how police construct the dichotomy between street and office. Informed by Weber, we can see differences in bureaucratic ethos and spheres as crucial aspects of responsible and democratic government. In this light, Weber’s idea of a heterogeneous bureaucracy which is supported and ‘thickly’ described in our observations in Part II, calls for a critical inquiry about how and why the actors in the field construct the office - street dichotomy. Rather than being a dichotomy of mutually exclusive rationales, the street – office distinction is a manifestation of the tensions that arise between multiple social worlds and interests in the police, which are all necessary for an auto-critical, legal-democratic government. That is, the complex of different



interests and responsibilities in contemporary policing are in conflict and their conflicts keep each other ‘in orbit’, so to speak, in a dynamic that balances government to be both responsive *and* responsible.

Based on these observations, the study problematizes a range of assumptions in the literature on innovation in government while also contributing the perspectives from scholarship on governmentality and the study of everyday life, associated with Michel Foucault and Michel de Certeau, respectively.

The study also has implications for future research and practice that will be discussed in concluding this chapter.

### **Gray zones as a concept**

Geertz reminded us that ethnographers ‘are reduced to insinuating theories because we lack power to state them’ (Geertz 2001, p. 71). Since cultural theory is reducible to the researcher’s interpretation rooted in thick descriptions ‘it is not its own master’ (Ibid.). Cultural theory should not be stated as self-referential but open up to multiple interpretations and not impose itself on matters that do not call for its explanatory potential.

With respect to these rules, what follows is an attempt to condense my observations and analysis of what the police describe as the *gray zones* in with their work and how they associate them with everyday creativity.

As suggested by this ethnography on innovation in the Danish police, creative *gray zones* arise as the outcome of different spheres of ethos that play out in the differential space between office and street.

Gray zones emerge as police officers are required - or feel called to - to take action in the midst of events for which black and white estimations of the situation and how to deal with it do not seem to apply.

To the individual police officer, the notion of '*working in the gray zone*' means a space for maneuvering or counterbalancing what police officers often experience as a simplistic and excessively restrictive framework for performing their job.

Policing becomes grayer with experience, since knowledge nuances the ways you relate to yourself and respond to your job and to the wide range of situations and people you encounter as a police officer. With experience, you learn when, if, and how law enforcement should be slackened or tightened.

Without a gray zone for slackening law enforcement it could turn into tyrannous harassment of good citizens. The context of a situation informs a police officer if a well-behaving young man who is pulled to the side of the road for speeding in his first and recently bought car, might better learn his lesson through a lecture from a well-meaning police authority than by a speeding ticket.


Conversely, gray zone practices also allow police officers to 'tighten the net' around offenders through the creative use of complex and indeterminately formulated laws and regulations. This makes it possible for police to outwit and dominate those who try to outwit them.

Therefore, working in the gray zones of law enforcement means that police bend or work around the restrictions imposed on them as a way to (re-)claim authority without transgressing the limits of what is legally, ethical and morally defensible, whether explicitly or implicitly.

Since the events that can occur in the colorful life of the street exceed our imagination, the notion of the gray zone is also a positive symbol of neutrality, for street-level functionaries are supposed to keep themselves at an emotional distance from those they serve, no matter if they are good or bad citizens. As such, *gray* serves to justify nuancing and variation of practices without justifying an excess of colorful (in the sense of unauthorized variation) or too dark (in the sense of illicit and unethical) responses.

With respect to the inherent risk that gray zone improvisation may turn too dark, we learned in chapter 8 how police officers internalize formal and informal codes of conduct that serve as a self-disciplinary ethic. This tells us that gray zones of policing symbolize the multiple potentials for action that arise from a *proper* space between discipline and autonomy.

The figure below illustrates that in the *correct* light of the office universe, policing is constructed as an unambiguous by-the-book enterprise and how, the closer police officials get to life as it *really* happens on the street, the ‘darker’ and more ambiguous the sphere of policing becomes. The dirty and ambiguous aspects of policing are filtered up through the ranks as cases, operational details and



decision-making is transferred from the street to the 24-hour report, from desk to desk, from police officer to legal processing, etc.

Whereas the illumination of the office constantly seeks ways to shed light on and control potentially dark aspects of policing (i.e. police officers who may violate their mandate) the action-oriented ‘dark’ sphere of the street conversely finds its way into the office, as we saw in Part III.

Gray zones are not necessarily creative per se, but they are police officers’ expression of those elements in their work life that *precede* and *spark* creativity. Gray zones express the ambiguity inherent in inadequate or conflicting representations of the world. Gray splits the categorical order of black and white at its seams and leaves an indeterminate space for opportunity. And creativity/invention may emerge from the gray zones as police officers find ways of compensating for their experience that there is no proper meaning or solution available to them at the moment.

So, whereas De Certeau explains creativity as a product of the dynamics between strategic place and a tactical space, the notion of gray zones offers an opening to the more detailed aspects of *why* the inhabitants or members of that place become creative and *how* they determine the limits that one should not cross. They bother to do so because they experience inconsistencies or inadequacies in how the office represents the street and in the disciplinary framework that is formally available for them to do a proper job. With respect to the existing order, gray zones emerge as a different but not opposing space for maneuvering. Thus, gray zones contribute to our understanding of what makes it possible for different rationales and cultures to coexist, an aspect that we will now explore further.

## **Gray zones and the semantic space between innovation and everyday creativity**

An obviously puzzling issue that emerges from our observations of how innovation plays out as managerial discourse in the everyday life of the Danish police is the pronounced discrepancy between the ways innovation is perceived across the layers of the hierarchy.

In discussing the semantic space between what varying spheres of interests, power, and practices, I have argued that the discursive strategy of innovation apparently fails to bridge or successfully traverse these different worlds or cultures of innovation.

Innovation ‘fails’ due to the institutionalized divergences of interests, privileges, practices and dilemmas surrounding creative autonomy within the police that innovation indirectly overrules, invalidates, or simply fails to address. Innovation is appropriated by the work sphere and rationale of the office and as a consequence, it loses its rationality for the work sphere of the street. Conversely, everyday creativity as it already takes place in the gray zones of the police is does not conform to the rationality of the office, and is seen as needing to be filtered and ‘cleansed’ through managerial select-and-control procedures, ‘*floskulators*’ (translators) etc.

There are two issues I find particularly relevant for discussion at this point with respect to the semantic space that is constructed between innovation as a discourse and innovation as everyday creativity in the police:

First, we must not forget that the police have grown into a contemporary instrument of government entrusted with a monopoly to protect and guard democratic and legal rights as well as the security, safety and order of the state and

its citizens. In exchange for this monopoly, the police is subject to what I call an ‘autonomy complex’, i.e. ongoing tension between the demands on police officers to think *out* of the box in order to prevent and fight crime while also keeping themselves and each other *within* the limits of what is legally, ethically, and morally acceptable.

Second, I suggest that we should regard the dichotomy that police construct between the ‘correctness’ of the office and the ‘realness’ of the street as not only a problem but also a positive phenomenon, and this also applies to the different ways that police relate to innovation. I would argue that this dichotomy arises as a tension between divergent interests from those of the police bureaucracy and it is thus a useful reminder of the complexity involved in maintaining a balance between responsive and responsible law enforcement.

### **The autonomy complex**

As implied in the notion of the police as ‘an extended arm of the state’, the police should not act independently of government in a legal-democratic society. As a guarantor of good order in society, the police is subject to the interests of that society and is not supposed to operate as an autonomous agent. To stay with the metaphor, any government ‘arm’ or instrument that begins to act in ways that are out of proportion with the societal body becomes abnormal. Such an ‘arm’ becomes a freak of government and hence a threat to the social order it has sworn to guard and protect.

This process is not altogether different from the ways that violators of the laws and regulations of society become constructed, marked, and punished as *criminals* (Foucault 1977).

The disciplinary apparatus that has been developed to keep this ‘arm’ of central government in place and to ensure that it is balanced and coordinated with the rest of the societal body actually argues *in favor of* the ‘straitjacket’ that hierarchy and bureaucracy impose on individual creative autonomy in the police.

Thus, the institution of the police can only justify itself so long as it explicitly remains subject to the condition that it operates on the basis of an *autonomy complex*. Here, the notion of *complex* should not be associated with psychodynamic unconscious repression, such as in Freud and Jung’s psychoanalysis. What I refer to as an autonomy complex is the ambiguous *complexity* of the police as a disciplinary instrument of government that detects, prevents and fights corrupted autonomy (crime) while at the same time being subject to similar internal disciplinary measures. Law enforcement is a snake biting its own tail, so to speak.

As they advocate for innovation as a discursive government program that calls for a higher degree of autonomy at all levels of public sector institutions, public innovation scholars and policymakers might do well to recognize why government institutions cannot and perhaps should not become just like private businesses, or at least not in all respects.

As we have seen, the police in Denmark have a rich and culturally embedded poetic language to express the ambiguities and challenges related to creative autonomy. For one thing, police have developed and institutionalized a large disciplinary body to tame *wild ideas* by keeping the *trolls in their box* and mark individuals whose gray zone activities become too dark as *rotten apples*, *bullies*, *crusaders*, etc. (see chapter 8). Along with the disciplinary managerial symbols of *cutthroats* and *dragons* (managers who spread omnipresent panoptic paranoia and

conformity down the ranks), such poetic language expresses the autonomy complex inherent in policing. These are tales, myths, and signs indicating the limits of gray zone enterprise. If you go past this zone, you turn dark and risk being corrupted by the crime on the street. You become a threat to the disciplined order of the police, a subcultural outcast - a marginal member of the culture - who needs to be kept 'inside your box' or 'put out in the cold' to cool down.

When innovation entered the world of the Danish police as a government objective, it became a novel managerial prerogative and something that now legitimately belongs to the manager's toolbox, something that can be planned. In their ownership of innovation, managers try to use it in ways that support their own rationales and concerns, including their cultural status in the hierarchy as an omnipotent disciplinary construct. Innovation ends up belonging to those who police from the office, not those who police the street.

In this way, innovation becomes distanced from the kind of innovation that frontline police officers would say has always emerged from the gray zones of policing for as long as the police have been an institutionalized authority of government (and perhaps even earlier). To frontline police officers, managerial 'nesting' initiatives that welcome ideas from their staff are all about political correctness and not about what they see as *real* policing.

"*We don't wanna set up for the kill*", Anthony Kiedis sings<sup>25</sup>, but this is exactly what frontline police officers think happens when managers apply their tools to 'harvest' ideas from their staff. They tame the '*wild ideas*' by inviting them into the light of the office, only to pick and choose among them – and exclude and kill the ideas that they do not favor.

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<sup>25</sup> Lead singer in the band Red Hot Chilli Peppers. The song, 'Hey', is from the album Stadium Arcadium.



This is not to say that the frontline staff never has any bad ideas. But as we saw in chapter 9, some managers succeed in creating a space and climate – a shelter – for everyday creativity, and to see how well new ideas can fare with the support of peers, managers, and trial-and-error testing.

What can this teach advocates of entrepreneurial government? In other words, how does innovation measure up against the disciplinary apparatus of the police hierarchy and bureaucracy - the *Monty Python nut case factory* as a Danish police officer ironically commented in chapter 2 - for whom the noble task is to ensure, enforce, and justify the police as a well-proportioned and coordinated extended arm of government?

Given the premise that today's Danish society is founded on democratic and legal principles, Foucault's reflection that the institution of police is 'simply an instrument by which one prevents the occurrence of certain disorders' (Foucault 1978c, p. 354, see also chapter 1) may seem a bit harsh. What Foucault omits here, perhaps due to his macro-descriptions of the workings of micro-power, are those additional measures that subject every individual working in the police to the same premise engendered the police institution: the omnipresence of a panoptic apparatus that continuously invents new techniques for taming and disciplining police from within.

Given our observation of the subtle workings of the police hierarchy and bureaucracy to fence in, filter, and in other ways discipline creative autonomy emerging within the police, we may in fact appreciate these mechanisms. As Byrkjeflot & du Gay (2012) write: 'bureaucracy is expert authority since civil servants are selected on the basis of their professional, impartial and non-partisan

knowledge. It follows from this that bureaucracy is not just an instrument, but also an institution ‘with a *raison d’être* of its own’ (Ibid., p. 94)

The authors further argue that the political demands of *responsive* government should not override the management and practice of *responsible* government. According to these authors, the costs incurred when government works around hierarchical and bureaucratic principles and procedures are high.

Were there not such essential democratic arrangements as bureaucratic procedures for careful documentation (i.e. keeping records and taking minutes so that decisions and decision processes are made clear), legal investigation, evaluation of government initiatives and practices, and the neutrality of state representatives, government institutions would risk becoming too laid back and unpredictable, unaccountable, corrupt, and uncoordinated (Ibid., see also du Gay 2000).

The authors specifically argue, with reference to certain unfortunate manifestations of entrepreneurial government in the UK, that the political pursuit of flexibility, ‘deliveries’, and the abandonment of hierarchical management and bureaucratic standards and procedures have proved to have serious consequences and have resulted in an inconsistent and nontransparent ‘fog of government’ (Byrkjeflot & du Gay 2012, p. 99). With reformers eager to reinvent government and institutional expectations to meet the needs of reform, the authors argue that the comprehensive flux of political initiative leaves a vacuum – a loss of ‘institutional memory’ that ‘modernising norms and techniques of conduct organizes out of existence’ (Ibid., p. 105).

The hierarchical and bureaucratic *Monty Python nut case factory* of the police is set up to control police autonomy. Considering the implications of what our society would be like were the disciplinary body of government *not* also self-

disciplinary, disciplinary power may not be as depressing an idea as Foucault tended to claim.

Entrepreneurial governance and New Public Management – with the creative autonomy and anti-bureaucratic spirit they entail – tend to overlook a bureaucratic ethos that, in fact, anchors institutional practices and memory on constitutional ground.

On the other hand, the disciplinary apparatus set up to ensure responsible and transparent policing, e.g. the hierarchy and bureaucracy casts a shadow, ironically enough, in the form of the gray zones that persistently lurk within any formalized order that presumes to split the world into black or white .

In this study we have seen how the strategic call for innovation from all levels of the police organization is muted at the same time by the hierarchical and cultural privilege accorded to top managers to *know* and to *know best*. While it may be true that the further up the ranks they rise, the greater the complexity of the problems managers must confront (Jaques 1990), the issue here seems actually to be an under-appreciation of the complexity of police work at the street level. Complexity takes on *different* forms at different layers of the police hierarchy. As one moves upwards, a manager's vision of work on the street becomes more obscure and needs to be reduced into simplistic, manageable boxes. What becomes black-boxed or filtered on the way to the office and the top of the hierarchy includes sensitivity and intimate knowledge of what is really happening in the local community. The loss also includes the more pragmatic, perceptual, and experience-based aspects of police knowledge and experience. In this way, hierarchy privileges some types of concerns, knowledge, complexity, and initiative while silencing others.

However, we have also seen that gray zones and gray zone creativity are highly persistent. That is, gray zone creativity may be silenced but in its silence, it continues to exist. Therefore, gray zone practices may take the form of a *hidden transcript* of the police, a term proposed by the anthropologist James C. Scott to characterize the ‘discourses that take place “off stage”, beyond direct observation by powerholders’ (Scott 1990, p. 4). In those instances when the public transcript of innovation, as owned by managers, fails to take into account the frontline view, gray zone inventions are likely to be kept quiet. As Scott writes: ‘the hidden transcript is produced for a different audience and under different constraints of power than the public transcript’ (Ibid., p. 5).

In the case of policing, this adds another, potentially less desirable, layer to de Certeau’s marginal tactics because tactics are actively hidden from strategic place as police officers claim their own tactical space. Thus, gray zone practices may actually contribute to the ‘fog of government’ that Byrkjeflot & du Gay draw our attention to.

What Jaques (1990), du Gay (2000), and Byrkjeflot & du Gay (2012) leave out in their praise of hierarchy and bureaucracy are more specific suggestions about the openings or possibilities for self-referential and self-affirming *responsible* government to be innovative and *responsive*.

This study suggests that, in the case of the police, such openings emerge as gray zones and gray zone creativity. When recognized and affirmed by management gray zone creativity become a critical for experience-based knowledge about advancements in crime as it *really* unfolds and is communicated by frontline staff. In any case, both underestimating the dynamics of the autonomy complex and managerial denial of gray zone aspects of policing are undesirable, given the

persistence of ‘gray’ practices and the risk that they can turn too ‘dark’ or lurk under the managerial radar as hidden transcripts.

Thus, gray zone enterprise is an important and insufficiently discussed phenomenon in policing (and may also inform similar mechanisms in other settings) because it sets the stage for further debates about *responsible responsiveness* for government.

To briefly conclude my discussion about the issue of different approaches to innovation in the police, I will argue that such variation is an expression of cultural diversity that is essential for auto-critical and self-disciplinary government.

## **Variation in the service of democratic government**

As already noted, the dichotomy between street and office is produced by the tensions between different bureaucratic spheres, each with its own ethos as shown in Part II. We also saw that the competing discourses of *correct* innovation and *real* creativity are linked to different social worlds, as they are produced by the police hierarchy and result in different concerns, privileges and practices with respect to innovation.

This section will discuss the potential for complementary and mutually disciplining bureaucratic rationales to further nuance the office-street dichotomy around the dominant and silent discourses of innovation in the police.

We should begin by noting that there is a more general debate in academia about how to define creativity and innovation. To avoid having this discussion be taken

over by *etic* debate we will only look briefly into that debate as it relates to innovation in government.

In the academic literature, creativity is typically seen as more elusive and less tangible than innovation, as it seeks to describe how people ideate and solve problems, while innovation often refers to more concrete things that can actually be put to use. Therefore, innovation is typically seen as more interesting and relevant for organizations than creativity.

Consider this example of a definition of innovation: ‘an *intentional and proactive process that involves the generation and practical adoption and spread of new and creative ideas, which aim to produce a qualitative change in a specific context*’ (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011, p. 8, italics in original). Innovation, then, is what public organizations need to strive for, because creativity as such is ‘just’ about ideas that do not, in themselves, make desirable change happen. Moore et al, state that “*Those changes worth recognizing as innovation should be...new to the organization, be large enough, general enough and durable enough to appreciably affect the operations or character of the organization* (Ibid., 1997, p. 276).

The way that the police distinguish between creativity and innovation is different, at least from the point of view of frontline police officers, for they are less concerned about newness, power of abstraction and generalizability and more interested in concreteness and utility. On the other hand, managers and lawyers are more concerned with justifying the utilitarian value of innovation, such as legal, political, strategic, ethical, and financial aspects.

These different priorities regarding the correctness and utility of new solutions in policing can be mutually beneficial. For example, Barinaga (2010) points out that

dichotomies, rather than being solely problematic, can also be seen as generative: ‘In stark contrast to what might intuitively be assumed, the components of a categorical pair do not describe two separate realities but one and the very same. Dichotomies characterise what is proper, but also what is improper. They demarcate a “we” through what “they” are not and a “they” through what “we” are not. The two sides of a categorical boundary acquire their meaning in relation (a relation of contrast) to each other. They help us experience and describe the world based on contrasts, and installing dichotomies is therefore a useful technique to any effort of defining anew a particular reality’ (Ibid., p. 181).

From this perspective, dichotomies in organizational life can be understood as manifestations of how individuals construct their identities, ethics and responsibilities differently but in relation to each other, because they are subject to different cultural orders within a larger cultural frame of reference. Such diversity and the resulting tensions activate auto-critical bureaucracies and spur internal and external debate about the role and behavior of government that is critical for democratic governance (Sunay 2012). The different cultural spheres in the police keep an eye on each other, and we have seen in Part III that some individuals are more successful than others in earning membership and maneuvering across different cultural domains when it comes to tactical creativity.

Drawing on Du Gay’s rereading of Max Weber (du Gay 2000) we may augment our understanding of the dynamics of the ethos-related dichotomy in the police by suggesting that it is an expression of different ‘life orders’ of bureaucracy (in Weber’s term *Lebensordnungen*), i.e. how professional life is ordered within distinct and individualized ethical concerns and dignities (Ibid.). The distinct ‘life orders’ of bureaucracy become evident in the different ways bureaucrats ‘attend to the practical techniques or tools for living a given ‘conduct of life’

(*Lebensführung*)’ (du Gay 2000, p. 9 with reference to Weber). The crucial point here is that heterogeneous ‘value systems’ (again with reference to Weber) guard and enforce different ethical spheres of moral life that are complementary. The differences and conflicts they give rise to should therefore be seen as valuable aspects of democratic life (Ibid.).

In this regard, Byrkjeflot & du Gay (2012, p. 101) emphasize that ‘it is not necessary to make a fetish of role-demarcation in government, to know that different actors in the governmental machine have different purposes, related to their ‘official’ position and ‘core tasks’, and a somewhat contrasting set of ethics framing their conduct, and for very sound practical reasons’. In his re-reading of Weber, however, du Gay (2000) treated the value of the different spheres of bureaucracy:

‘For Weber... ethical interests and capacities are not the expression of a universal moral personality; rather, they are the plural creation of historically specific ethics or *Lebensführungen*. The ends of value-rational action are therefore multiple and specific to particular spheres of life...’ (Ibid., p. 31).

As we saw in Part II, frontline police officers construct their *real police* identities up against the *correctness* of the office to justify and reserve their privilege to act in accordance with experience-based knowledge and respond to *real* aspects of crime. Here, the dichotomy serves the reality of lower ranking and frontline police officers in that it justifies the inevitable *gray zones* of creativity they require in their daily work, as demonstrated in Part III. In their view, the system needs a little shove, some subterfuge, and autonomous action in order to respond to life as it happens on the street.



Middle managers (at least those who have not benefited from the *gray zone vaccine* as described by the commanding officer in Chapter 7) construct and justify the need to weed out some ideas and adopt other as their own by invoking the need to “tame” individual involvement with unauthorized practices. From the perspective of the proud guardians and protectors of the constitutional aspects of bureaucratic office, e.g. legal rights, equality in service, democratic freedoms, and autonomous aspects of policing must be kept on a short leash.

Each of these alternate perspectives, or ‘life worlds’, exists because of the other, creating a dynamic push-and-pull relationship, a kind of orbit, without which the police - as the extended arm of government - would be amorphous.

## **Contribution to the literature**

I will now discuss and position the contribution of the study to the prevailing assumptions about innovation in government as it has been inspired by the selected theoretical framework of Foucault and de Certeau.

## **The study of everyday innovation**

In chapter 1 we saw how *police* both refers to a foucauldian notion of governmentality - a particular way to conduct the conduct of subjects – while also referring to the modern institution of police as it has specifically emerged in Denmark. This multifaceted meaning of *police* served as a brief reminder that police, as we know it today, carries with it a rich history - a cultural embeddedness - that admittedly deserves a study on its own to fully grasp the implications of history on today’s practices of policing. Nonetheless, in reminding ourselves that

the organizational settings we study are deeply situated in history helps us draw specific contours and unique features of what constitutes a given cultural sphere. In other ways, recognizing the institution of the Danish police as a product of society is helpful in exploring ‘society within’ the police.

As an alternative approach to studying the role of government institutions in contemporary society, this thesis suggests the value of ethnographic, dense descriptions of *present* and very specific practices of the police. This brings out insights of the kinds of subtle dynamics and dilemmas that governing, in this case policing, constitutes as everyday practices expressed as fragmented bureaucratic *ethoi* through local symbolic language.

Further, as Scott (1990) points out, ‘any analysis based exclusively on the public transcript is likely to conclude that subordinate groups endorse the terms of their subordination and are willing, even enthusiastic, partners in their subordination’ (Ibid., p. 4). Had I engaged with the managerial discourse of innovation solely as a ‘public transcript’, i.e. on its own premises, and not sought out what plays out in its shadow, this thesis would probably have failed to recognize the paradoxical effect of this discourse. That is, I would not have recognized the kind of creativity/invention it excludes. When managers take ownership of innovation as ‘strategic’ they tighten an already existing grid of highly selective, conforming, and self-affirming managerial technologies. It is because of this phenomenon that managerial ‘nesting’ for innovation further reinforces the barrier between managerial control and frontline creativity, what police – including the national commissioner – recognize as the *concrete layer*, *Rockwool layer* or the *middle management wall*. The frontline police officers do not and cannot subject themselves to this premise as their daily work is interwoven with ambiguous gray zones and the need to act, improvise and invent new solutions here and now.

In this process it has proved helpful to read Foucault together with other theorists, primarily de Certeau. By doing so, we have been able look beyond what Baudrillard called the tautological circle represented by the paramount tension between power and freedom as the hearth for creativity in Foucault's writing. Informed by de Certeau and by using the street metaphor as a method for engaging police officers in unconventional debates about innovation and creativity in their work, we have lent voice to those improvisational and experimental tactics through which police make use of and expand ambiguous and indeterminate marginal spaces for creativity.

From this kaleidoscopic twist, the idea of *gray zone* creativity as the key to a 'thickened'/ more dense understanding of creativity and innovation in the police contribute to Foucault-inspired studies of the intricate relation between the ways that government institutions govern and are governed as well as the complex coexistence of different discourses on innovation.

Conversely, it has also been helpful to read de Certeau together with Foucault in that his conceptual framework for disciplinary power mechanisms, including the subtle workings of discourse, feed into a deeper understanding of de Certeau's notion of 'strategic place'. De Certeau has been criticized for underestimating the role of power. What this study shows is how crucial it is to recognize and understand the micro-power of the formal system in the police to contextualize *what* it is that police officers try to circumvent and invert with their everyday gray zone tactics. In fact, tactical spaces for creativity/invention can also be an act of power – of the claiming of space – to serve and justify street-rationality.

In investigating how innovation as a managerial discourse guide managers to focus on ideas and solutions that need to ring a bell in the official political agenda

of the police we see how managerial endorsed innovation silences creativeness/inventiveness that managers do not recognize or understand as part of ‘*strategic innovation*’.

Police officers’ own term, gray zones, offered a crucial opening for moving closer to innovation – or creativity – that emerges from their everyday work beyond what managers recognize as innovation. As an *emic* concept, gray zones informs us about *how* police can possibly work tactically without violating their mandate.

The culturally embedded poetical concept of gray zone is a powerful illustration of the ethical aspects of tactical spaces for creativity/invention within a system that, as in the case of the police, is guided and guarded by very a very specific disciplinary framework and ethos.

Gray zones are also a poetical metaphor for potentiality, i.e. from where creation emerges in the everyday life of the police as a tactical move to deal with ambiguity in life. ‘All opportunities have a genesis: the processes of preparing, arranging, trying out, and relating, which place you in a position where you can transform occasions into opportunities and opportunities into actualities’, Hjorth (2005, p. 387) writes. Police officers’ stories of how they work in the gray zones are illustrations of the very specific ways in which they engage with creating opportunities in their work in ways that are still legally, ethical and morally defensible even though they deviate from standard procedures and norms.

As such, the experiment of this thesis has not been for me to poeticize as a researcher but to identify the poetics already in use by those whose everyday lives we study.

## **Innovation in government revisited**

In chapter 1 we drew a connection between innovation as an aim of government and reformists' as well as scholarly pursuits to conceive of government more like private business.

Somewhat compressed, the rationale is that in order to become more efficient government must become more innovative. For government to become more innovative, public institutions must cut down their bureaucratic, overgrown jungle of rules and rigid bureaucratic-hierarchical processes. Public organizations should have an increased focus on results rather than getting stuck in procedures (e.g. Osborne & Gaebler 1992).

By lending voice to gray zone creativity in the police and exploring what this 'underbrush' of creativity means to the police as a government institution, this study join in with scholars who argue for a more nuanced approach to entrepreneurial government (e.g. du Gay 2000; Byrkjeflot & du Gay 2012; Kovalainen & Sundin 2012). The study also challenges how innovation tends to be dominantly constructed in the literature and government strategies as large-scale, managerial and radical improvements.

First, ambitions of government to become more entrepreneurial and efficient, and the literature on innovation in the public sector supporting that, seem to overlook the role of *disciplined* innovation in government. Since government institutions are entrusted with very specific mandates and responsibilities that their different professional disciplines have been developed to serve and protect, innovation within government must subjected to the premises by which they justify themselves.

In acknowledging these undisputable premises, the different rationales and the ambiguous gray zones involved with innovating government (police) practices, it becomes possible for government to be responsible *and* responsive in one and the same movement.

Second, in exploring innovation that emerges from its own shadow, that is, innovation that falls outside of how we construct it as a dominant discourse, what this study suggests is to pay attention to the different semantic of innovation as practice. As such, we have seen how innovation on one side comprises big capital-I Innovation, i.e. large scale new solutions and programs of government that have strategic impact in society; on the other side we have seen lower case-i innovation, signaling 1) its humble position in the margins of how we ‘discourse about’ innovation, 2) a multiplicity of settings to which different innovative solutions apply and have different meanings and 3) an infant idea in process, emerging from the marginal *gray zone* of existing order, rather than a ‘shop and go’ solution.

Examining what police themselves associate with creative practices suggests that we expand our understanding of what public sector innovation is, or might be. It is *also* small-scale and localized changes in practice and ‘hacks’ to material and technology, that are developed by police officers themselves and with their professional communities, not for purpose of legitimacy or efficiency (which are managerial norms) but based on professional norms of protecting citizens and colleagues. This is a form of innovation in which formalized management practices play a very limited role, except as obstacles who also do not seem to recognize this type of innovation. Where police officers are embedded in the world of professional practices, managers are embedded in the world of discourse, where innovation is something very different from what police officers understand to be creative.

There is a good reason for why this type of innovation is not included in the conventional discursive construction of public innovation, that tends to prioritize capital-I innovation: because of the disciplinary regimes that are embedded in police hierarchy, this type of innovation is *actively hidden* by police officers and not revealed to managers or researchers who only ‘pass through’ police practices. Rather than in managerial spaces, police innovation happens in gray zones.

However, when lower-case innovations such as those developed by police officers themselves are omitted from our understanding of innovation, organizations seeking to be more innovative end up also disregarding a considerable innovative capacity that might contribute to improving public core services in ways that capital-I innovation do not take into consideration.

A better understand of this form of lower-case innovation in government calls for a very different empirical approach. Rather than basing our inquiries on distant and a priori *etic* categories, we need to engage closely with the *emic* culturally embedded meanings that are ascribed to practices in the organizations in which we study.

## **Chapter 11: Conclusion**

This research took off as an explorative study of innovation in the Danish police at the same time as the police and the prosecution launched a joint strategy that put innovation at the top of their policy agenda. I soon realized, however, that it made little sense to investigate innovation through an *etic* approach, i.e. as a universally applicable concept defined outside the cultural sphere of the police. The individuals in the police force with whom I spoke related to innovation in radically different ways. Within a short time of beginning my employment in the police, I

also learned that innovation was associated with a number of tensions and reservations within the organization.

Encouraged by the complementary theoretical frameworks of Michel Foucault and Michel de Certeau, I directed my research strategy toward a more nuanced and close engagement with innovation and creativity as manifested in the everyday life of the police.

The thesis is based on 18 months of empirical field work from June 2011 to January 2013 in which period I was employed as a PhD student in the National Police in Denmark and could engage with people working in different work settings, locations and at different hierarchical levels in the organization. The empirical material also includes nearly 60 interviews with individuals and groups of various ranks.

In summary, the thesis shows that innovation in the police is constructed in at least three important ways. At the top of the hierarchy, innovation is driven by a concern to legitimize the police as efficient and responsible, which means that certain techniques are mobilized to make innovation manageable. At the middle, innovation is a matter of translation and selection: translating top-down agendas into local initiatives and selecting amongst bottom-up solutions. At the bottom, innovation as a term carries little meaning, even though rank and file police officers see creativity as an inherent part of their work, closely connected to doing 'real' policing. Because of this disparity in understanding, individuals across the police organization make use of 'gray zones' to find a space for creative work. Gray zones are a phenomenon that police officers consistently experience in their work, which they make use of in order to feel that they are responsive to new challenges. Gray zones are also actively created as police officers attempt to find



ways to be creative. Moreover, in some cases, gray zones appear to have become institutionalized, for parts of the formal organization have attributes resembling those of gray zones.

The study has been informed by the works of Michel Foucault in several respects.

First, Foucault describes a genealogy of political scientific texts dating back to 16<sup>th</sup> century Europe to suggest that the ‘art of government’ is ‘intervention in the field of economy and population’, thereby reminding us that government is itself a historical construct. The subsequent development of the administrative state, the continuously changing complex of knowledge, rationales that comprise the state apparatuses and their techniques of power all come together in Foucault’s conceptualization of *governmentality* (Ibid.). This informs us how the broadest notion of the ‘police’ was first manifested as a renaissance quest for peaceful coexistence and good order of the growing population. Over time, as different governmentalities have intensified and multiplied their techniques of power, *police* has changed its meaning and function until the present day institution of police. In Denmark, the police have become a state institution with a very specific mandate and organization, along with an increasingly complex set of responsibilities, tasks, and inherent conflicts.

This glimpse into the history lends important insight into at least some of the compositional aspects of the contemporary Danish police as a disciplinary instrument of the state, which itself is disciplined through the production of a legal, hierarchical, and bureaucratic administrative body to ensure that police officials do not exceed their mandate.

Second, besides providing a framework for understanding government *as* innovation, Foucault also offered an understanding of innovation *in* government.

Approaching innovation as a *dominant discourse* that has colonized Western government at the time of this writing, we can nuance our *etic* understanding of innovation as representing an indirect political objective of making government more like a private business. That is, in order to meet a complex set of societal challenges, policy makers and scholars generally seem to assume that public organizations need to be more efficient, effective, accountable and entrepreneurial down to the sphere of each individual within the institutional apparatus of government.

The Foucauldian frameworks come together in the empirical analysis that guides Part II in addressing our interest in *how innovation, as an aim of government and managerial discourse, plays out in the everyday setting of the police.*

What became apparent to me from my involvement with different cultural spheres in the police was how the disciplinary mechanisms of the police hierarchy produce three different worlds of policing with respect to different priorities, privileges and practices, depending on whether innovation is viewed from the top, the middle, or the bottom of the hierarchy.

In the aftermath of a comprehensive police reform in 2007, the top managers became preoccupied with meeting a list of political demands and expectations to make the police more effective, efficient, and accountable. Thus, top managers primarily regard innovation in terms of organizational restructuring and managerial techniques that will serve them in meeting primarily politico-economic goals. And as a result of their privileged decision-making status as the ones who *know* and *know best*, top police managers often pursue a ‘nesting’ approach to innovation. That is, they apply managerial techniques that enable top-down control of creativity; for example, through different adaptations of the traditional

‘suggestion box’ where the staff can post ideas for improvements. But since managers primarily favor those ideas that save resources in the short run, other types of suggestions of functional relevance to the frontline police officers - such as new investments in technological equipment (devices), uniform pieces, new police practices, etc. have lower priority, and after a while, the frustrated police officers stop posting new ideas.

Middle managers primarily deal with innovation in the form of top-down initiatives that are supposed to be implemented, such as performance management, and ‘massaged’ into the daily practices of the staff. At the middle strata of the police hierarchy, much effort goes into translating or adapting top-down initiatives to practices that make sense locally. Middle managers would point to such adaptations as examples of practices they associate with innovation in their daily work.

Given their position in the hierarchy, middle managers are responsible for *selecting* the kinds of initiatives they pass along to their superiors and subordinates and engage with. However, the general impact of the police hierarchy subtly instills a panoptic paranoia down the ranks. Career incentives and other disciplinary techniques lead middle managers to loyally comply with strategic interests.

Middle managers do not necessarily have access to the strategic knowledge that feed into top managerial decisions and perspectives. As a result, they are left with a considerable amount of uncertainty when it comes to guessing what might be expected of them with respect to innovation happening within their own context.

Partly due to such uncertainty, middle managers primarily employ a strategy to ‘play it safe’ and avoid running the risk of looking bad up the ranks. Therefore, at

the middle layers of the hierarchy, managers are generally reluctant to engage with creative suggestions from their staff that might be regarded by their superiors as 'wild ideas' (i.e. implausible suggestions). It is also unclear where to send bottom-up ideas in the large police organization. As a result, many of the ideas that emerge from the daily experiences of creative frontline police officers are put on stand-by, rejected, taken over, or changed up through the ranks by people who do not share the same needs and experience as those who came up with the ideas.

For those working at the bottom of the hierarchy, innovation is considered to be a '*hurrah word of management*' and consultants. Given the direct exposure of frontline staff to (criminal) life as it happens out on the street, the *correctness* of managerial rhetoric and intent is of little value unless it results in concrete, new *real* changes that make a concrete difference to the police in their daily work.

When term innovation is presented to those at the bottom of the hierarchy, it appears that it founders in the cultural divide between the 'real cops' doing 'real police work' and the world of *correct* work in the office.

The existence of this divide is recognized in the international literature on police as a conflict between frontline staff and their managers, and while such conflicts likely exist in most organizations, they are particularly profound in police organizations. One explanation for this conflict has been the suggestion that managers work under more privileged conditions as they are spared from the 'dirty' hassle and dilemmas involved with working on the street. But from a Foucauldian perspective, when analyzing how *real* police identity is constructed in opposition to that of political *correct* managers we also realize that this conflict allows frontline police officer to claim a space of power. That is, at the bottom of the hierarchy, individuals may not be in the position to know best (make

decisions) or to pick the tasks they want to perform. But they do have the privilege to act. This power to *do* is reinforced by the action-oriented work of policing that is informed by experience rather than abstracted reflections about the work being done.

While frontline police officers tend to reject innovation as merely being *correct* managerial rhetoric, they responded with much greater enthusiasm to my interest in the sorts of creative solutions they came up with in their work. Frontline police officers refer to everyday creative practices as *duct tape* and *kitchen table solutions*, i.e. various concrete solutions to a specific problem or opportunity they encounter in their work. These solutions are developed and used by police officers primarily for their own purposes and are rarely shared or developed further, because these ideas emerge from other priorities than those of managers, legal experts, or others in the organization who have the prerogative to take the ideas further.

In returning to the research question of how innovation, as an aim of government and managerial discourse, plays out in the everyday setting of the police, our finding may be formulated succinctly. From our observations of the initial colonizing attempts of its discursive agenda, innovation is primarily used by top and middle managers as a way to describe and justify their managerial techniques and privileges. These techniques work to the benefit of political demands and expectations for a more effective, efficient, and accountable police force, at least from a managerial point of view. With respect to the aim of furthering personal autonomy, the innovation discourse primarily results in purely cosmetic attempts to welcome the ideas of lower ranking staff, but the police hierarchy is fully constituted to limit, filter, and assimilate individual creative autonomy.

The segmented view of innovation by individuals at the top, middle and bottom of the hierarchy is produced by mechanisms of disciplinary power, and it becomes apparent that the tensions arising between priorities and privileges of the top versus the bottom also result in a semantic gap. What is created is, in fact, a dichotomy between management's *correct* innovation and *real* creativity as it constructed among frontline police officers.

This dichotomy also helps to answer the second research question, namely: *how does innovation measure up against the sorts of practices already being carried out by police officers that they associate with creativity?*

What we learn from the dynamic just presented is that the innovation discourse affirms and even reinforces conflicting priorities and domains of power between frontline police officers (street) and managers (office). This dynamic silences creative suggestions emerging from the bottom of the hierarchy that are not recognized as important or of much potential by other organizational spheres in the police. However, there is a long tradition of managerial disciplining of creativity in the police along with an ingrained body of managerial and cultural mechanisms for doing so. For this reason, the notion of innovation promulgated by the managerial sphere seems to outweigh the sort of creative practices that police officers are already engaging with in their daily work, which are not acknowledged as 'innovation'.

The Foucauldian framework serves our analysis of why and how innovation 'acts' on the individuals in the police through subtle discursive technologies of power, such as the managerial ownership of innovation. However, this framework does not offer an adequate approach to enable a deeper understanding of the multiple

cultural spheres in the police with respect to the persistency of concrete creative practices that are *other* to the dominant discourse of innovation.

Foucault has been criticized for putting too much emphasis on the dynamics of dominant power and acts of resistance in his work, a criticism he may have acknowledged himself, and for this reason, we sought out an alternative path to understanding creativity and innovation within the existing social order, which we found in the theoretical writings of Michel de Certeau.

In proposing his theory of everyday practice (de Certeau 1984) de Certeau suggested that we explore the processes by which variation is created when people actually make use of the ways that social discourse prescribes that they act within a given social system of reference. Through the use of creative *tactics*, people make space for other practices that are not necessarily acts of resistance in face of dominant or conventional social order (what he named *strategic place*) but are rather to be seen as an ‘art of the weak’. That is, new practices and knowledge emerge from the humble margins of the existing and dominant order of things. These practices quietly act on the system of order from within by expanding the space for tolerance and acceptance of these new ways of doing things.

As an illustration, de Certeau described a walk he took in New York City to demonstrate how pedestrians make creative use of strategically designed places. The city metaphor proved to be very useful in my interviews and conversations with police officers as an alternative way to refer to innovative life in the police organization beyond what is strategically conceived as innovation.

Thus, de Certeau’s theoretical framework helped guide the attention and approach of this study toward a deeper understanding of the ways that everyday creative

practices may play out silently in the margins of what is discursively understood as innovation in government.

The aim of the study to move closer to how creativity occurs in the police organization was further supplemented by an ethnographic approach. Contemporary ethnography builds on a rich body of experience with respect to the theoretical approaches for the researcher to continuously engage with the field and generate an ethnographic text about what happens in ways that include the interpretations of the 'cultural other'. In particular, the objective of bringing thorough contextual and detailed accounts, i.e. *thick descriptions* (Geertz 2001) out of the field together with an *impressionist* style of writing have informed this ethnography. These ethnographic approaches are in line with de Certeau's insistence on the culturally fragmented aspects of everyday life, but offer entry points to interpretive aspects of diversity as well. With respect to the latter, I continuously exposed the analytical interpretations of what was presented to me in the field to a process of member checking (Emerson & Pollner 1988), in which I would invite different actors in the police to contribute their view on specific matters.

Further, in our attempt to lend voice to the creativity that arises from everyday work in the police we notice that police officers have developed a culturally embedded poetical language that expresses the subtle challenges and opportunities they face when trying to innovate from within the organization. In Part III we investigated police officers' descriptions of '*working in the gray zones*'. This inquiry provides a more profound answer for the final research question, namely *what can we learn about how the tension between strategic discourse and everyday practices creates precedents for some new practices while silencing others*.



The study answers this question by suggesting that the kind of creativity/invention that emerges from the ambiguity or inadequacy of authorized solutions - but does not find managerial support due to the interests and rationales of office - tends to be silenced by the strategic discourse of innovation.

We showed that the ways that police use the gray zones in their discretionary space for improvisation and creativity/invention are an inevitable part of police officers' daily job. Gray zones and creative gray zone practices are the epitome of responsive policing informed by the 'street-rationale,' where '*doing it real*' sometimes trumps concern about '*doing it correctly*' without violating general legal and ethical frameworks. Therefore, gray zones symbolize an ambiguity of the life of police officers created by inconsistencies or inadequacies in how the office represents life on the street and in the disciplinary framework that is formally available for them to do a proper job out on the street. Because of their responsive potential, creative gray zone practices are tolerated and forgiven by office/managers to a certain extent, in the form of a tacit (gray zone) compromise between the rationales of the street and the office.

We also showed how police officers' notion of gray zones extends into the organizational sphere of the office, deliberately making space for creativity within a top-down disciplinary and highly conforming system. By forming *informal* and *strategic* networks, police across ranks circumvent the system and turn power mechanisms upside down to speed up the processing of innovative suggestions. For police officers who do find that the back-channels do not work efficiently to serve their purpose or who do not know how to navigate them they may take the risk of simply '*waking up*' the formal system by disseminating their suggestions and solutions through official e-mailing lists or in other ways that directly challenge higher ranking officers about the deficiencies in existing practices. A

stealthier way to work around the system was exemplified by police officers who ‘*hack the system*’ meaning that they sneak in their own solutions by discretely replacing official practices with their own ideas. They also invent their own ‘projects’ to respond to local forms of crime that are not being strategically addressed or prioritized ,as in the example of *project mole*. It appears that the gray zones are kept in check by internalized formal and informal codes of conduct that serve as a self-disciplinary ethic of autonomy.

The study demonstrates that the inherent gray zones of policing are filtered out or opposed by the rationality of the office, which resists ambiguity by continuously producing guidelines, restrictions, procedures etc. for police practices to promote the image of a police force that is responsible, transparent, and accountable. On the other hand, the need for responsive policing calls for a mobilization of the rationality of action and for specialization of the police force to concentrate and use experience and knowledge within focused areas of crime.

Our perspective is supported by our observation of temporary task forces, which are formally established by the political management of the police with the purpose of focusing responses to such challenges and take the form of privileged, creative spaces within the system. These spaces develop because the focused task performance synchronizes managerial and frontline interests to perform the job as effectively and creatively as possible within the limits of law. To expand the range of creative problem solving, task force managers arrange for close cross-disciplinary teamwork that breaks down traditional cultural barriers between professional groups and enriches the knowledge substrate from which they operate. The *heterotopic* and innovative potential of creative forms of collaboration tends to be countered by concerns such as the resources the task forces draw away from the police districts and the privileges granted to them,

which evokes a persistent rhetorical challenge from the police union in terms of the inherent inequality in creating an *A versus B police* (i.e. a corps d'élite). In other words, union demands for equal privileges for all of their members stifle constructive debates about the reasons that task forces become associated with an aura of creativity, prestige and positive professional identity among the police officers.

Local training units in the districts provide a qualifying space, i.e. development of courses and training concepts, for acquiring competencies that are crucial to prepare different groups of employees for the physical and experience-based aspects of policing. They also arrange cross-sectoral simulation exercises, for example, with the purpose of coordinating different actors in case of big events, catastrophes, accidents, etc. The role of local training units in providing an experimental environment that strengthens and updates staff competencies only appears to be appreciated by some police district managers, for such units are not generally distributed. Also, their inventions tend to stay local because there is no formal knowledge sharing network established between local and central instructors.

Finally, the police dog school functions as an intermediary 'street stage', a *real* heterotopia, where instructors and dog patrol officers regularly meet from across the country to participate in courses. In the course program, the management has intentionally arranged for the participants to have time to play and experiment with the gray zone ideas they bring with them from their daily work back at home.

These examples of formalized explorative places inform us that within the official order of the police, formalized units are being deliberately managed so as to create

informal, creative environments that shelter, support, and use the potential of gray zone creativity to enhance specialized performance.

These successful efforts should be seen in contrast to the traditional ways of organizing the police, which paradoxically counteract the strategic call for innovation and personal autonomy by dismantling personal autonomy as it is manifested in everyday creativity – or at least the kind of creativity that emerges from the gray zones as an inherent aspect of policing.

Given that gray zone creativity is the process by which police officers adjust rules and norms for policing to real situations and may be the source of actual inventions we may appreciate the complex role of the disciplinary apparatus within the police. Hierarchy, bureaucracy and other elements of the self-regulatory body of the police were invented for the purpose of ensuring responsible policing. At the same time, though, the police is expected to respond to new types and patterns of crime and other societal changes. The dilemma between responsible and responsive government constitutes an *autonomy complex* to which the police is (and should be) subjected in order not to exceed the limits of autonomy tolerable in a legal-democratic society.

Nonetheless, *real* creativity does happen on an everyday basis, guided by a rationale of the street that encourages frontline police officers to respond in improvisational and innovative ways to the situations they confront every day. As an institution, the police force has become adept at keeping this sort of everyday autonomy at a minimum.

To sound a critical note, capital-I Innovation (the dominant discourse) fails to address these complexities that surround the autonomy already inherent in policing, and it thereby fails to genuinely include the kind of lower case-I

innovation (everyday ideas and inventions that go beyond the categorical prescriptions of the dominant discourse) that emerge from the core services of the police, along with their great potential. Instead, innovation as a dominant managerial discourse tends to narrowly address politically *correct* innovation, i.e. innovation that is already ‘trendy’ in society in general or in sync with political demands and expectations. Police administrators also favor the “correct” approach to innovation because it ensures that the police mirror other more general tendencies in society and live up to the trust placed in them by the government and citizens of a democracy.

This means that gray zone creativity fails to be recognized for its core potential benefits. This lack of recognition may result in rank and file police officers applying unauthorized gray zone inventions without supervision, disguised as authorized/official solutions and below ‘the managerial radar’. Given the persistence of these kinds of gray zone practices, they pose a risk that is not limited to the non-transparency of this non-transparent aspect of policing and the resultant inequality of service. They also pose a risk for the growth of counter-cultural ‘*rotten apples*,’ and for the gray to turn too dark and potentially anti-democratic or corrupt.

In the final section we will put into perspective the implications of this study for research and practice.

## **Implications for research and practice**

*For future research* the study implies that in order to advance our understandings of the link between responsible and responsive government (in this case in the police) with respect to innovation, there is much to learn from exploring the *emic*

categories for creative practices and local vocabulary that are used by the people living/working in the cultural setting we study in.

Through such inquiries we gain insight about the specific moral, ethical and legal dilemmas involved with specific areas of government responsibilities in relation to responsive practices within their domain. This draws our attention to a crucial local sensitivities and concerns that reformist calls for innovation are too general and self-referential to take into their account. This supports Pollitt & Boukaert's (2000, p. 191) observation that 'as some of the most successful reform leaders in several countries have recognized, a crucial ingredient of a successful reform strategy is that it should create and sustain conditions in which small improvements - many of them unforeseen and unforeseeable - can flourish.'

Our future research engagements should also consider the different domains of rationales, interests and concerns (ethos) within a given governmental institution. To look and see beyond the dominant discourse of innovation enriches not only our understandings of how specific government institutions already relate themselves responsibly to creativity/innovation, but also of how variation in such relatedness potentially creates internal tensions that are crucial for auto-critical innovation in government.

Specifically in relation to the police, gray zone creativity has a direct link to the core services that the police provide, since this is where such creativity/invention arises from. It should therefore be noted that the recipients of police services (those who violate law) are not necessarily willing receivers of such services. The somewhat precarious relationship between police and their target groups should therefore include open internal dialogue in the police about the dilemmas and challenges frontline police officers experience and to what extent they experience

that the police system offers and supports the availability of proper solutions to them in their daily work.

This also calls for further investigations of what kind of the kind of potentials gray zone inventions, or lower case-i innovations, have for the police institution and society at large: how do they add to - or supplement - political/managerial and strategic innovation? What kinds of resource investments and organizational environments do they require apart from the heterotopic aspects we have explored in this study? How widespread is gray zone creativity, and how does innovation beyond its dominant discourse play out in other spheres of government?

The concept of gray zones and gray zone creativity in policing together with in-depth field work offer openings to future studies of the link between responsible and responsive government (police).

*For practice* the study of how innovation plays out *as* and *beyond* dominant discourse in government (police) illustrates how managerial interests, privileges and distance to frontline service ignore and exclude gray zone creativity that is not only a vital part of frontline core service but also implies complexity and responsibilities that have serious impacts on constitutional and ethical aspects of government practices.

Innovation that is spurred and informed by street-rationality - and therefore fundamentally differs from what woos to office-rationality - does not initially fit into binary administrative/legal logics such as 'is this a good or bad idea?' It is not necessarily something that should be put on a harsh trial by lawyers/ managers in infancy where it barely has a voice to defend itself. And – unsupported by middle-managers, it often does not stand a chance against the kind of power games that are played out between managers, departments and different professional

concerns. At least not in the formal chain-of-command system where top managers have the power to know best and middle managers have the power to select, but in both cases within their *own* sphere of reference/interest.

The phenomenon of gray zones and gray zone creativity in policing needs time, mutual managerial trust, support and qualification, i.e. the kind of sheltering creative spaces that we saw in chapter 9, to reveal its potential and scope.

However, this kind of local invention - when formally unsupported and centrally uncoordinated – is also problematic in that police practices become unaligned (see also Ashby et al. 2007), non-transparent and undocumented. In that sense, gray zone inventions that are applied but unauthorized are like hopeful asylum seekers; they are present, *really* here, living their lives while waiting for a chance to become official members of the community.

Also, the police union plays an important and unusually influential role in the Danish police; therefore, their somewhat conservative and narrow definitions of police professionalism tend to discourage their members from welcoming interdisciplinary collaboration (in particular in respect of academic competencies other than legal expertise). This means that in-house expert and technical competencies that are necessary for qualifying innovation are poorly acknowledged, identified, recruited and used. Rather than succumbing to conservative manifestations of power and lowest common denominator standards of police competencies, relevant stakeholders – including union representatives - may advantageously engage in ambitious dialogue about how core service innovation is best supported and substantially qualified through systematic access to and use of relevant internal and external knowledge and expertise.



Informed by history, we saw in chapter 1 how the Danish police was gradually being centralized to support and increase cross-national coordination and alignment of policing. At the time of writing, there is much debate in the organization about how to best distribute, allocate and coordinate central and local responsibilities. At issue is also how to reasonably delimit the autonomous space of the police districts/ local departments.

This study offers to inform this debate with a reminder that local innovation inevitably happens as it emerges from everyday police work. Whereas local autonomy poses problems of uncoordinated and unsystematic innovation, centralized coordination and development of innovation poses problems of distanced office/managerial rationales that do not necessarily take street-rationale and frontline usability into consideration. Therefore, central coordination could advantageously focus on special areas of core services and provide openings for frontline innovators' contributions on their own premises for usability. We have also seen the importance of formally supported horizontal knowledge networks for coordinating specialized areas of 'best practice' policing together with the important role of training to embody new frontline police practices.

Further, tensions and debates between street-rationales and office/managerial rationales are crucial for auto-critical dialogue across different domains and concerns in the police. In respect to innovation, such dialogue should be supported rather than muted since ignorance of opposing concerns may lead to mutual exclusion/silencing of the other and eventually non-transparency and 'under the radar' sporadic gray zone innovation.

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